

**SOCIAL POLICY IN ONTARIO - THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION**

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### ABSTRACT

The post-war period has witnessed considerable growth of voluntary associations in the social welfare field. Many of these groups have become powerful influences on the direction of social policy. In many jurisdictions the parents of mentally retarded children have emerged as one of the most influential interest groups in the social welfare sector.

The material in this study examines the thirty year history of the Ontario Parents' Movement for Retarded Children - its early formation, its influence strategies, its accommodations with government and its struggle with the choice between direct service delivery and advocacy. The evidence presented suggests that the advocacy position is disfunctional as an influence strategy because it runs counter to the main tenets of political culture in the province. Since access to the policy making process is based on shared attitudes and values, interest groups which adopt advocacy strategies will be denied access to the policy making sphere. Limitation of access will in turn limit influence.

Those seeking more detailed information about the research methodology for this thesis should contact the author, J. Kelly, 303 Gainsborough Rd., Toronto, M4L 3C8.

I, Jon E. Kelly, declare  
that this thesis has been  
composed by myself and that  
the work is my own.

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## CHAPTER I

### PROLOGUE

The post war period of the twentieth century has witnessed a veritable explosion of voluntary associations which have come together to lobby for policy change. Automobile owners have joined together in associations to put forward shared dissatisfaction with the quality of their vehicles. Patients rights groups have mounted campaigns to demand improved hospital and medical care. Homeowners have created residents associations to press for a host of improvements to their communities. The list of such groups seems to grow daily -their influence touching every sector of society.

Of particular interest to this thesis is the emergence and influence of voluntary organizations within the social welfare sector where we have witnessed a proliferation of coalitions, self-help groups, parents' movements, federations and action groups.

As later material in this thesis will show, social policy in the Province of Ontario prior to the 1960s was largely determined by a small cohort of professionals and government Ministers with little, if any, consultation with those affected by policy decisions. The more recent decades, on the other hand, present a dramatically different picture with the emergence of a plethora of strong voluntary organizations which developed power bases the politicians and professionals could not ignore.

This dissertation will examine in considerable detail the emergence of the Parents' Movement for Retarded Children as a major influence on policy affecting the mentally retarded. This organization is acknowledged as the driving force behind the massive reorientation of mental retardation services in Ontario between 1950 and 1980. That reorientation involved a dramatic shift away from what has been termed the institutional or medical model of care to a community services model which emphasizes the development of support services to enable mentally retarded adults and children to live in their own homes in their own communities. This shift

involved a de-emphasis of institutional care on the assumption that retarded people are not sick and therefore do not need the all encompassing level of care provided in institutional settings.

In 1950 there were no community support services for the retarded in Ontario. The only public service was the Provincial Hospital accommodating over 2,000 at Orillia, Ontario, 150 kilometers north of Toronto. By 1984, there was a wide range of a community services available in the Province representing a total annual provincial government expenditure of \$230 M. The vast bulk of that service was provided by the parents' organizations.

### The Central Research Thesis

While the examination of the evolving interaction between the Parents' Movement and the political administration in the development of the community service model is of considerable historical interest in itself, analysis in this thesis will highlight the role, or more properly, roles played by the parents' organization in their pursuit of policy changes.

Wolf Wolfensberger, a prolific writer and observer of voluntary organizations has developed a most articulate and persuasive position concerning the role of such associations. In his analysis of parent organizations he sees them growing in a relatively predictable way. The typical patterns of organizational growth include:

- o the early problem solving/mutual support group with charismatic leadership
- o the gradual shift from charismatic to bureaucratic leadership with concomitant formalization of the organization
- o considerable frustration with public services leading to the creation of their own service
- o expanding demands on public support and the acquisition of public funding

- o the professionalization of services and alienation of the parents
- o stagnation, goal displacement and identity crisis
- o the shift away from service provision into change agency, monitoring and quality control - the advocacy stance.<sup>1</sup>

Wolfensberger sees this shift from service provision to advocacy (the "third stage") as not only predictable but essential for the long term benefit of mentally retarded people. This belief in the desirability of the advocacy role is based on what Wolfensberger sees as major limitations of service delivery. His arguments can be summarized as follow:

- o the delivery of services converts organizational leadership into management thus deflecting the organizational goals away from the promotion of rights toward an interest in the maintenance and growth of the organizations themselves (goal displacement)
- o the provision of 'special' services is not culturally normative in that it creates service ghettos for the mentally retarded, (segregation)
- o the influx of public funding will co-opt the Movement and become "one of the major interests it has to protect", (co-optation).<sup>2</sup>

Wolfensberger defines an advocacy group as a group committed to independent voluntary action which undertakes "massive societal reorientation". It acts as a change agent and plays an independent watchdog function which monitors quality within the service system and lobbies for policy change.

Advocacy proponents believe the parents' organizations should divest themselves of the direct service responsibility in favour of strategies to change society's attitudes and acceptance of the mentally retarded into the mainstream and the promotion of their rights. The advocacy role is also oriented to monitoring services in order to preserve quality control.

Lined up on the other side of the issue are those who see generic social services or direct government provision as less sensitive and more bureaucratic. The proponents of service operation by the parents' organizations believe that they know their children best and that their organizations would not be a strong influence if they were not directly involved in services.

This group see the role of parent organizations as establishing a broad based service network and pressing government for public support for that network. Some of those who hold this view would look to the spin-off of these programs, once they are well established, to generic service providers. Others see their service role as a continuing one.

In recent years this struggle between the service provider view and the advocacy view within the Parents' Movement has been enacted in the Province of Ontario with often dramatic results.

The analysis of the 30 year struggle of the Parents' Movement in Ontario is designed to address the question of the role and strategies of voluntary organizations in their attempt to change social policy. This exploration, however, will introduce a somewhat broader debate than the service vs advocacy question. This broadening of approach is undertaken because of certain disquieting features of the Wolfensberger delivery/advocacy paradigm which seem to beg a shift in perspective.

One of these features is the strongly normative overtone to the advocacy arguments. There is certainly widespread evidence of the evolution of parent organizations through the early developmental stages which Wolfensberger outlines. The "third stage", however, - the advocacy stage - would seem to represent more of a strong hypothesis than an empirically demonstrated pattern of events. One wonders if there are not stable states along the delivery/advocacy continuum which might be adopted depending on particular circumstances of the organization and its milieu. There is a certain implied 'best' position in Wolfensberger's writing which seems to attract more commitment than his data support.

Wolfensberger's analysis is also limited by his choice of the service/advocacy paradigm itself. One wonders if decisions about organizational roles and strategies might benefit from analysis which goes beyond this rather introspective view of parents' organizations. Suppose, for example, one were to look at the parents organizations within a pressure group framework and ask what the optimum course of action might be to maximize policy influence. Perhaps the existence of services provides an useful lever of influence which would not be available to an exclusively advocacy oriented group.

One wonders, also, about the relationship between parent organizations and the political cultures in which they must function. Are there biases in political culture or in policy-making processes which favour certain types of influence strategies?

In fact, this study will examine a parents' organization in the context of a specific political culture, a style of policy-making and within a pressure group framework in order to see if such a shift in perspective might elicit an alternative to the course of action Wolfensberger proposes.

It is expected that the results of this analysis will be useful for many community groups as they struggle with their approach to organizational development and their influence strategies. Beyond these considerations, however, this study provides considerable insight into the inner workings of the political administration of the Province of Ontario. In a sense the Parents' Movement is, at one and the same time, both the subject of this analysis and the window through which we can observe the influences which set the course of social policy in this jurisdiction.

### **Information Generation and Analysis**

One astute political scientist has characterized policy studies as similar to espionage activities. There is, indeed, a certain truth to this assertion in that it is often exceedingly difficult to penetrate the machinations of the policy-making process. There are undoubtedly a number of reasons for this difficulty. The in-camera nature of the process, the reticence of senior bureaucrats and the unrecorded caveats and accommodations all contribute to the obscurity of the



process. Moreover, even those who are intimately involved with policy development will often have differing opinions about events and causes.

In undertaking this research the writer had certain advantages in terms of access to government files, documents and people. While I was not a party to most of the policy initiatives examined in this thesis my role as a policy advisor to the Government of Ontario provided a rich base of information and familiarity which would be unavailable to most researchers. Access notwithstanding, it is necessary to assemble, integrate and analyse considerable information in order to document any policy process.

In this thesis documentary evidence was obtained from Government files and archives, the files of the Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded (O.A.M.R.), the records of the proceedings of the Ontario legislature and the library material from the Toronto Star and the Globe and Mail newspapers.

Augmenting the documentary information interviews were conducted with twenty five people who were directly connected with O.A.M.R. or the provincial government and who were involved in varying capacities in the formulation of mental retardation policy.

The case studies in later chapters were built through extensive cross referencing of correspondence, minutes of meetings, file documents and the recollections of those directly involved.

### **The Nature And Structure Of The Study**

This examination of the relationship between the Parents' Movement and the policy making apparatus in Ontario is essentially a historical one. The historical approach has several major benefits the chief of which is the capability to examine the evolution of the major policy actors and their inter-relationships.

The Parents' Movement and the political administration shifted roles considerably in the past thirty years. From a historical perspective we can see the whole range of activities of the Movement as it related to government in its formative stages

and as a mature organization. We can also observe the service/advocacy conflicts and their impact on the organizational effectiveness of the Movement.

The historical perspective has additional advantages as well. It allows the investigator to describe events as they evolve rather than simply report outcomes. This is particularly useful in the analysis of Ontario's political culture. Finally, the historical approach enables the investigator to distinguish between the elements of the policy process which are lasting and those which change over time.

Before proceeding into the body of the dissertation, it may be useful to outline the manner in which the rest of the document is structured. The latter part of this first chapter presents an initial exploration of the literature on pressure groups and their relationship with policy makers. This exploration will include the findings of a number of writers who have examined pressure groups in the mental retardation sector.

Chapter II explores the political culture in the Province focusing on several historical developments which serve to crystalize the main values, attitudes and traditions which underly more current social policy. This chapter will also provide an introduction to the political administration in this province.

Chapter III focuses on the origins of the major interest group of the study - the Parents' Movement for Retarded Children. This chapter examines the germinal stages of the Movement - its start-up, its strategic approaches and its early successes.

The meat of the case studies is presented in Chapters IV and V. These chapters examine seven major initiatives in which the Parents' Movement promoted changes in Provincial policy for the mentally retarded. Chapter IV delves into the policies which were developed in the 1950s and 1960s the period during which the parents organized and established themselves as a major force.

Chapter V looks at the post-1970 era - a time in which government moved to bring the bulk of services to the mentally retarded out of the medical system into the social service sphere - a direction the parents strongly promoted.

While the separation of the material in chapters IV and V may reflect a certain arbitrariness on the part of the writer there is a certain natural flow to policy development which seems to correspond to the periods 1950-1970 and post 1970.

Chapter VI incorporates the conclusion of the study with some implications for other social policy initiatives and interest groups.

### **A Word About Terms And Titles**

There are several terms and titles used in the succeeding pages which could be confusing without adequate preparation of the reader. The most prominent of these problems is the multiple of descriptions of the group most commonly referred to as mentally retarded. Partially reflecting public misunderstanding and partially reflecting professional labels, mentally retarded people have had a variety of labels, including incurables, the feeble-minded, idiots, defectives, imbeciles, morons, retarded and most recently developmentally handicapped. The Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-minded (1904-1908) in the U.K. attempted some of the early classification of such definitions as follows:

"Idiot is taken here to mean a person so deeply defective in mind from birth or from early age, that he is unable to guard himself from common physical dangers, such as prevents us from leaving young children alone. Imbecile is taken to mean a person who is capable of guarding himself against such common physical dangers, but who is incapable by reason of mental defect existing from birth or from an early age of earning his own living. Feeble-minded is taken to mean a person who is capable of earning his own living under favourable circumstances, but is incapable from mental defect from birth or from an early age (a) of competing in equal terms with his normal fellows; or (b) of managing himself and his affairs with ordinary prudence. Defective applies to children only and is taken to mean children who are "defective" as defined in the Elementary Education (Defective and Epileptic Children) Act; 1899."<sup>3</sup>

Gradually, through the years these labels were converted to more scientifically measurable categories such as the Stanford Binet I.Q. levels. The term mentally retarded came into use in the 1930s to describe the global condition which included all of the earlier definitions.<sup>4</sup> In the 1970s the term developmental handicap came to be used to replace the retardation label.

The main commonality of all these terms was the presence of "mental impairment" identified either at birth or in the early years.<sup>5</sup> The focus on the mental development concept serves to distinguish this group from those who acquire a mental illness which is not a developmental disability. While the question of definitional precision is not of major importance to this paper there has been an attempt to use the labels appropriate to the era in each stage of the study.

Similarly, the names of major organizational entities have changed over time. The Parents' Movement for Retarded Children refers to the coming together of parents in the 1940s and the coordinated efforts to influence the direction of government policy. The formal organizational manifestation of the Parents' Movement was incorporated in 1953 as the Ontario Association for Retarded Children (O.A.R.C.). The name of that organization was changed in 1965 to the Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded (O.A.M.R.). O.A.R.C./O.A.M.R. is the Province-wide organization which speaks for the federated interests of the Parents' Movement and the local affiliates which are usually named after the municipality in which they are located. Thus, the Metro Toronto affiliate of O.A.M.R. is titled the Metro Toronto Association for the Mentally Retarded (M.T.A.M.R.). As of 1984, there are 120 local affiliates of the provincial association.

Governmental Departments also evolved over time, the Department of the Board of Health becoming the Department of Health and subsequently the Ministry of Health. The Department of Public Welfare (D.P.W.) went through similar transformations, becoming the Department of Social and Family Services (D.S.F.S.) in 1970, and later the Ministry of Community and Social Services (M.C.S.S.) in 1972.

As with the nomenclature relating to the diagnostic labels, the names used throughout this thesis mirror current usage of the eras examined.

For the purposes of this study, social policy means the complex of governmental decisions, assumptions, and provisions which serve as the framework for the delivery of public benefits to socially, physically and mentally disadvantaged people. This definition is selected not from an a priori theoretical base but, as

succeeding pages will demonstrate, a reflection of the actual operational usage of the term in the Province of Ontario.

Finally, the term political culture is used extensively in this document. This term has been employed in several pieces of literature with varying meanings.<sup>6</sup> In some instances it has been roughly analogous to political history.<sup>7</sup> In this paper this term refers to the values, attitudes and traditions of a society which form a loose normative framework underlying the political decision making process.

### The Literature

#### Pressure Group Politics

Almost eighty years ago, Arthur Bentley gave strong impetus to examination of the importance of interest groups in political life in his major work, which put forth the argument that the 'raw material' of political science cannot be found in the

"law... it cannot be found in the proceedings of constitutional conventions, nor the arguments and discussions surrounding them. Hints and helps are there, but only minute fragments of the raw material.

The raw material can only be found in the actual performance of legislating, administering, adjudicating activities of the nation and the streams and currents of activity that gather among the people and the rush into these spheres."<sup>8</sup>

Bentley went on to put the argument that ideas and feelings of society can only be manifested through group activities and have no reality except in the activity of these interests.<sup>9</sup>

These ideas were quite unique at the time (1908) and their uniqueness may explain the reason that the Process of Government was so obscure for many years after it was written. In the years which followed publication of Bentley's views other issues occupied the political analysts, and references to interest groups are somewhat isolated. The real boom in interest in pressure group politics came in the 1950s, when there was a considerable growth in the investigation of the "legislating-administering-adjudicating" activities of governments and the relationship between governments and pressure groups.

As attention to interest groups began to resurface S.E. Finer, in his small book Anonymous Empires presented an early attempt to draw attention to the influences of small organized lobbies on policy making and to produce a typology for these groups.<sup>10</sup> About that time writers like C. Wright-Mills, Hunter and others, mostly in the United States, began to produce studies purporting to identify a "power elite" which works behind the political scenes to manage the affairs of society.<sup>11</sup> This ruling class theory found its theoretical roots in such writers as Pareto and Robert Michels. The advent of the elitist interpretations of political life sparked a new round of interest and research into political theory and generated an alternative thesis whose proponents came to be known as the pluralists.

Perhaps the most influential leader in the blossoming of the pluralist theories was David Truman. Noting the effects of massive growth of administration in the 1950s, Truman began to look at the growth of lobbies in conjunction with the increased administrative discretion in Western governments.

"Not so widely appreciated", he writes, "is the fact that along with these changes (administrative changes) has come an inevitable increase in the play of interest through the executive activity in legislative and discretionary administration. This accretion of executive functions is in large measure due to the gravitation of interest groups toward the government...With rare exception, the assertion of interest claims upon and through the institutions of governments results in the expansion of administrative activities."<sup>12</sup>

Here, Truman raises two points which he sees as becoming a very important part of political life and an important new feature of public administration. The first of these is the expansion of government activity at the bureaucratic level. The second, and perhaps most important, is the diversion of interest groups away from individual members of parliament and the growing connections between interest group leaders and bureaucrats.

The Truman notation about the growth of lobby interest in the United States to the administrative levels and the concomitant expansion of the administrative functions was picked up by several writers, perhaps most effectively by Samuel Beer.<sup>13</sup>



Beer traces the decline of "interested" M.P.s in favour of the "private bureaucrat" referring to the tendency for pressure groups, who would in earlier times have tried to get a sympathizer elected, to shift their emphasis to creating their own bureaucracy. Beer sees this shift as a manifestation of "quasi-corporatism". The main substance of this system is continual, day to day, contacts between public bureaucrats and private bureaucrats.<sup>14</sup>

In his examination of the relationships between the British Medical Association and the British government in the 1940s, Eckstein notes the way interest groups tend to adjust their structures, "...to the distribution of effective power within the government apparatus. . ." He also notes the degree to which government attitudes and structures determine the form of pressure group politics and policies.<sup>15</sup> He underlines the increasing bureaucratization of the pressure groups themselves and suggests that "only bureaucratic structure is appropriate to the kinds of negotiations groups nowadays must carry on to realize their interests."<sup>16</sup>

### **The Notion of Symbiosis**

Beyond the structural arrangements Eckstein and several other writers have observed an intriguing pattern of interaction which develops between interest group leaders and senior bureaucrats. These writers have observed that this relationship is based on a common ground/mutual support dynamic through which policy accommodations are negotiated.<sup>17</sup> It is important to dwell briefly on this relationship which Presthus has, quite usefully, labelled "symbiotic".<sup>18</sup>

In the symbiotic model pressure group leaders and political administrators become interdependent. They support each other and derive mutual benefits from negotiation, compromise and policy development.<sup>19</sup> Drawing on evidence presented by Eckstein, Presthus and other political scientists we can assemble a conceptual framework for the symbiotic relationship.

Let us look, first of all, at the motivational base for such a relationship. Extrapolating from the evidence it is possible to identify three key features which bring the participants together. The first of these is a common interest in a specific policy issue or sector.

Clearly, however, simple common interest will not be sufficient to motivate continued contact or negotiation. Both the interest group and the political administrators must derive some benefit from the process. In fact, the symbiotic relationship can convey two types of benefits - tangible and symbolic. In terms of tangible benefits the interest group can aggregate and manage the demands of its constituency. It can hold its members together and support government initiatives. It can channel complaint, negotiate, compromise, and sell the compromise to its constituency. This exchange has obvious political advantages for the government. In exchange the government can provide financial resources for the policy direction the interest group is promoting.<sup>20</sup>

In terms of symbolic benefits the participants offer each other legitimacy. The interest group leaders are legitimized as the representatives of their constituency and the government is legitimized politically.<sup>21</sup>

In addition to common interest and mutual benefits there is considerable evidence, that there is a much broader base for such intersector activity - i.e. shared values and attitudes.<sup>22</sup> Attempting to understand the reasons for this shared value aspect of the symbiotic relationship Beer points to the merging of public/private effort during the war which brought many private citizens into quasi-governmental positions. After the war ended, these ties were structured into intersector ties. Presthus, notes the same phenomenon in the Canadian setting.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, evidence of such an intersector exchange will be seen in the case material examined in this study.

Lester Milbrath has examined the makeup of interest group leaders finding that these leaders are by and large middle to upper middle class people with strong educational backgrounds. He also found a strong correlation between educational achievement and expectations about political efficacy.<sup>24</sup> Other writers such as Albee and Farber and Robert Segal have identified similar characteristics in the socio-economic base of the Parents' Movements in the mental retardation and mental health sectors.<sup>25</sup>

These writers and others have found that one factor which the interest group leaders and political administrators have in common is a "general agreement on the



ground rules to govern conflicts of power and to ensure a minimum of violence."<sup>26</sup> These leaders, Porter argues, "uphold this normative order in part because their power depends upon it - and men do not like to strike at the underpinnings of their own power. . . ."<sup>27</sup>

When interest group leaders and political administrations come together, then, much more is at stake than their common interest. They are also interested in the mutually beneficial exchanges of access, approval and resource allocation and mutual support for commonly held values and attitudes.

### **The Process and Effects of Symbiotic Interaction**

The closer the intersector relationship gets to the purer form of negotiations the more the participants are required to have the appropriate attitudes toward each other and the process itself.<sup>28</sup>

Eckstein makes the useful distinction focusing on two types of interaction which may occur in the intersector environment. He sees a consultative process in which the government seeks the ideas of the interest groups but does not require their approval to proceed with policy changes and the far more important linkage where the government needs the support of the private actors and negotiates with the group for the approval. He is primarily concerned with the second type of model. "Negotiations", Eckstein argues, "demand the concentration of authority on both sides, as well as the vesting of considerable discretionary power in the negotiators."<sup>29</sup> Truman noted this tendency toward concentration of authority in a small group given the difficulty for the leaders to communicate with the mass membership.<sup>30</sup> As Luttberg and Zeigler point out this communication gap "is not necessarily dysfunctional". Luttberg and Zeigler expand on this separation of leaders from membership likening the role of the leaders to that of elected representatives. Leaders, they argue "accept the maxim that they should do what the followers want, but they are also jealous of their autonomy to do what they think best." This tends to push the leaders into the positions where they attempt to satisfy the values and expectations of the membership - values and expectations which are quite often latent.<sup>31</sup>

This type of intersector relationship requires that the interest group invest considerable autonomy and in many cases secrecy in their representatives and be willing to accept compromise.

In recent years, several Canadian political scientists have investigated the relationships between interest groups and political administrators in the Canadian environment, predominantly the Federal setting, and added significantly to our depth of understanding of the way in which these processes work in Canada.

Robert Presthus, after a major study of the Canadian political setting, has provided several useful glimpses of the realities of that setting. While the corporatist hypotheses of Presthus are subject to debate, he does raise several characteristics of the pressure group environment which are well worth noting.

Presthus draws attention to the fact that interest groups in Canada and especially in Ontario tend to spend a great deal of time in interaction with bureaucrats. Moreover, he found a disinclination among most groups to going to the press with their issues or to approach Opposition M.P.s. The system bias, then, works toward the enhancement of internal accommodations between interest group elites and political administrators. Interest groups avoid political affiliation while indicating that they are not overly concerned with the party in power.<sup>32</sup>

Another Canadian writer, David Kwavnick, has taken the symbiosis discussions one step further by putting forward the argument "that interest group leaders may feel that it is more important to obtain recognition of the group than to win a concession on a specific issue, since recognition acknowledges the group's right to have its views considered by government."<sup>33</sup> This evidence adds strong reinforcement to the administrative symbiosis idea highlighting situations in which the private sector actors will postpone or water down the goals of the organization in the short term at least for the sake of stronger participation in the policy making process.

Echoing the Kwavnick idea, Pross also suggests that "effective interaction . . . . depends on the cultivation of access to public decision makers . . . . and a willingness to accept short term defeats . . . . in the interest of continuing favourable relations . . . ." <sup>34</sup>

Both A. Paul Pross and Robert Presthus have noted the tendency of the symbiotic process to exclude certain types of actors from participation. Pross writes, "In fact, the system presents great impediments to those who want to raise new issues and who lack the knowledge or power to command access."<sup>35</sup> One of the types of groups excluded are the advocacy type groups.

"The Canadian policy system . . . tends to favour elite groups, making functional accommodative consensus seeking techniques . . . . rather than the conflict oriented techniques."<sup>36</sup>

Helen Jones Dawson, another Canadian writer, makes a strong point about the legitimacy of a group in the relationship with government when she notes

"a group which cannot prove its sole right to speak for its clientele whether because of internal dissent or the existence of a rival, . . . often encounters a lively time when appearing before a committee, for there are usually members present who have some interest in undermining their credibility."<sup>37</sup>

Reinforcing this argument Hoffman has argued that pressure groups typically prefer low profile activities which lessen the risk of public confrontation noting the potential danger that open arguments will spawn "counter groups".<sup>38</sup>

The interest groups Dawson examined were also unlikely to use the Opposition in their lobby, to resort to letter writing by the membership threatening politicians with the use of the franchise or to pressure back benchers or Provincial Secretaries. She also notes an obsession with the "desirability of remaining aloof from any hint of partisan politics."<sup>39</sup>

Dawson brings out another highly important dimension to the action of pressure group leaders in the intersector forum noting,

"that many demands are initiated by these actors and sold to the membership and the general public. In 'selling' those demands, the interest group leaders create the climate of opinion which legitimates the action of government should it decide to meet the demands."<sup>40</sup>

Pross also underlines the inflationary effect of the interaction between the sectors arguing that

"strong governments give rise to strong interest groups which can realistically make demands whose satisfaction would necessitate an expansion of the role of the government upon which the demands were made."<sup>41</sup>

Generalizing somewhat from the contributions of these writers regarding the making of policy, we might expect that:

- o Interest groups are central participants in the creation of policies,
- o Interest groups will take a strong interest in interaction with senior civil servants and ministers,
- o Interest groups are not likely to opt for political affiliation with a single political party, but rather avoid party politics altogether,
- o Interest group leadership will likely be relatively advantaged in a socio-economic sense,
- o Since the leadership is advantaged they will share many of the interests and values of the public sector actors and will choose accommodative strategies rather than confrontational ones,
- o Interest group leaders and the political administrators may form an overarching "symbiotic" relationship based on common interest in a specific policy sector, mutual benefits, as well as an interest in maintenance of commonly held values and beliefs,
- o The more influential the interest group becomes, the more the leaders may become semi-autonomous, using their membership as a constituency,
- o Interest group leaders may trade off specific goals for the longer term benefits of continued access and participation,
- o Interest group leaders are likely to have to sell their accommodations to their membership,

- o The process of accommodation will require the interest group to compromise its goals.

From even this preliminary review of the pressure group literature we can see a number of relevant pieces of information with which to examine the advocacy stance Wolfensberger proposes. The literature would reinforce Wolfensberger view that goal displacement will take place in the lobbying process. In fact, the more successful the group is in gaining access to the policy-makers the more risk there will be of goal displacement.

Yet this presents a problem in that the research evidence would suggest that direct participation is a highly valuable means of influence. There would seem, then, to be a kind of 'Hobson's choice' scenario here. Participate, accommodate and influence or remain pure, distinct and ineffectual.

The literature suggests a pervasive bias on the part of most interest group actors toward accommodation as opposed to a confrontational approach. Yet the advocacy strategy is confrontation oriented. This would suggest that one might expect an advocacy stance to undermine the participation of influential members, to severely limit linkages with policy makers and to lead to the development of splinter groups or counter groups.

While other contraindications might be cited from the literature, it is clear that the advocacy group would have a potentially difficult time in establishing itself as an influence in the policy making process. Let us proceed, however, to examine the political cultural environment and the actual case studies leaving further pursuit of this issue to later discussion.

### **The Parents' Movement In The Pressure Group Typologies**

It is highly important to observe that the characteristics presented here are not intended to apply to every type of interest pressure group. It may be useful, therefore, to identify the main features of the pressure groups discussed in the paper.

Pressure groups have been categorized in the literature in various typologies reflecting the interests of different writers. Generally the typologies are focused on the goals, organizational structure, sectoral interests or membership characteristics of the groups. Pross and Selznick have put forward typologies based on organizational structures which highlight a continuum between issue-oriented groups and institutional groups.<sup>42</sup> Issue oriented groups come together around single issues or events. They are, therefore, short-lived and non-bureaucratic. The institutional groups at the other end of the spectrum have multiple goals and a longer lifespan. Institutional groups tend to become bureaucratized and have organizational imperatives which cause a certain goal displacement. While the major pressure group in this study went through several organizational changes it lies undoubtedly toward the institutional end of the spectrum. It has a continuing membership and an organizational bureaucracy which is not focused on one issue but which sees itself as active across the spectrum of mental retardation issues.

Another feature of this group is its voluntary nature. Whether it represented parents, their agencies, the mentally retarded themselves or other interests the Parents' Movement is at base a voluntary organization in which participation is not compulsory as it would be, for example, in labour unions, law societies, medical associations and so forth. The motivational base of voluntary organizations is shared interests and goals rather than coercion.

In addition to the organizational characteristics the pressure group examined in this study has another significant feature which serves to further locate it in a typological framework. This group's activities are confined to the social welfare sector. Since this is the case, the results of the study will be more directly applicable to that sector. Chapter II will highlight some of the political, cultural features of that sector in the Province of Ontario.



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## CHAPTER II

### THE ROOTS OF ONTARIO SOCIAL POLICY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

While the major focus of this study relates to more contemporary issues and events, some understanding of the evolution of Ontario's social policy and its political culture will aid considerably in the appreciation of recent developments. This Chapter explores patterns and trends which were imbedded in social policy and the mental retardation sector and which lay a foundation for an understanding of more recent developments. It is intended to be explanatory rather than a detailed social history. The chapter will highlight selected events which are particularly noteworthy and instructive as a foundation for the later chapters.

#### Mental Retardation Pre-history

References to mental retardation reach as far back as Plato's Republic and the Biblical scholars.<sup>1</sup> The first major documented contribution to their identification and treatment was the work of the French medical doctor who achieved some success in socializing a boy who had spent most of his early years in the wilderness of southern France.<sup>2</sup> While success was only partial, reports of Itard's work seem to have sparked interest in a small number of dedicated men, who became reasonably successful proselytizers communicating their enthusiasm in a relatively short period on a wide scale.<sup>3</sup>

A few years after Itard's success a Swiss doctor named Johan Jacob Gugenbuhl established a small school for the cure of cretins at Abendberg near Interlaken in Switzerland. Doctor Gugenbuhl claimed overnight success in the cure of cretinism and thereby won considerable fame throughout Europe for his self proclaimed achievements. Unfortunately, this man had what was termed a messianic vision which seems to have outstripped his clinical achievement. Gugenbuhl's fame turned to notoriety when Swiss government investigators revealed a few years later that the doctor had accomplished somewhat less than he had claimed. After several years of operation the Gugenbuhl institution was closed down by the authorities.<sup>4</sup>

About the same time (circa 1837) a protege of Itard, Edouard Oresimus Sequin began to work with an idiot boy, who, after 18 months showed remarkable improvements bringing Sequin some qualified success. Sequin subsequently established a school for idiots and with continuing success established two more centres shortly thereafter in France. By the mid-1840s there were small experimental institutions for the treatment of the retarded appearing in many parts of Europe.<sup>5</sup>

Beyond the enthusiasm of these individuals the early growth of institutional services for the retarded appears to have been partially a matter of fortuitous timing. The medical profession was seen to be making great strides in 'curing' the insane, i.e., lunatics, during this period. The mentally retarded, i.e., idiots, imbeciles and cretins seem to have benefitted from a secondary interest. Of course, the distinction among these groups was very blurred. Another reason for the expansion of services to the retarded between 1830 and 1870 was the growing public concern about the proliferation these marginal groups.<sup>6</sup>

After 1848 Sequin emigrated to the United States and stimulated the development of several institutions in the 1850s and 1860s in that country. Sequin was also the founder and first president of the Association of Medical Officers of America Instituted for the Feeble-minded.

Another American pioneer in this field was Samuel Grindly Howe who strongly advocated government interest in the mentally deficient as well as the deaf and blind. Howe persuaded the Massachusetts Legislature to establish a school for the education of idiots in south Boston in 1848. By 1887 the school was located in Waltham, Massachusetts where it became a showpiece of progressive treatment for the mentally defective. The school was visited by politicians and professionals from disparate parts of North America including several of those involved in the later development of mental retardation services in the Province of Ontario. The impetus which began in Massachusetts gradually spread to other American states. "By the 1880s there were institutions in New York, Minnesota, Iowa, Indiana, California, Michigan, Maryland and Nebraska".<sup>7</sup>

### The First Asylum in Canada

The first lunatic asylum in Canada was established in 1841. After the opening this institution became very quickly clogged with "incurables" (the mentally retarded) who were an embarrassment to the medical profession because of their failure to respond to the newer treatments of the day.<sup>8</sup>

A disappointed medical profession who operated the asylum made strong representations to the government promoting the establishment of a classification system which would differentiate among patients on the basis of curability.<sup>9</sup> This classification problem rose because of the tremendous variety of persons who were referred to the asylum. In fact the asylum held the mentally deficient, alcoholics, epileptics, and other groups who were thought to be hampering the treatment of legitimate lunatics.<sup>10</sup>

### Local Charities and Municipal Services

Though there were many local Charities in Canada by the 1840s, there was no public provision for the care or treatment of the mentally retarded or anyone else. In pre-confederation Canada, the first municipal responsibilities were the gaols. Local gaols were filled with every manner of indigent and aged, the destitute, the sick, the feeble minded and so forth. Municipal government, still in its infancy in 1840s had very limited local administrative experience.<sup>11</sup> It was not until 1849 that local citizenry in Upper and Lower Canada were afforded more of a role in local affairs. In that year the Union government passed the Municipal Corporations Act which provided a local base of authority which for the first time went beyond the establishment of local gaols. In fact, after 1848 local counties were set up and given responsibilities for gaols, houses of industry and correction. Towns were also made responsible for regulating houses of refuge, alms houses and poor relief.<sup>12</sup> Local governments were slow to move on the provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act leaving the Provincial Asylum for Lunatics as the only public residential service for the mentally retarded until well after 1950.

As the local gaols and houses of refuge were developed, they became overwhelmed with a variety of people including indigents, the poor, the sick and the aged.

Those who have examined this period in some detail have presented several explanations of this absence of municipal development. Some have noted that municipal government was still in its infancy at this time as a result of decades of paternalism and neglect by colonial powers.<sup>13</sup> Goffman notes the roots of Ontario society in an agrarian base which values independence and hard work. Early inhabitants had literally hacked their existence out of vast forests and were not sympathetic to public services. Goffman also suggests that public welfare was essentially in opposition to the protestant work ethic and the social institutions of the Catholic church.<sup>14</sup> Armitage and Splane, also students of this era, have come to similar conclusions about the "hostile ideological" setting.<sup>15</sup> Splane refers, somewhat generously, to the "practical humanitarianism" of the time based on the belief that hard work would be rewarded and that society must be hard on its weaklings or it would foster cancerous and destructive social ills. (One gets the feeling that there is much more stress on "practical" than "humanitarian").<sup>16</sup>

After examining the roots of pension policy for the aged, Bryden expresses his view of early Ontario experience this way.

"The underlying attitude continued to prevail that only a very few were genuinely incapable of providing for themselves, and the belief in the primacy of family responsibility had, if anything, been strengthened by the pioneer experience. Institutions, it was argued, would be magnets for the slothful, attracting them even from overseas. Relief for the few who needed it would be best dispensed at the township or village level, for who knew better than neighbours who the slackers were."<sup>17</sup>

It is important to note here, as Simmons has, that the presence of two levels of government authority i.e., the senior government and the municipal governments providing services to ill-defined target groups creates an almost overpowering inclination on the part of the local municipalities to shift their burdens to the fully financed asylum.<sup>18</sup> More importantly perhaps, one can see, even in rudimentary social policy in the Province of Canada,<sup>19</sup> a model of intergovernmental/interjurisdictional issues which are likely to cause ongoing controversy and frictions.

Another readily identifiable theme even in the early stages of social policy in Ontario was the tendency of professionals to provide more for those who showed some potential for 'curability' as opposed to those who 'clogged' the system.

### Early Developments in Social Administration

The first attempts to rationalize the mix of uncoordinated activity really began to develop in 1857 when the Province of Canada decided to appoint a five man board to inspect prisons and asylums. The Prisons Inspection Act of that year also provided for the improvement of local gaols. Though this legislation was not implemented immediately, by 1859 a Board of Inspectors of Prisons, Asylums and Public Charities was in place. The Provincial Lunatic Asylum was brought under the jurisdiction of this Board.<sup>20</sup>

The appointment of the Board represents a significant milestone in the growth of public administration in Canada since it was the first public sector administrative body in the social welfare area. The inspectors were influential men who took their responsibilities seriously and were interested in policy and principles as well as administration.<sup>21</sup>

In its first report in 1860, the Board found 104 idiots among the 426 patients in the Provincial Lunatic Asylum. The report found the asylums (one in Toronto and a new one at Beauport, Quebec), to be discriminating against the feeble-minded in favour of idiots. This discrimination was based on the above noted belief of the medical profession that the mentally ill could be treated whereas the mentally retarded were incurable. While the board opposed ejecting the retarded from the asylums it did see the logic in separating the incurables from the lunatics and the creation of classes of asylums.

At the end of the Union period Canada had a rudimentary system of local and Provincial governments and had begun to develop social welfare system primarily based in a hodgepodge of charitable efforts, local municipal "houses of industry" and Provincial asylums.<sup>22</sup> The economy at this time was agriculturally based and in the years prior to Confederation (1867) was experiencing a boom.<sup>23</sup>

### The Confederation Period

The legislative base of Canadian Confederation was the British North America Act of 1867. The BNA Act gave the Provinces all responsibilities relating to health,



education and welfare.<sup>24</sup> The Act, however, made the Provinces creatures of the Federal Government by giving Ottawa an overriding authority to disallow Provincial legislation and to raise money through taxation.<sup>25</sup>

One of the first legislative acts of the Province of Ontario was to ratify the provisions of the BNA Act regarding Provincial responsibilities including those in the social policy sector.<sup>26</sup> The Provincial government under Sir John Sandfield MacDonald, early in 1868, passed legislation assuring the continuation of the Inspectorate of Prisons, Asylums and Public Charities. The form of the board, however, was reduced from a five men to one inspector - J. W. Langmuir.<sup>27</sup>

Langmuir was a full time paid civil servant who assumed an active stance in developing social welfare structures and services both during his tenure as Inspector and afterwards. Because of political support, financial prosperity and the continuing assumption of the treatability of the insane, Langmuir was able to expand the Office of Inspector hiring an assistant Inspector and some support staff.<sup>28</sup>

### **The Charity Aid Act - A Model for Public/Voluntary Partnership**

Langmuir began in the early 1870s to bring some rationalization to the haphazard public support for private charities. Private charities which predated all governmental activities in the social welfare sphere had continued their activities largely because of the virtually total inadequacy of the public system. The fruit of Langmuir's efforts was the Charity Aid Act of 1874 providing public funding for hospitals, refuges, orphanages and homes for unwed mothers. This legislation introduced the provisions upon which public support for charitable institutions were based. It set a tone and embodied key features which have been incorporated in public sector/private sector relationships.

This legislation with its intricate formula<sup>29</sup> introduces several principles in the social welfare field which were heretofore unstated. The most significant of these is a strong inclination toward the voluntary delivery of social services. Typically, this means that government, rather than provide a service itself, will underwrite the costs of provision of the service and leave the delivery to non-profit

corporations.<sup>30</sup> The provincial contribution is usually less than 100% leaving the charity with the burden of raising part of its own operating costs.<sup>31</sup>

In spite of its complexity the legislation was in effect promotional and sponsored a great growth of the institutional welfare system. The Charity Aid Act of 1874 complimented the Municipal Corporations Act (1848) which established Provincial support for the development of goals and Houses for the transient poor.<sup>32</sup> These two pieces of legislation had the effect of providing care, albeit, unintentionally, for many mentally defective and feeble-minded persons.

During the late 1860s and 1870s both the inspector J. W. Langmuir and the Director of a lunatic asylum Dr Workman, pressed for more facilities for the insane and separate facilities for the "incurables".<sup>33</sup> The first institution exclusively for these people, the Provincial Asylum for Idiots, and Feeble-minded, was opened in Orillia, Ontario in 1876.

### **The Emergence of Urban Ontario**

The economic boom in Ontario ended in 1873 partially because of the exhaustion of the agricultural expansion in the Province and partially of Federal initiatives.<sup>34</sup> This period also witnessed the beginning of urbanization with the organization of unions and other urban groups which began to make stronger demands on government for changes to mitigate the effects of economic decline.<sup>35</sup> In the social policy area, the 1890s, saw the growth of a wide range of rudimentary welfare legislation including an Act Respecting the Maintenance of Wives of Deserting Husbands, the Municipal Homes for the Aged Act, the Houses of Refugees for Females Act, the Children's Protection Act, and legislation giving workmen the right to sue their employers for compensation in event of industrial injury caused by neglect.<sup>36</sup>

### **Saving Youth From Sin - The Children's Protection Act**

It is instructive to examine briefly a particular piece of legislation which was prominent in public administration in the 1890s. The Children's Protection Act of 1893 can be used to highlight some of the developments of political administration up to this time.



Before 1893, child protection was left to the private charities which were only inspected by the government if they were supported by public monies. The major services provided by these charities concentrated on "industrial schools" which were committed to the "protection and reclamation of destitute youth". The documents of this period mirror a clear and consistent overtone of 'saving children from the path of evil' and the moral duty of the Christian to undertake charitable works.<sup>37</sup>

The apparent lack of Provincial concern about the protection of children surfaced in 1890 as a major complaint. A concerted campaign was waged by a small group of activists who were concerned about the welfare of homeless and neglected children. J. J. Kelso and his small group gained considerable press and public sympathy with their arguments that animals were afforded greater protection under the law than Ontario's children. Kelso received a sympathetic hearing from Langmuir, (then retired) and the politicians of the day. Kelso and Langmuir collaborated to create the Children's Protection Act (1893) and the introduction of local committees which were made responsible for child protection.<sup>38</sup>

The Act dealt with cruelty, neglect, shelters, the creation of Children's Visiting Committees and juvenile offenders. The committees were composed of local citizens who would identify homeless and neglected youth and attempt to connect them with local charities and industrial schools as well as supervise their accommodation and behaviour. It provided for a Provincial Superintendent who was a paid official. All of the local activities were mandated but purely voluntary. J. J. Kelso became the first Superintendent of Children's Protection.

The introduction of the children's protection legislation incorporated the earlier attention to the moral duty of christians to instill in children the motivation to lead an upright life. Kelso himself referred to the legislation as "saving children" from the path of delinquency. In fact, much of the thinking behind the act was based on growing concern about the apparent rise in juvenile criminality.<sup>39</sup>

The Children's Protection Act and the events surrounding it are instructive from several points of view.

Firstly, the Children's Protection Act served to reinforce the idea of government support for existing charitable activities and stimulating local 'good works'. In this case, the local activity was entirely voluntary. This legislation also mirrors again the ambivalence of society about the poor unfortunates. On the one hand, children were seen as unprotected and innocent. On the other hand, neglect could lead to juvenile criminality and anti-social behaviours. Benevolence complemented social defence.

### **The State of Social Welfare circa 1900**

In Ontario, the asylums for the insane and idiots increased their capacity by 1200 in the last decade in the 19th century.<sup>40</sup> Though attempts continued to be made to establish separate accommodation for criminals, deaf and dumb, epileptics and other groups every report of the Inspector of Prisons, Asylums, and Public Charities chronicled the indiscriminate overcrowding of the institutions.<sup>41</sup>

In summary, then, the last quarter of the 19th century witnessed a significant expansion in the social welfare field both in terms of institutional services and the public administrative structures. At the local level the newly incorporated municipalities were floundering with their burgeoning populations and growing social turmoil. These phenomena generated widespread demand for improved care of the disadvantaged.

During this period four substantial features of early social policy have been imbedded in Ontario's psyche;

1. an intricate pattern of intergovernmental issues which complicate social welfare policy,
2. a strong bias toward the charitable delivery of social services supported by government, and
3. deepseated ambivalence in the public mind about "marginal" groups incorporating both charitable duty toward the "poor unfortunates" and fear of social denigration and malingering.

4. a tendency of government to invest public resources in the "curable" - those who could benefit from treatment and contribute to society.

### The Era of the Menace of Mental Deficiency

The last quarter of the 19th century saw a significant shift in public opinion relating to the mentally ill, idiots and feeble-minded. Certainly, there was a disillusionment after the early optimism about the curability of the insane. In a time of economic decline societies in many parts of the world began to feel threatened by peripheral groups like the retarded and the insane. The presumed association of idiocy, pauperism, insanity and crime gained popular acceptance which lasted into the 20th century.<sup>42</sup> The Eugenics movement, though it proceeded from a quasi-scientific base which was found inadequate, combined with worsening economic times to pave the way to a more fearful, protective attitude.<sup>43</sup> Gone were the thoughts of fine buildings and beautiful settings which had earlier guided institutional construction. The era of the "poor unfortunates" was over by 1900 replaced by an era of fear and regression even in professional circles.<sup>44</sup>

Public concern and identification of the mentally retarded grew in the 1900s leaving the government uncertain about what to do. The concern expressed by the public clearly reflects a more fearful attitude at this time - an attitude based on fear of the proliferation of the feeble-minded.<sup>45</sup> In its response to this growing public concern the provincial government appointed a commission to investigate the care of the feeble-minded in Ontario. The Commissioner, Dr. Helen MacMurchie made her first report in 1906.<sup>46</sup>

### The Voice of Righteousness - Helen MacMurchie

MacMurchie attempted a census of all the feeble-minded through existing social welfare agencies such as prisons, reformatories and refuges. She found 1,400.<sup>47</sup>

The MacMurchie reports mirror attitudinal changes in society making frequent references to the control of the feeble minded for the "preservation of the Canadian stock".<sup>48</sup> In her sixth report she goes so far as to suggest that if permanent care was provided for all feeble minded women for a generation - even

30 years -there would be such a drop in the numbers of the mentally deficient that the problem would practically disappear.<sup>49</sup> She was supported in this recommendation by a large lobby group seeking the removal of all mental defectives of child bearing age. The idea of removing feeble-minded women was seen not only as the protection for society but also a protection for the women of low intellect who would be kept away from the seductions of unscrupulous men.<sup>50</sup> The proponents of this direction held that institution should be clean and comfortable but secure<sup>51</sup> - a benevolent colony.

MacMurchie's ideas were not restricted to segregation, however. She felt that some feeble-minded could be trained in special classes as England, Scotland and New Zealand had already done. She felt that the introduction of special classes for children could minimize the effects of feeble-mindedness. Her reports implanted in the legislative and social work milieu the newer view of the role of the state responsibility for the feeble minded based on preventative education.<sup>52</sup>

From the Sessional Papers and the literature about Helen MacMurchie one gets the clear impression of a woman who was on a crusade. Dr. MacMurchie had, at one time, been a newspaper reporter and used those journalistic talents to cajole and sometimes vilify the government of the day. Simmons records her paragraph headings in her sixth report as follows: "Public Opinion Urgent; What Delayed This Report; Unfit for Publication; Ominous for Ontario; What has Happened; Supreme Folly; A Poor Policy for Ontario; and, the Price of Delay."<sup>53</sup> This 'yellow journalism' combined with Dr. MacMurchie's moral crusade must have been an enormous embarrassment to the government.

### Service Expansion after 1900

Over the first decade of the 20th century there was a growth in the institutional system and a continued differentiation of custodial care. In his 1906 report Edward M. Rogers the Inspector of Prisons and Public Charities, notes the improvement in staff training and professionalization in the asylums especially in the areas of dietary management, the training of matrons and nutritionists.<sup>54</sup> By 1911 the Hospital for the Feeble-minded and Idiots accommodated 786 people and had a waiting list of 232.<sup>55</sup> The feeble-minded continued, however, to clog local gaols, Houses of Refugees and orphanages.<sup>56</sup>

The child protection system was growing steadily in spite of a very restricted budget. The continual presence of the feeble-minded brought expressions of concern from J. J. Kelso, the Provincial Superintendent of Neglected and Dependent Children, that these people were properly cared for in institutions not by local children's committees.<sup>57</sup> Here we have another example of a growing professional view that "these ill favoured children" were encumbering and clogging their services.<sup>58</sup>

In the first decade of this century the pressure for social services generated a large scale growth of programs funded under the Charity Aid Act. By 1911 there were 6,082 in homes and refugees and 2,020 children in 35 orphanages.<sup>59</sup>

Throughout this time the broader welfare provisions continued to grow and diversify. By 1916 many local children services committees had full-time staff.<sup>60</sup> Juvenile courts, though not mandatory were operating in a few municipalities. The Dominion Juvenile Delinquents Act had been passed in 1908.<sup>61</sup> In 1916 an Act to regulate Maternity Boarding Homes removed these institutions from the Charity Aid Act.<sup>62</sup> By this time the first Mothers Allowance apparatus was being developed as well as the Workmen's Compensation Board.<sup>63</sup>

### The Hodgins Royal Commission

It is clear from the historical documents that there was extraordinary ferment in the City of Toronto and many parts of the province throughout the first decade of the 20th century pressing for better care for the feeble-minded.<sup>64</sup> It is also clear that a major element in that uproar was the assumption that government neglect would lead to further propagation among the feeble-minded population.<sup>65</sup> Under enormous pressure from the municipalities, churches, the press and the formidable Dr. MacMurchie, the Province responded by passing an Act respecting special training classes for the feeble-minded providing support for school boards who established such classes.<sup>66</sup> The special classes initiative was accompanied by a promise to expand the institutional facilities at Orillia and to create a Royal Commission to examine the care and training of the feeble-minded as well as the links between the feeble-minded and criminality. This Royal Commission was undertaken by Mr. Justice G. Edgerton Hodgins.<sup>67</sup>

After examining the British Mental Deficiency Act of 1911 Hodgins suggested that such an act should be introduced in Ontario to bring more controls over the entry to institutions, treatment standards, and better provisions for mental defectives who leave industrial schools, and generally improve control over the system by the provincial authorities. It invites a planned systematic approach in which programs such as institutional care, juvenile courts, and education are seen as part of a broad interrelated program.

Hodgins took a number of positions respecting the care of the feeble-minded which were worthy of note. He noted the connection between mental deficiency and criminality suggesting that all morons are "potentially criminal".<sup>68</sup> Moreover he pointed out the inadequacy of punishment of the feeble-minded since incarceration of these people with real criminals tends to make them worse.<sup>69</sup> "Guardianship and congenial work could enable many feeble-minded to live happy self-supporting life. There is a pressing need to put the feeble-minded in institutions rather than gaols."<sup>70</sup> This report embodied an outlook of practical social defence while reinforcing the idea of segregated but comfortable colonies.<sup>71</sup> It also reinforces the idea of the institutions as places of improvement and training rather than just a "benevolent impulse".<sup>72</sup> Institutions and schools are envisioned by Hodgins as places of manual training and vocational education in order to produce workers who are as self-sufficient as possible.<sup>73</sup>

Hodgins Report is a classic document, not so much because of its impact but more because it crystalizes the ambivalence of a society and an era about the place of "mental defectives". It embodied fear and social defence as well as benevolence. It linked the mentally retarded to criminality and stressed prevention.<sup>74</sup> It expressed hope that "seventy-five per cent of these people can be saved."<sup>75</sup> "The state has a duty" says Hodgins, "toward the mentally defective and toward itself to repress evil tendencies toward anti-social acts".<sup>76</sup>

It viewed the mentally defective as a societal burden and potentially evil. While they needed to be identified, segregated and taught, they were not to be abandoned in jails. In fact, jails would expose them to the real criminal elements and make them worse.



The Province did not show any inclination to introduce comprehensive measures along the model of the British Mental Deficiency Act though there was considerable professional agreement with the training, prevention and productive work issues. The lack of response on the more comprehensive measures may reflect the passing of the acute political issues (and Helen MacMurchie). Additionally, it may well have been due to a change in priorities linked to the war and the change in government in 1919 which brought in a loosely bound coterie of rural representatives under the umbrella of the United Farm Organization.<sup>78</sup> For whatever reason, the Hodgins report was not a major item in the political agenda by the time it was finished.

### The Era of Institutional Self-Sufficiency

The main impact of the Hodgins report seems to have been at the local level. Under the professional influence of Dr. Downey, the Superintendent of Institution in Orillia there was a clear role change in that institution during this time. Whereas the original purpose had been largely relief of the pressure on the institutions for the insane, the Institution for the Feeble-minded and Idiots was now becoming a hive of industry. Dr. Downey was attempting to make the facility self-supporting -a permanent home for the patients. Downey, therefore, attempted to keep out the more severely defective who would have a lower productivity and would be a burden on the institution. In fact, by 1915 Downey was complaining that his institution was being forced to take too many of the insane and those too young to do manual work.<sup>79</sup> The earlier concepts of segregation, control, and benevolence were now being influenced by the professional belief that the feeble-minded need not be a burden on the public purse.<sup>80</sup>

By 1917, the two new cottages at Orillia were complete. As they became operational, however, they were diverted from their original purpose as facilities for the mentally deficient to use in relieving the overcrowding at the mental hospital in Whitby.<sup>81</sup> The overcrowding in Orillia mounted to critical proportions with a waiting list growing to 440. Though another cottage was eventually added providing for 150 feeble-minded men in 1919, it is clear that the government continued to subordinate the feeble-minded to the larger hospital system especially hospitals for the mentally ill and veterans.<sup>82</sup>



### The Introduction of Mothers' Allowance Legislation

One of the major pieces of legislation on the political agenda during this period was the Mothers' Allowance Act. It is highly useful to spend some time examining the struggles of both the Conservatives and the United Farm Organization as they proceeded with legislation on Mothers' Allowance.

Discussions about the dispensation of "outdoor relief", i.e., giving money rather than services to the poor appear to have surfaced as early as the 1880s. Splane notes that Langmuir supported the idea of some provision of this type.<sup>83</sup> The idea seems to have simmered for years until it resurfaced again in 1902 in the legislature. In that year, J. J. Kelso (typically) goes on record as morally opposed to "outdoor relief" from the poorhouses because "it encourages laziness and pauperism". Kelso continued this theme for several years while the suggestion of direct payment to individuals remained contentious.<sup>84</sup>

The idea would not die, however, especially in the aftermath of the first world war which left large numbers of the widows of servicemen penniless and destitute.

After years of debate, the Conservatives finally incorporated reference to an upcoming bill in their Throne Speech of 1919.<sup>85</sup> The government, however, was defeated in the subsequent election and the initiative was left to the U.F.O. to resolve.<sup>86</sup>

On May 11th, 1920 the U.F.O. government introduced the first Mothers' Allowance Act bill providing an allowance to widows with two or more children. This benefit also went to families of asylum inmates as well as the permanently disabled. The recipient must be a British subject and "a proper person to have custody of children".<sup>87</sup> She had to have two children under the age of 14. When one of these children reached the age of 14 the allowance was cut off.

There was little disagreement with the provision of support to widows in order to keep them out of the Houses of Refuge. Most of the debate around this legislation centered on the earlier Conservative suggestion that deserted wives with children be included. The United Farm government dropped the deserted wives provision

largely as a result of the fear that provisions for deserted wives, would encourage men to desert. The Liberals pressed in the committee debates for the extension of benefits to mothers with only one child but this attempt was unsuccessful.<sup>88</sup>

Clearly one characteristic which emerges from these debates over mothers allowance is the fear of the extension of assistance which might engender dependency and idleness in the groups receiving benefit. Again we see the concern about ensuring the recipients are deserving - deserving in this case referring to those who are not complicitous or culpable in their own misfortune. This group was defined originally as a woman whose husband was dead leaving two dependent children, a woman whose husband was in an asylum for the insane, or a woman whose husband was permanently disabled with no chance of recovery. The support provided was unabashedly "enough money to prevent them from being in want".<sup>89</sup> In fact this meant that they were not to starve. It was to be minimal.

### The Beginnings of Service Differentiation in Social Welfare

After 1923 the Conservative government which had replaced the U.F.O.<sup>90</sup> began to take a greater interest in administration and organization of the hodge-podge of boards, commissions and agencies which to this time had reported individually and directly to the Provincial Secretary.<sup>91</sup>

In order to deal with these problems a Royal Commission on Public Welfare was asked to inquire into the provincial hospitals, asylums and other public institutions. After doing so, the Royal Commission included a series of recommendations about the treatment of the feeble-minded which went a step further than those who were earlier advocating their institutionalization. The Commission recommended sterilization - a practice already in place in several other North American jurisdictions. It went on to deal with a number of administrative measures designed to improve operation of the hospitals, asylums and institutions.<sup>92</sup>

While the government did not adopt the sterilization measures, it did agree that the social welfare system did need considerable administrative improvement and it proceeded in 1930 to establish the Department of Public Welfare responsible for mothers allowances, old age pensions, soldiers aid, the Children's Aid Branch,

industrial schools, house of refuge and orphanages. Asylums and hospitals were left with the Department of the Board of Health.<sup>93</sup> Thus by 1930 the social welfare system was sufficiently differentiated to distinguish among offenders, the sick, physically as well as mentally, and the poor.

Walter Baker, drawing on his extensive examination of the child welfare system in these years, has suggested that as the early reformers such as J. J. Kelso moved out of the public administration during these years they were replaced by men who brought attitudinal shift away from "extreme voluntarism" to what he terms "professional humanism".<sup>94</sup> As a consequence of professionalization of the civil service the state paid more and more attention to the efficient administration and control of programs.<sup>95</sup>

Through this period one can see significant changes in attitude toward the institution at Orillia and other provincial services for the mentally retarded. The medical profession had begun to take an interest in mental deficiency defining clearer boundaries between the insane, idiots, morons, the feeble-minded and the mentally deficient. Once again curability began to play a role in service provision since, as Hodgins had pointed out, many of the mentally deficient could be "saved" by preventative measures. This medical orientation and renewed medical interest particularly in the feeble-minded was manifested in organizational terms by the transfer of the Orillia institution to the Dept. of the Board of Health thus severing the traditional link between the asylums and prisons.

In the 1930s under Dr. McGee's leadership, the institution had begun to discharge and "place on probation" more residents. Dr. McGee's report in 1931 embodies the first use of the term mentally retarded.<sup>96</sup>

He was also responsible for a change in the name of the Orillia institution from asylum to Hospital School symbolizing a change from the chronic colony to training facilities with a greater stress of training in vocational skills. In 1935 the population of the Hospital School at Orillia was 1,796 with 109 patients in the community on probation.<sup>97</sup>

A new Liberal government came into power in 1934 under Mitchell Hepburn. The Liberal administration introduced efficiencies into the funded programs such as the Children's Aid system within the Department of Public Welfare.<sup>98</sup> This was attempted through an upgrading system under which the provincial inspectors would grade each Children's Aid Society and the Societies would receive provincial support in accordance with their score. This had the effect of passing great leverage and influence to the provincial supervisors and serves as another indication of the expanding role of the Civil Service in the 1930s.<sup>99</sup>

Nineteen forty-three (1943) marked a significant shift in politics in Ontario with the election of the Progressive Conservative government under the leadership of Colonel George Drew. By the time PC's came to power, there was a significant base in social welfare legislation and services. The institution at Orillia continued to be grossly overcrowded with over 2,000 patients.<sup>100</sup> There were now 10,742 children under the supervision of Children's Aid Societies.<sup>101</sup> The Mothers' Allowance Legislation had been broadened over the years to include mothers with only one child and women who were deserted. By the 1940s there were 19,000 recipients of Mothers' Allowance who had a total of 30,000 children.<sup>102</sup> In addition to these major programs the province had in place a wide range of legislative provisions for the aged, the unemployed, the blind and the homeless.<sup>103</sup>

### **The Federal Government Gets a Foothold**

The 1940s also began to witness the emergence of the federal government as a much stronger influence on social policy. In 1946 the Federal government, in an effort to improve health care services across the country launched the National Health Grants program. Under this initiative, Ottawa made generous financial assistance available for the creation of hospitals, clinics and professional training courses. The program provided financial support in several categories based on an attack on several diseases such as T.B., mental illness and so forth.<sup>104</sup> The Province of Ontario reacting to what was considered federal intrusion in provincial matters resisted the initiative.<sup>105</sup> Ontario was not quick to pick up on federal funding. In fact the Province failed to take advantage of several million dollars which the federal government had allocated for use by Ontario.<sup>106</sup> Under strong Opposition and press criticism Ontario reluctantly began after 1949 to take

advantage of these federal allotments.<sup>107</sup> The federal initiatives while they were significantly useful in the improvement of many of the mental health programs had only secondary effect on the Hospital School in Orillia.<sup>108</sup> In social welfare terms the National Health Grants were more significant because of the large scale federal initiatives into previously exclusively provincial jurisdictions. The Province resisted and resented this intrusion since they feared the eventual removal of federal funding leaving the Provinces to pick up the costs of ongoing services.<sup>109</sup>

In general, the mental retardation services were overshadowed during the late 1940s by the renewed enthusiasm and interest in services for the mentally ill. The United States was taking lead in developing new pharmacological and electro-shock therapies which produced an explosion of information and confidence in the American press respecting new forms of treatment.<sup>110</sup>

Under pressure from the press and the Opposition about overcrowding at the Hospital School in Orillia the Conservative government began in 1945 to develop plans for a second Hospital school at Smith Falls.<sup>111</sup> In fact, the renewed interest in the mentally retarded seems again to have been part of a 'ripple-effect' following up on the optimism about treatment of the mentally ill. In addition, however, the Western World had entered a new era of prosperity in the late forties and early fifties. This prosperity gradually eased Provincial fiscal pressures and opened the door to growth in public expenditures.

Though the mental health area received considerably more attention in the House and in the press there were modest improvements in the mental retardation facilities as well. In 1950 Mr. Goodfellow acting for the Minister of Health announced the opening of the new Hospital School at Aurora just north of Toronto. This development would house about 250 patients to be transferred from Orillia. Also that year the Smith Falls facility was opened with 250 beds. This facility would house 1,800 to be phased in over 5 years.<sup>112</sup> These developments represented a significant expansion of the accommodation for the mentally retarded who to this point had been accommodated only in Orillia.

### **Public Welfare - The Department of Charitable Delivery**

The Department of Public Welfare during this time continued to make adjustments to its relationships with charitable organizations introducing such provisions as capital and operating grants of 50% for municipal homes for the aged. In addition, the Children's Protection Act was amended to allow 25% provincial sharing of the operations of Children's Aid Societies.<sup>113</sup> The Minister of Public Welfare in putting forward the amendment to the Children's Protection Act restated the government's interest in supporting "private autonomy" with the help of provincial "prizes". The Minister, Mr. Goodfellow argued that private subscription in societies would mean "a greater interest in the welfare of the unfortunate children of the community."<sup>114</sup> Here again the Province is explicitly reinforcing its commitment to the private delivery of public services supported by cost-sharing formulas.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s a new force rapidly emerged in the mentally retardation service sector in many western societies. In Ontario this force was embodied in the Parents' Movement for Retarded Children. Though there had been individuals and groups voicing interest in the retarded and the mentally ill prior to the 1940s these organizations had not been broadly based or consistent. The growing influence of the Parents' Councils will be discussed in detail in succeeding chapters.

### **Political Administration in the 1950s**

The Federal government had by 1950 established a foothold in the social policy sphere. The National Health grants were not the only assertion of federal interest. The Provinces through these years also entered into agreements with the Federal government for sharing in the cost of a variety of programs such as Old Age Assistance, Vocational Rehabilitation, Short Term Correctional Services and Income Maintenance.<sup>115</sup>

The policy making structures in the provincial government were still at a rudimentary stage before 1954. As Schindeler points out, before 1954 individual Ministers developed initiatives on their own and then approached the Treasurer in order to determine if money was available to finance the proposal. (In the 1950s



funds were usually there). Having confirmed the funding capability the Minister would then go to the Premier to seek permission to proceed.<sup>116</sup>

In the early 1950s the Premier, The Honourable Leslie Frost perceived the need to implement a more formal policy process. The Financial Administration Act of 1954 provided for a revamped Treasury as a permanent committee of the Cabinet overseeing all matters of finance, revenue, estimates, expenditures and financial commitments. The Treasury Board also had responsibility for Administrative policy in the public service. The Treasury Board thereafter began to review all financial operations of government departments in advance of Cabinet consideration. A permanent secretariat was also set up.<sup>117</sup>

While Ontario politicians had always been highly cost-conscious, the increased attention to administration and management of public service increased substantially the power of financial components of the government and reflected an interest to Cabinet to move towards a more businesslike approach to the operation of government.<sup>118</sup>

Another feature of the Conservatives era was a growing attention to the delineation of Departmental mandates. The Department of Health maintained a clear responsibility for the sick and the mentally ill and the mentally retarded during this time. The Department of Education was clearly responsible for academic education from Kindergarten through University including the special classes which had been created in the early years of the century for feeble-minded children. The Department of Public Welfare was charged with the care of the needy and the aged, deserted wives, and income maintenance. These distinctions are not raised here merely for information purposes but because the emergence of a more clearly defined administrative approach tended to elaborate more clearly interdepartmental distinctions which would become more important as the years progressed. Another important feature of these distinctions is the strong tendency of government to view the Department of Public Welfare as the community service department. This means that Public Welfare is associated with the funding of private charitable efforts.



In the early 1950s the Department of Public Welfare under the strong leadership of Mr. Goodfellow began to enhance the Income Maintenance system developing several pieces of legislation providing improved support for longer term welfare cases such as Mothers' Allowance and the permanently disabled.<sup>119</sup>

At the social welfare delivery level, patterns identified earlier continued into the 1950s producing multi-variate services which were largely uncoordinated and which had been developed in response to specific target group needs during critical periods of stress. The Province, by the 1950s, was running the long term Income Maintenance system directly leaving short term welfare programs to the municipalities and most direct personal services to private groups. The predominant non-governmental social service delivery agencies were the Children's Aid Societies which had expanded during the 1940s and 1950s under the 50% cost sharing formula. Most other private agencies were still in autonomous hands supported by private donations or less generous provincial/municipal sharing formulas.

The Public Welfare budget which had doubled in the first six years of Progressive Conservative rule began to decline slightly in the 1950s with the introduction of the federal Disabled Persons Allowance Act and the beginning of the universal Old Age Pensions. The Disabled Persons Allowance Act was to cover persons between the ages of 18 - 65 who were totally disabled. As the Federal government gradually moved into the area of universal programs the Province came under increasing pressure from the Opposition and the Press to use the newly freed up Provincial dollars in other programs.<sup>120</sup> The Province did, in fact, reallocate its expenditure into improvements to the Child Welfare Act, and the introduction of "An Act to Provide Rehabilitation Services for Handicapped Persons". In the words of the Minister, Mr. Goodfellow,

"The primary purpose of this bill is to assist in carrying out the existing services we have at the present ...Where we have groups and organizations doing a splendid job, and its intention is to encourage them in every possible way to improve upon and to carry out the work they are undertaking".<sup>121</sup>

The health system in the 1950s was dominated by the private arrangements of the medical profession and the hospital infrastructure including public and private

facilities throughout the province. The mental retardation Hospital Schools had expanded with the completion of Smith Falls<sup>122</sup> and the renovation in Orillia. Overcrowding continued to be the outstanding feature of the system, however. During this period of expansion and enthusiasm the Minister of Health McKinnon Phillips proclaimed enormous improvements in the care of the mentally ill. In some of his speeches in the early 1950s Phillips makes the earliest references to the treatment of the mentally ill in community settings i.e., "in his own home, in his own community". The new focus of the mental health system was an expansion of services including outpatient services from psychiatric clinics and general hospitals.<sup>123</sup>

By this time all local education was run by a vast network of semi-autonomous local boards. Public and separate school systems were operating the public system divided into primary and secondary operations each of which had its own local board. The local boards were widely varying in quality and competence. The system itself was unwieldy from an administrative viewpoint and the financial support apparatus was highly complex.

### **Summary of Major Developments Prior to 1950**

It is clear from the documentation presented thus far that a number of patterns have emerged in the provision of Ontario's social welfare system by 1950. Some of these trends were embedded in Ontario's culture before Confederation. Others are more recent.

1. The trend toward providing more public funds for those who are curable continued into the 1950s with the mentally retarded being the "poor cousins" of the mentally ill. This is not to say that the conditions of the mentally retarded had not improved. By the 1950s there were many more institutional beds and auxiliary classes. The overriding position, however, of the retarded was vastly inferior to the mental health position. The institutions for the retarded were constantly and enormously overcrowded.
2. The intricate pattern of intergovernmental relationships noted earlier had become even more complex by the 1950s with the federal government

undertaking a range of initiatives in criminal justice, income maintenance, old age pensions, and so forth. The intervention of the Federal government however was largely based on their superior financial capabilities. They influence through cost-sharing. This is highlighted in the example of the National Health grants which raised intergovernmental controversies not only in terms of jurisdiction but also in terms of the economic interests of the provincial and federal government.

3. The province was unwavering in its commitment to the private delivery of social services. In spite of major pressures for improvement of services to the mentally retarded between 1900 and 1950, the government responses largely centered around the underwriting of the costs of the special classes provided by local boards of education and the incremental addition of beds under the Charity Aid Act and its successors as well as the children's protection system.
4. Perhaps the most striking feature of Ontario political culture was the pervasive ambivalence of this society toward the disadvantaged. On the one hand, there was a strongly rooted belief in personal charitable duty toward the "poor unfortunates". On the other hand, there seemed to be a rigorous inclination to make sure the "poor unfortunates" are truly worthy - i.e., not complicitous in their own misfortune. Moreover, when it came down to deciding the amount of help to be provided the minimum was given - "enough to keep them from being in want".
5. Because of strong public sector propensity toward fiscal control and the efficient management of the public enterprise, successive governments undertook reorganizations and other management improvements. In the mental retardation sector this increasing professional efficiency was affected by attempts to make the institution more self sufficient.

In general terms, Ontario was interested in running its affairs well, keeping costs at a minimum and staying out of the direct service role as much as possible.

Before the 1950s, one can see a highly limited role for interest groups in the social policy sphere. The policy sector was occasionally affected by Federal and municipal interest but it was, by and large, in the hands of the Provincial administration.

### **Political Culture & the Advocacy Thesis**

While the evidence is not yet convincing, there are a couple of features of the Ontario political culture which would seem to be somewhat inimical to the Wolfensberger advocacy position. The private delivery ethos, for example, would seem to suggest that there would be benefits in direct service delivery since one could not look to government in an expanded service delivery role. There is, however, the possibility that the advocates could seek out some other community agents as the actual service deliverers.

Perhaps more unnerving for the proponents of the advocacy position is the notable absence of any apparent commitment of this society to individual rights. The Canadian constitution - the British North America Act - adopted the concepts of peace, order and good government as its centrepiece unlike the America enshrinement of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Policy decisions adopted in the social welfare sphere appear to be based on a more pragmatic response to pressure rather than any apparent recourse to any inalienable rights of individuals.

It must be remembered, however, that the material covered thus far is taken from the pre - 1950 era.

It would, therefore, be somewhat premature to draw strong implications for the role (roles) of interest groups in more recent times. The succeeding chapters will update and expand upon these earlier political cultural themes.

### Footnotes

1. Rosen, Marvin and Clark, Gerald R. and Kurity, Marvin S. The History of Mental Retardation and Collected Papers. (Baltimore, 1976), p. xiii.
2. Kanner, Leo. History of the Care and Study of the Mentally Retarded. (Springfield, Illinois, 1967), p. 23.
3. Rosen, p. ix.
4. Kanner, p. 23-28.
5. Rosen, p. xvii.
6. Simmons, Harvey G., "Explaining Social Policy. The Mental Deficiency Act of 1913," Journal of Social History Vol II #3, 1978 pp. 387/88. See also Kanner, pp. 37.
7. Kanner, pp. 39-43.
8. Simmons, Harvey G. From Asylum to Welfare. (Downsview, 1982), p.p. 2-17.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Splane, Richard. Social Welfare in Ontario. (Toronto, 1965), p. 24.  
See Also Strong, Margaret Kirkpatrick, Public Welfare Administration in Canada, Chicago, 1930, p. 24.
12. Ibid. p. 25.
13. Ibid. pp. 5-30.
14. Goffman, Irving. Social Welfare Policy in Contemporary Canada. Ed. Leach, (Duke University Press, Durham) 1968, p. 194
15. Armitage, Andrew. Social Welfare in Canada. (Toronto, 1975).
16. Splane, p. 17.
17. Bryden, Kenneth. Old Age Pensions and Policy Making in Canada. (Montreal, 1974). p. 81.
18. Goffman p. 197
19. The Act of Union passed in 1840 by the British Parliament created a brief union of the present Provinces of Ontario and Quebec into a single administrative unit overseen by a Lieutenant Governor. The Province of Canada was abolished by the British North America Act of 1867. Strong. Public Welfare Administration in Canada. 1930. p. 14
20. Splane, Richard. Social Welfare in Ontario. (Toronto, 1965), p. 30.

21. Ibid. p. 36.
22. Ibid. p. 38-40.
23. Ibid. Strong, p.p. 14-40.
24. Splane, quoting British North America Act of 1867, Section 91. p.p. 7-8.
25. British North America Act. Section 91
26. Ibid. Section 28
27. Irving Goffman notes in his article that the decision by the writers of the BNA Act to pass responsibility for social welfare to the provinces was not a manifestation of great interest in this policy area but rather an attempt to give a legal base to arrangements that already existed in practice. Splane also notes that the BNA act expresses social welfare in institutional terms rather than needs. (See also Wallace - C.J.E.P.S. xvi. 1950. See also Splane, p.p. 41, 42.
28. Ibid. p. 44
29. Ibid. p. 46, 47. 50.
30. Ibid. p. 50. The grant formula provided a flat sum of 5 cents per patient/day for charitable institutions with the provision of an additional 2 cents per patient day where  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the non-patient income exceeded the aggregate amount of seven cents from the Province.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Simmons, p. 6.
35. Splane, The Federal Government introduced the "National Policy" in the 1870 stressing economic development of the west and consolidation of Canada from coast to coast. Part of this plan involved the building of the Canadian Pacific Railroad which represented an enormous expenditure for these times. That expenditure was created at the expense of Ontario's low cost economy forcing major population shifts in the Provinces - especially a significant rural-urban migration. Splane. p. 6, 7, 8.
36. Baker, Walter. Citizen Participation in the Administration of Government Policies. Ph.D Thesis, (Queen's University, 1966), p. 26. See also Goffman. p. 197 and Splane. p. 52
37. Ibid. p.p. 55, 56.
38. Strong. p. 43.

39. Baker, p. 26
40. Splane. p. 56 (See Also Baker p. 230 and Ontario's Sessional Papers - 1901, Vol. 33, Part 4. Report of the Superintendent of Neglected and Dependent Children.
41. Rosen. p. xx.
42. Kanner. p. 189.
43. Ibid. p. 132. See also Greenland, C. Services for the Mentally Retarded in Ontario. 1870-1930. p. 92. This undated report appears to have been written around 1965 as background for the Department of Health.
44. Simmons, pp. 35-37.
45. Ibid. p. 60
46. Ibid. p. 67.
47. Simmons, p. 71.
48. Ibid. p. 72. See also Strong. P. 190.
49. Ontario Sessional Papers (1912). Vol. 44, Part 8. Eighth Report on the Feeble-minded in Ontario.
50. Ibid.
51. Simmons. p. 72.
52. Ontario Sessional Papers (1903). Vol. 35, Part 4. p.p. 14-22.
53. Ontario Sessional Papers (1912). Vol. 44, Part 7. p. 55.
54. Ontario Sessional Papers (1907). Vol. 39, Part 7. p. 6, 7.
55. Ontario Sessional Papers Vo. 43, Part 6. Eighth Report on the Hospital for Idiots and Epileptics.
56. Ontario Sessional Papers (1907). Vol. 39, Part 7. Report of the Department of Neglected and Dependent Children.p. 50.
57. Ontario Sessional Papers. Report of the Superintendent of Neglected and Dependent Children. p. 21.
58. Ibid.
59. Ontario Sessional Papers. Vol. 46, Part 6. Report of Hospitals and Public Charities.
60. Baker. p. 65 - 70.



61. Ontario Sessional Papers (1909). Vol. 41, Part 8. Report of the Department of Neglected and Dependent Children. p. 128.
62. Goffman. p. 197.
63. Ontario Sessional Papers (1909), Vol. 41, Part 8, Report of the Department of Neglected and Dependent Children, p. 23.
64. Ontario Sessional Papers. (1911). Vol. 43, Part 6. Report on the Feeble-minded in Ontario. p. 10, 11. See also Ontario Sessional Papers 1912. Vol. 44, Part 7.
65. Ontario Sessional Papers (1912) Vol. 44, Part 7. Report on the Feeble-minded in Ontario. p. 6.
66. Ontario Sessional Papers (1912). Vol. 44, Part 7. An Act Respecting Special Classes - 3rd reading. March 20/1911. p. 55.
67. Simmons. p. 68
68. Report of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Mentally Defective and Feeble-minded in Ontario. The Honourable Frank Egerton Hodgins. (1919). p. 4.
69. Ibid. p. 4.
70. Ibid. p. 37.
71. Ibid. p. 67, 68.
72. Ibid. p. 81.
73. Ibid. p. 82-90.
74. Ibid. p. 120.
75. Ibid. p. 22, 23.
76. Ibid. p. 37.
77. Ibid. p. 20.
78. Simmons. p. 98, 99. See also Greenland, C. Services for the Mentally Retarded in Ontario. 1870-1930. - staff paper - Dept. of Health, 1964, p.12.
79. Ibid. p. 104, 105.
80. Ibid. p. 102 - 106.
81. Ibid. p. 102 - 106.
82. Ibid. 102



83. Splane. p. 104, 105.
84. Ontario Sessional Papers (1902). Report of the Inspector of Neglected and Dependent Children. See also Ontario's Sessional Papers - 1913. Vol. 45, Part 7.
85. Globe and Mail Article. Feb. 26, 1919. It is tempting to speculate about why the Conservatives chose to go forward with this controversial initiative in an election year. They knew it would not get to the House before election. This government was under considerable pressure from women's groups at this time - around the Federal Conservatives Conscription Policy; enfranchisement of women, and temperance. It may have been appealing to put forward the idea that the government would move to help widows and orphans.
86. Oliver, Peter. Public and Private Persons: The Ontario Political Culture 1914 to 1934. (Toronto, 1975), p. 32. Oliver suggests that the incorporation of deserted wives in the government position was a major reason for the Conservative defeat.
87. Globe and Mail article May 20, 1920.
88. Ibid. Apr. 9, 1920.
89. Ibid. May 11, 1920.
90. The U.F.O. government was high on righteousness but short on judgement. In the 1923 election they enfranchised large numbers of women. Unfortunately, the government came out strongly for the abolition of prohibition. The newly enfranchised women, virtually unanimous in favour of prohibition turned out in droves to vote against the government and turfed the U.F.O. out of office.
91. Splane p. 58
92. Report of the Royal Commission on Public Welfare. (Toronto, Aug. 13, 1930.) p. 9.
93. Simmons. p. 118.
94. Baker, pp. 113-119.
95. Ibid. pp. 103, 108.
96. Ontario Sessional Papers (1936). Vol. 18, Part 6. p. 3
97. Ontario Sessional Papers (1931). Vol. 18, Part 4. p. 7
98. Ibid.
99. Baker. p. 120.
100. Ontario Sessional Papers. (1943). Vol. LXX4, Part 3, p. 14.

101. Ibid. (1940) Vol. LXXII, Part IV, p. 5.
102. Department of Public Welfare - Annual Report - 1940/41.
103. Ibid.
104. Department of Health and Welfare, National Health Grants - 1948-1961, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1962.
105. Interview Dymond.
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107. Globe & Mail article Dec 17/52.
108. Interview Dymond.
109. Goffman, Irving J., Social Welfare Policy, Contemporary Canada. Ed. R. H. Leach p. 204.
110. Interview Dymond. See also Globe & Mail Aug. 16, 1954 and Toronto Star Aug. 28/47.
111. Annual Report - Dept. of Health - 1945/46.
112. Globe & Mail article May 13/50.
113. Ontario Legislative Debates, 1948, 4th Session, 22nd legislature, 841.
114. Ontario Legislative Debates, 1948, 4th Session, 22nd legislature, 841.
115. Department of Public Welfare - Annual Reports - 1950 - 1960.
116. Schindler, F.F. Responsible Government in Ontario (University of Toronto Press, Toronto) 1969, pp.42-50.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Dept. of Public Welfare - Annual Reports - 1950-55. See also Ontario Legislative Debates, Feb. 21/1952, Vol. XXXIII, p. D.D. 2. Introduction of Allowances for Disabled Persons Act - Bill 114.
120. Ontario Legislative Debates - speech by the Hon. M. Phillips, Minister of Health, Feb. 24/1958, p. 333.
121. Ontario Legislative Debates - Estimates of the Department of Public Welfare Vol. II, Mar. 22/55, p. 1100.
122. Department Health - Annual Report - 1951/52.
123. Department Health - Annual Report - 1957/58.

### CHAPTER III

#### ORIGINS AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE PARENTS' MOVEMENT

##### The Rise of the Parents

By 1950 the basic elements for a social welfare system were very well established. Services were operated by both government and charitable agencies and there was a growing public administration which oversaw the services. Before 1948 the major critiques of government policy had come from the press, Opposition members and small lobby groups pressing for specific changes in this or that piece of legislation. Nineteen-forty-eight witnessed the development of a dramatically different force in the mental retardation sector.

By all counts, Mrs. Victoria Glover is credited with setting off the spark that ignited the Parents' Movement for retarded children<sup>1</sup> in Ontario. Mrs. Glover wrote a letter to the Editor of the Toronto Star on September 29, 1948. The complete letter is quoted here because of the eloquence of her appeal.

"Sir;

May I say a few words on behalf of our backward children, and their bewildered mothers. There are no schools for such children, no place where they could get a little training, to be of some use in the world, only Orillia, which is always full. If these children can be taught something in Orillia, why can't a day school be put at their disposal? I am sure that their mothers would gladly pay for their transportation to and from school. I think it is time for something to be done for parents, who from a sense of faith and hope in a merciful Providence want to keep them at home living a normal life. These are real parents, only asking a little aid and encouragement to shoulder their heavy burden. God bless them, and may the Ontario Government help them, and their children who might still be made something of, living a normal life and with the perfect love, understanding and guidance of such parents."

Mrs. D. B. Glover

Very soon after Mrs. Glover's letter appeared in the Toronto Star<sup>2</sup> a group of parents of retarded children in Toronto met in a church basement to form a Toronto Parents' Council for Retarded Children.<sup>3</sup> After several organizational

meetings the parents identified as their primary interests the remedying of the school situation which had been mentioned in Mrs. Glover's letter and the improvement of institutions.<sup>3</sup>

The small group of parents attracted considerable interest from the press even at the earliest stages.<sup>4</sup> They also had support from members of all parties in the Legislature.<sup>5</sup> The parents believed that because they were taxpayers they had a right to education for their children even though these children could not learn at the same rate as normal children.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, they approached the Hon. Dana Porter, Minister of Education, for support. Mr. Porter, acting on the advice of the professionals in his department felt that retarded children were "a training problem, not an education problem".<sup>7</sup> The Department of Education therefore referred the parents to the Minister of Health which was assumed to have prime responsibility for providing for the retarded.<sup>8</sup> Health was not enthusiastic but did write to the Federal government persuading them to fund a small experimental project for the education of retarded children in Toronto. The project began in the fall of that year.<sup>9</sup> The parents, however, were impatient for more broadly based action and decided to create their own school at the same time.<sup>10</sup>

The parents' class was run in a church basement and supported entirely by the parents themselves. Much of that support came in the form of voluntary work - driving, painting, repairs and so forth. Money was raised through a variety of methods including rummage sales, card games, raffles and a variety of other affairs.<sup>11</sup>

The fund raising drives had broader benefits than the acquisition of dollars. They consistently attracted the attention of the press and therefore served to inform the citizens of Ontario about the activities of these parents. As they entered the 1950s local associations for the retarded had begun to develop several schools and to enjoy favourable coverage by the media. They were at one and the same time a promotional group and a service provider. Moreover, they quickly learned to exploit that coverage inviting well known speakers to address their meetings and inviting the press and public to attend.<sup>12</sup>

In the first years of the 1950s the parents gradually expanded their schools with financial support of fund raising by the membership and some partial assistance from some local municipalities.<sup>13</sup> The parents wrote numerous briefs the Ministers of Health and Education and by 1953 persuaded the province to provide some minimal support for their schools beginning in 1954.<sup>14</sup> The Province urged, however, that the parent groups which were now forming in various parts of the province create a central body which the Department of Education could deal with and which could accept responsibility for the disbursement of provincial funds.<sup>15</sup>

Several councils met in the late 1953 to form the Ontario Association for Retarded Children (O.A.R.C.) to act on their behalf in receiving financial aid in the province and pressing for improvements. The O.A.R.C. immediately formed an education sub-committee to coordinate the committees of the locals and relate to government.<sup>16</sup>

Beginning in 1954 the province began to contribute \$25. per month per child toward half day programs on a ten month basis. The Parents' Council saw this move as a significant milestone and moved quickly to expand their services.<sup>17</sup>

During this period several officials of the Department of Education gave their personal expertise to the Parents' Movement assisting them with the organization of their schools, curricula and teacher training. Officially, however, the Department looked askance on the schools and the children because of their feeling that they were inappropriate for "academic" training. This view was shared even by some of those who were personally sympathetic to the parents' initiatives.<sup>18</sup>

As might be expected, the Parents' Councils were very heavily burdened with their contributions to the schools. The costs of transportation were especially burdensome and formed a high percentage of the operating costs in spite of the substantial commitment of many voluntary drivers. Additionally, it was difficult to get qualified teachers in a time when salaries in the Parents' Councils Schools were significantly less than the public system and teachers were in great demand. The schools were racked with other problems as well. The facilities were generally quite meager with programs in church basements, private homes, vacant commercial facilities and other less than ideal settings. With ever increasing enrollments the problems with the inadequate facilities soon became acute.<sup>19</sup>



Burdened under chronic funding and administrative problems the Parents' Councils began again in 1954 to approach the Chief Director of Education to press for increased funds and a change in the Education Act. Dr. Athouse declined arguing that the value of the parents' initiatives had to be proven before further public support could be developed.<sup>20</sup> Considering that the Parents' Movement had only 5 years experience by 1953, it is quite astounding that they had generated such widespread support and were planning expansion of the schools to accommodate over 300 children.<sup>21</sup>

The growth in the schools necessitated massive fund raising and publicity campaigns. During this period parents began even more actively to exploit both goodwill and good press. These years they were highly successful in a wide range of fund raising schemes. A prominent supporter was able to persuade the Progress Club of Toronto to provide a yearly grant of \$10,000 to defray the cost of transportation to the schools.<sup>22</sup> Along with this contribution came a commitment to appoint a Club member to the Council Board. The Club also agreed to approach Toronto city Council and the Board of Education on the Parents behalf.<sup>23</sup> In September 1954, the Parents' Council sponsored a publicity campaign linked to the opening of a new school. The centrepiece of this campaign was the visit to the school by Roy Rogers and Dale Evans.<sup>24</sup> These high profile events were augmented by a host of local events like bingos, cocktail parties, auctions, raffles, and backyard sales.<sup>25</sup>

In 1954 the largest of the Parents' Councils, the Metro Toronto Chapter, was operating several schools throughout Metropolitan Toronto. In order to consolidate these classes and to take advantage of an opportunity to acquire property in central Toronto at an excellent price they launched a financial campaign in 1955. Once again the parents enjoyed considerable media support.<sup>24</sup> The door-to-door campaign sought over \$400,000 and was orchestrated by professional fund raisers.<sup>26</sup> When the proceeds were finally totalled the campaign netted well over \$600,000. This campaign also won commitments from the Province and Metro Toronto to contribute capital funds - \$100,000 from Metro and \$100,000 from the Province.<sup>27</sup> The Lieutenant Governor of Ontario officiated at the opening of the Beverly Street school on May 19, 1956. These financial and symbolic contributions were interesting in the sense that the Province seems to show considerable



sympathy for the Parents' Movement yet the operating grants to the schools were still highly restricted.

As the Provincial Association (O.A.R.C.) became more organized and hired staff, they began in 1955 to prepare a brief for the Minister of Education. This brief suggested several improvements in the education area and was reported in The Globe and Mail as criticizing the "piecemeal approach to planning" by the government and demanding a Royal Commission.<sup>28</sup> The document traced the development of government support and interest by Dr. Dunlop and other members of government. It acknowledged financial and moral support received and went on to seek further assistance. It recommended a number of system adjustments including inspection of schools by the Auxiliary Education Branch of the Department of Education, enabling legislation to allow local municipalities to take M.R. schools into the elementary school system or to finance the operation of O.A.R.C. schools, legislation allowing school boards to voluntarily support O.A.R.C. operations, grants for transportation and more training for children between 12 and 18. They sought also a funding formula similar to the "G" Grant formula which was used as the basis for public school funding.<sup>29</sup>

As an indication of the growing political sophistication of the parents group, this brief was provided to government well in advance of the meeting with the Minister. It was also circulated widely generating considerable support from a number of circles including the press and members of the legislature.<sup>30</sup>

In a subsequent "informal meeting" with the Minister of Education the government indicated it would not establish a Royal Commission but did agree to create a interdepartmental committee which established liaison with the newly acquired Secretary to the Ontario Association for Retarded Children. There was some belief in O.A.R.C. ranks expressed at their board meetings that this turn of events would be even more useful than a Royal Commission.<sup>31</sup>

As it turned out the discussion between the interdepartmental committee and the O.A.R.C. staff did not meet the expectations of the local councils. In 1957, the feeling began to grow that the government was simply delaying in responding to their request.<sup>32</sup> Consequently, another brief was prepared for the province arguing

for closer ties between local Inspectors and the O.A.R.C. schools. The brief recommended grants should be carried from the schools to the regular school system if that regular school admitted a child from a Council school. They requested improved grants in education and transportation and the establishment of Advisory Committees to oversee the development of the MR schools. Again they pressed for limited grants to allow local school boards to begin to become involved in the MR programs.<sup>33</sup>

The presentation of the brief was reinforced by similar demands through the interdepartmental committee and resolutions passed at the annual meeting of O.A.R.C. in 1958.<sup>34</sup>

In spite of limited Provincial funding the classes for retarded children in several areas increased substantially during these years. In addition, some schools were receiving support from local municipalities on a grant basis.<sup>35</sup> As programs expanded frustration mounted in dealings between the parents' movement and the Province. The board of O.A.R.C. continued to pass motions on a regular basis and forward them to government. They sought changes in the legislation respecting auxiliary classes making them compulsory rather than discretionary and the improvements in the institutional system. They wrote brief after brief to the Province on a wide range of issues.<sup>36</sup> The only concrete response from the province through this period was the appointment of a single Inspector in the Department of Education who would inspect the MR schools officially.<sup>37</sup>

There is some evidence to suggest that the Parents' Councils were facing a number major problems in their negotiations with the province in the 1950s. One of these, which had already been noted, is the rigid views of the teaching profession on what is 'training' and what is 'education'. Dr. W. J. Dunlop had been called out of retirement to become Minister of Education from 1951 to 1959. One writer has pointed out that Dunlop's method of administration was unreceptive to policy change.<sup>38</sup> It may have been that Dunlop personally played a major role in resisting the advances of the MR school system.

Another factor working against the Parents' Movement at the time was undoubtedly the massive growth on the educational system from the 'baby boom' era.

Throughout the 1950s schools were being built at a rapid rate and the supply of teachers was always behind. Though there was a great deal of money available, the public education system's demand for that money seemed to be growing in geometric proportions.

Still suffering because of chronic underfunding, the Ontario Association for Retarded Children undertook another high profile fund raising campaign in 1958/59. This campaign benefitted from leadership recruited by a prominent advertising executive Harry "Red" Foster, former hockey star and President of the prestigious Foster Advertising. (Mr. Foster also had a mentally retarded brother). Foster was also to recruit several other well known business personalities such as Esling, President of Goodyear Tire Co., Gundy, partner in the prominent Wood, Gundy Management Consulting firm and others to head the campaign.<sup>39</sup>

By 1960 there had been several increments in this support available to the schools and the Department of Education had appointed an Inspector to oversee the development of the MR system. By this time, there were 74 full-time teachers in the retarded schools only half of whom held teaching certificates. There were also 85 part-time teachers most of whom were untrained.<sup>40</sup>

### **The Parents' Movement and Ontario's Political Culture**

In the period between 1948 and 1958 the Parent's Movement for retarded children had established itself as a major force in the mental retardation field. The Movement had established financial support for their schools. They had recruited support in many sectors of society. Through this period their influence was communicated through their community activities, their yearly briefs and the intermittent involvement of a handful of influential individuals. The Parent's Movement made significant ongoing connections with civil servants.<sup>41</sup>

Before proceeding to examine in fuller detail the relationships and activities of the parents in the policy making sphere it is useful to reflect briefly on the early place of the Parents' Movement in the Ontario's political culture as noted in chapter 2. Several features are particularly important in terms of understanding the influence of the parents.

The nature and etiology of mental retardation itself conveyed a certain legitimacy on the Parents' Movement. Retarded children were blameless for their conditions. They were the "deserving poor" who were afflicted by a condition which was permanent and entirely out of their control. Over the years the growth of understanding of the care and supervision of the mentally retarded had taken much of the edge off of the social fear mentality. The Parents enhanced this direction by demonstrating that their children could be taught. More importantly, the Parents' Movement gave the retarded an entirely new image - a belonging. The retarded were no longer petty criminals or fertile feeble-minded women, they were now children - part of somebody's family - the neighbour's slow daughter. Even the term Parents' Movement removes the focus from pathological subnormality to benevolent, nurturing families.

Another highly important feature of the early Parents' Movement was their obvious attempts to take care of themselves. They were seeking relatively little by way of support. They were seen to be setting up and running their own schools and helping each other through charitable/voluntary initiatives. They were not idle. The fact that the parents established their own schools also helped to revise public image of mental retardation. It implied hope and education. It aligned the retarded children with a growing social investment in the future of education.

The establishment of the schools introduced a significant service element to the Parents' movement which had some beneficial effects for their promotional efforts. The operation of the schools concretized their needs. In a time of 'bricks and mortar' - the reconstruction period - the schools blended in with a societal and governmental push to build.

The service delivery decision is in sharp contrast to the American experience in which the Parents' Movements, by and large, opted for promotional action only. The effect of these decisions on their programs will be seen and discussed in later chapters.

### The Parents' Movement as a Lobby Group

Mental handicaps are distributed widely in society (3% of the population).<sup>42</sup> This meant that many influential people had first hand knowledge of mental retardation either in their own families or among friends or neighbours. The distribution of the condition made it relatively easy for O.A.R.C. and its local affiliates to recruit high profile spokesmen and to draw in associates from the sports, media and entertainment fields. The broad base of the Movement also crossed political, cultural, religious barriers. It is to their credit that the pioneers in the movement recognized this mix of interests and backgrounds and were able to steer the organizations away from political affiliations or confrontations which would cut-off certain constituencies within their ranks.

It is clear that the Movement chose to educate society and political representatives rather than embarrass and confront. Parents also chose to create their own services and to press for very practical gains. They opted to interweave with the fabric of society that is, the churches, the press, the service clubs and so forth. The Parents' Movement cultivated the very grass roots network which, as we will see, enabled them in later years to benefit from that good will.

The Parents' Movement decided very early on not to become involved with partisan politics. In fact, on one occasion when the press did report stories critical of government, Harold Lobb, the executive secretary of O.A.R.C. wrote to the Minister of Education, Mr. Dunlop, saying that the newspaper reports did not come from O.A.R.C. and "we shall make a very special effort in future publicity to acknowledge the various ways in which your department has given substantial help to the education of the retarded".<sup>43</sup> Their political style was educative and non-confrontational informing all of the political actors including the press and the public of their interests and goals. Their political style was so dispersed and so natural that it appeared to be no style at all. To this day, most founding members of the Parents' Movement will argue that they were not in fact a lobby.<sup>44</sup> Most disdain the term lobby.

The adoption of this non-confrontational approach had several major advantages. In the first place, it allowed prestigious members of the community to identify

with a cause that was largely positive. While there was a measure of critique of government policy underlying the whole Parents' Movement the critique rarely appeared in an overt fashion. The Movement therefore, attracted a host of prestigious supporters who would have strong political and media involvement.

The impact of prestigious members had several benefits. Such people had the contact with a large network of personalities including politicians, businessmen, celebrities and so forth. They could draw out support by working as campaign chairman, hosting special events, opening doors to service clubs and business support and so forth. Another function of the more influential members was in meetings with government officials especially Ministers. Influential representatives especially from the business sector were often brought in to help put the parents cause before the government. As Warren Clayson<sup>45</sup> points out, when a group of businessmen from the manufacturing sector or the banking sector meet with the Premier or the Ministers it is likely that these people will know each other. This will mean that a politician is not meeting with a community delegation seeking their own advancement but with a group of acquaintances and possibly friends who support the cause from which many of them will derive no personal benefit.

The Movement seems to have had instinctive feeling for the exploitation of the press and public events to gain support and attention. Many events were in fact staged to draw attention to the work of the Councils and needs of the mentally retarded. These events were invariably presented as a picture of people helping themselves and not as a group of "do gooders". The events themselves served to build the associations into the communities and to offer the average person in the community a chance to contribute to a charitable cause while enjoying themselves at the yearly cocktail party or card games or rummage sales or some other activity. Through a variety of means then the Parents' Councils were able to build themselves a broad and solid base of support which was not dependent upon any one type of tactic and which was not perceived as a lobby.



### **Were There Extrinsic Factors Which Facilitated the Growth of The Parents' Movement?**

It is interesting to speculate for a moment about the broader social changes or forces which may underly the assembling of the Parents' Movement. The prominent writers in the field have focused their attention on the tremendous achievements of these groups without much attention to the social conditions which may have facilitated their success. This chapter has examined some of the intrinsic features of the Movement which would serve to explain its achievement but one wonders at the apparent spontaneity of their organization. Even more bewildering is the contemporaneous emergence of similar parent groups throughout the Western world.

Surely one factor in their formation must have been the enormous growth in the post-war economies in much of western society. This was an era of growing commitment and belief in education and growing interest in medical services and medical insurance. Vernon Lang catalogues the boom in social welfare growth during the 1950s (see next chapter) and the sharp rise in public services. It is quite evident, that the parents of retarded children began to see all of these benefits-especially in the education field-and ask why their children should be excluded.

Lang also points to a shift in the role for the state in the late 1940s and 1950s. He sees a movement away from the regulation role to that of builder. This shift was led by the Federal government which seemed to have transferred its mobilization capacity away from the war effort into social and physical reconstruction.<sup>46</sup>

There is another side to the post-war era which may have facilitated the mental retardation sector. It will be recalled from earlier discussion that the first world war helped modify societies' attitudes about mothers allowances. The presence of large numbers of widows helped to legitimize the extension of benefits to wives of the disabled and later deserted women. The growth of services for disabled veterans after second world war may well have had a trickle-down effect for other disability groups - especially children.

The seeds of the Parents' Movement may well have found fertile ground in a society which was experiencing a resource boom, a reconstruction era and a greater awareness of disabilities generally.

Harvey Simmons points to the rise of another social force which may also have reinforced the parents' positions. He notes the growing challenges to the medical and psychiatric model of care in the mental health and mental retardation sphere. Such writers as, R.D. Laing, Thomas Szaz, Irving Goffman and indeed Wolfensberger began to question the labelling and deviance approaches and to shift their focus away from pathology to environmental structures and social attitudes.<sup>47</sup>

Notwithstanding these extrinsic factors which likely supported changes in the mental retardation sector, it will become increasingly evident as we survey the case study evidence in chapters IV and V that the Parents were, undeniably, a major force in shaping social policy.

## Footnotes

1. The term "Parents' Movement" emerged somewhat later as a broad label which covers the early voluntary organization of parents of retarded children as well as their official spokesmen at the local and provincial levels. "Parents' Movement" is also used in a connotative sense to suggest the enthusiasm and mutual support that the founders and early participants generated.
2. Star article. Sept. 29, 1948.
3. Interview. Hunt.
4. Several articles in Toronto Star, Globe and Mail and Telegram in 1948/49 covering the activity of Parents' Council - recorded in Historical Background paper prepared for the Metro Toronto Association for Retarded Children. Feb. 24, 1969.
5. Minutes of Meeting. Toronto Parents' Council. Jan 7, 1949. See also Star article Nov. 3, 1948.
6. Interview. Hunt, and Star articles. April 20, 1949.
7. Star article. April 20, 1949. See also letter from Hon. D. Porter to Mr. E. V. Hunt. Nov. 2, 1949.
8. Simmons, Harvey, G. From Asylum to Welfare. Downsview: 1982. p. 150.
9. Interviews. Hunt and Patricks.
10. Interviews. Hunt and Patricks.
11. Ibid. See also Minutes of Board of Toronto Parents' Council. June 26, 1950, Feb. 26, 1951 and April 10, 1951.
12. Star article. April 26, 1949. Speaker at Parents meeting R. Frizby who ran a school for retarded children in Northern Ontario. Other speakers included well known experts from Winnipeg, Britain and the U.S. All addresses were reported in newspapers.
13. Minutes of Meetings of Parents' Council. e.g., Jan. 7, 1949, Apr. 20, 1949.
14. Minutes of Meetings of Parents' Council. March 23, 1953, Jan. 25, 1954.
15. Ibid. May 25, 1953
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid. Jan. 25, 1954.
18. Interviews. Delaporte and Hunt.

19. See Minutes of Meetings. Jan. 1954 through 63.
20. Minutes of O.A.R.C. Board Meeting Jan. 30, 1954. (See also letter Hon. D. Porter to Hugh MacKenzie, July 31, 1957 "Wishful thinking and fixed ideas must not be allowed to influence funding").
21. Minutes of Board Meeting of Parents' Council. Dec. 8, 1953.
22. Ibid. Feb. 22, 1954.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. Sept. 27, 1954.
25. Toronto Star, May 31, 1955 and March 3, 1955. The Telegram, Dec. 1, 1955.
26. Minutes of Board Meeting of Parents' Council. Sept. 26, 1955.
27. M.T.A.R.C Bulletin Jan, 1957.
28. Globe and Mail, Dec. 11, 1956
29. O.A.R.C. Brief to the Prime Minister and Cabinet 1956.
30. Globe & Mail Article 1956. See Also Toronto Telegram, Dec. 18, 1956.
31. Minutes of Board Meeting O.A.R.C. Sept. 8, 1956.
32. Ibid. Aug. 21, 1957.
33. Brief of O.A.R.C. to Ontario Cabinet, 1957.
34. Minutes of O.A.R.C. Annual Meeting - July 5, 1958.
35. Schools in Metro Toronto and St. Catharines received small sustaining grants from local municipalities.
36. Minutes of O.A.R.C. Board Meeting Oct. 4, 1958.
37. Ibid.
38. Fleming, W.G. Education: Ontario's Preoccupation. (Toronto, 1972) p. 75-78.
39. Minutes of O.A.R.C. Board Meeting, Oct. 4, 1958.
40. Minutes of O.A.R.C. Board Meeting, Feb. 13, 1960.
41. Minutes of O.A.R.C. Board Meetings, 1958/59.
42. Lundy, L. - staff paper The Incidence & Prevalence of Mental Retardation in Ontario, Ontario Ministry of Community & Social Services, 1981.

43. The Minutes of the O.A.R.C. Board meeting of July 5, 1958 clearly reflect a debate about the appointment of active political figures as patrons. The board rejected the idea partially because they felt that the patrons would be in a conflict of interest where they were in departments from which the Associations were seeking money. (See also letter from Harold Lobb, Executive Secretary of O.A.R.C. to Hon. E. Dunlop, Minister of Education, Jan. 28, 1957).
44. Interviews. Hunt and Patricks.
45. Interview. Clayson.
46. Lang, Vernon, The Service State Emerges in Ontario, (Ontario Economic Council, Toronto) Jan., 1974. pp.7-28.
47. Simmons - p. 197.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE PARENTS MOVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL ARENA - THE TEXT BOOK LOBBY

#### Introduction

The next two chapters move into the case study material examining the experiences of the Movement as they flexed their lobby group muscle and attempted to alter the course of social policy as it affected their constituency. In all seven case studies are presented - four in this chapter and three in the next. The cases examined in this chapter include:

- o The Blueprint - the coming of institutional improvements,
- o The Homes for Retarded Persons Act - the emergence of community residential care,
- o The Retarded Children's Education Authorities - the first step in removing the parents' schools from the charitable domain and finally,
- o The Integration of the Schools - takeover of the M.R. education function by the school boards.

Chapter V examines the policy-making in the 1970s:

- o The "New Policy Focus" - the decision to expand community services and de-emphasize institutional care,
- o Community Residential Care Policy - the second generation of issues arising from the limitations of the Homes for Retarded Persons Act, and,
- o The Resource Centre controversy - the policy which brought the service/advocacy, cleavage into sharp relief.



These case studies provide a range of glimpses into the relationships between the Movement and the public administrators in the Health, Education and Social Service Departments. The case studies are the vehicles through which the investigator can probe the theoretical dimensions of political culture and interest group politics.

They generate empirical data about the inner processes of policy development and thereby provide a grounded perspective from which to consider the advocacy position.

These studies were selected on the basis of their significance as important events in the mental retardation sector in the past thirty years. Admittedly there have been other major developments such as developmental day care, sheltered workshops and a range of community support services, but these seem adequate to provide a well rounded view of the evolving relationship between the Parents' Movement and the political administration in the Province as well as a solid overview of the emergence of the community service system.

Chapters IV & V each begin with brief overviews of contemporaneous events in the life of the political administration and the Parents' Movement in order to provide the reader with a broader context for the case studies.

### **Political Administration in the 1950s & 1960s**

The activities of the provincial government increased dramatically during the 1950s and the 1960s. Financial controls were set in place with the passing of the Financial Administration Act of 1954.<sup>1</sup> Through the years the Provincial administration was tightened. Mr. Robarts, a man with a background in management, became Premier in 1962 determined to overhaul the operations of the provincial government.

The early part of this period, that is from 1957 to 1962, has been described by Lang as the "take off period".

"This period of social policy in Ontario were dominated by;

- a sharp rise in Federal expenditures in the social policy area, both direct (unemployment insurance and old age security) and indirect

(cost-shared) unemployment assistance, hospitalization, technical and vocational training assistance;

- a boom in building large institutions, particularly schools with emphasis on their vocational components;
- a human resources development orientation expressed in both the orientation of education toward vocational streaming, technology and economic growth, and in various care, rehabilitation and recreation programs;
- increasing predominance of government over private sector funding throughout the field of social services."<sup>2</sup>

On the crest of expanding revenues Robarts undertook major reviews of both education and health services and substantially altered both in the 1960s. Mr. Davis, as Minister of Education, presided over a vast enhancement and rationalization of the educational system from primary through secondary. Through the 1960s the local Boards of Education were reformed and consolidated and stronger administrative features introduced.<sup>3</sup>

The preoccupation of the Health Department, was the Health Insurance scheme promoted by the Federal government.<sup>4</sup> The Province consistently opposed the introduction of a medicare system but eventually had to yield to overwhelming pressure generated as a result of the federal initiatives.<sup>5</sup> Here again the federal government used its superior funding power to make available to Ontario considerable monies which the provincial government ultimately could not afford to ignore.

The social service system grew steadily but did not experience a resource boom like that of the Health and Education sectors. Several attempts were made to bring new management skills to the Children's Aid Societies and the system generally. Social welfare improvements consisted, not of sweeping changes, but rather of improvements in the funding basis under several pieces of legislation and the introduction of new areas of support such as visiting homemakers. The major work of the Department of Public Welfare remained in Income Maintenance System.<sup>6</sup>

The introduction of the Canada Assistance Plan in 1966<sup>7</sup> had the effect of reinforcing the historical relationships between public finance and private delivery

in Ontario. This federal act introduced 50 per cent federal reimbursement for expenditures on behalf of "persons-in-need". The federal dollars supported income maintenance programs and other social services delivered either by the provinces themselves, by municipalities or charitable organizations. The Canada Assistance Plan was to have profound effects on the Mental Retardation sector.

In response to increasing complexity and concerns about professionalization among service providers they tended to band together in the 1960s to form federations such as the Ontario Federation of Family Service Associations, the Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies, etc. These organizations often assisted local associations in improving professional standards. They also acted as a federated voice in dealings with government but rarely operated services from a central level. Generally such associations worked with limited staff and financial support depending heavily on the local affiliates.

#### **The Parents' Movement 1954 to 1969**

In July 1954 a major charitable foundation with special interest in mental retardation began to provide funds to the Ontario Association for Retarded Children to hire its first paid staff member - a part-time secretary.<sup>8</sup> The first secretary began to correspond with government on behalf of the movement.<sup>9</sup> It was not until 1956, however, that a full-time Executive Director was hired.<sup>10</sup>

During this period, between 1956 and 1960 the Executive Director Mr. Lobb and some of the Board placed considerable emphasis on a yearly brief to the government. There was also increasing stress on the role of the Association in the improvement of services to the mentally retarded in provincial Hospital Schools. The organization, little by little, began to see its scope of interest more generalized than the local school issues.<sup>11</sup>

By 1958, the Ontario Association had diversified its interest through the establishment of 10 sub-committees such areas as recreation, scientific and technical services, professional advisory functions and others. In that year, the O.A.R.C. had developed 43 affiliates representing 3,000 individual members and 850 mentally retarded children in local schools.<sup>12</sup>

The Movement continued to promote a public relations stance which was very broadly based and positive in orientation. It continued to be inter-denominational and subscribed to no political party or theory. It saw itself as a classless movement in which people from a spectrum of society were brought together around the common cause.<sup>13</sup> The members were motivated strongly enough by their common problems to set aside individual differences, political, religious and social variance.

In the late 1950s the yearly brief to the province came under strong criticism as an ineffective form of communication. This questioning of the brief was based on both an awakening interest in pressing for changes and a growing frustration with the responses received. Essentially, the Province had responded to the Movement in the early 1950s through the establishment of the educational grants noted earlier and the expansion of the institutional system. In the latter part of the 1950s many began to view these developments as a minimal response given the dramatic economic growth of the Province during that period.<sup>14</sup>

After 1958, O.A.R.C. entered a period referred to in their official history as "strengthening of the base". About this time the Movement started to become "more fully aware than ever before that it must conduct a 'cradle to the grave' program for all mentally retarded regardless of age or I.Q."<sup>15</sup> The scope of interest, then, was increasingly beyond the earlier focus on the schools and the institutions. In fact, by 1960 the Associations were exploring many more service areas including sheltered employment, residential programs, summer camps, recreation, etc.<sup>16</sup>

In 1960 the frustration of many members within the provincial association brought strong party pressure to bear on Premier Frost who eventually granted them a meeting.<sup>17</sup> In fact, the mere capability of the Movement to generate enough pressure to demand a meeting with the Premier is significant. The meeting itself was an odd affair which did not go well at all. The Premier appeared to be frustrated by the constant demands from the Parents' Councils. He was also frustrated by the inability of the professionals to find a cure for mental retardation.<sup>18</sup> (Some of the people interviewed for this study suggested Mr. Frost had a close relative who was retarded and that his frustration was partially based

on his own family experience. He may also have been angered by the way in which the Association forced him to meet with them.)

The O.A.R.C. executives were somewhat naive in approaching this meeting. They entered the Premier's office to find they were meeting with a large of group Cabinet Ministers along with the Premier. They began to read their brief verbatim. As one might expect, the Cabinet was not prepared to listen to such a recitation. The Premier and Ministers intervened asking some questions as the O.A.R.C. representatives read. The Premier expressed anger that the brief was critical of the government and that it did not acknowledge all of the things the government had done for the retarded. The meeting ended in dispute and disappointment.<sup>19</sup>

One of the interesting things about that meeting is the direction of the criticism Mr. Frost was making. He wanted acknowledgement of the things the Province had done. In other words, he wanted them to make a public gesture of support and solidarity for the government. As we shall see later in this study, articulation of support is a major contribution an interest group can make to the political administration.

On balance the dispute between the association and the outgoing Premier was not all that significant since O.A.R.C. retained its ties with Dr. Dymond who had recently been appointed Minister of Health and Mr. Robarts, the new Minister of Education who in a short time was to become the Premier.

With the 1960s came a new optimism in the M.R. sector largely due to the change in Ministers and the retirement of the Premier in 1962.<sup>20</sup> No doubt, another factor in this optimism was the appointment of the new Executive Director to O.A.R.C. William Kirk came to the organization with a keen interest in developing the organization's links to governments and expanding his contact with the civil service.<sup>21</sup> He proceeded to expand the informal links with the civil servants.<sup>22</sup>

Throughout the 1960s the associations moved slowly to broaden their program and policy base. Local associations launched residential and recreation programs, home care programs, rehabilitation workshops, and a variety of other programs.

Financial support came from growing provincial legislation providing grants for services supplied by the voluntary agencies usually on a needs tested basis. This growth in legislation was especially apparent after the introduction of the Canada Assistance Plan in 1966. The funding support for the provincial O.A.R.C. came from several sources - the assessments to the locals,<sup>23</sup> two large estates, and later fund raising telethons.<sup>24</sup> During this time as well the United Way campaigns began to provide substantial incomes for M.R. community programs.<sup>25</sup>

Having set the broad picture of developments in the political administration of the Parents' Movement and the beginning of the relationships between the two in the early years this chapter now proceeds to examine in detail four specific policy initiatives which formed major pieces of policy in the M.R. sector during those years. These policy studies examine the actual policy making process which translates the need and demands of the environment - mostly expressed by groups like the Parents' Movement into public policy. The first of these is the "Blueprint" policy created by the Department of Health in 1965. The Blueprint represents a major re-orientation of the institutional system serving the mentally retarded and an early acknowledgement of the need for community based services. This policy, like many other well publicized developments was a culmination of a long series of adjustments and improvements in the services leading up to 1965.

The second and third policy studies highlight progress in the educational field - specifically, the education of the trainable retarded child in Ontario. The first of these involved the establishment of the joint administrative bodies through which the municipalities became involved in the joint operation of the Council schools. The second education case study proceeds directly from the first. It involved the eventual takeover of the parents' schools by the public school boards.

The fourth study is in the residential care area. It traces the genesis and implementation of the homes for Retarded Persons Act in 1966. This study focuses on the roots and growth of policy relating to community residential care for the mentally retarded.



I. The Coming of Institutional Improvements - The Blueprint

The "Blueprint" was essentially a package of policy improvements announced by the Hon. Matthew Dymond, Minister of Health, in 1965. This policy study examines the events leading up to the blueprint statement including a number of the spinoffs which were intimately related to the policy.

In the latter part of the 1950s the Parents' Movement and the public more generally became more increasingly aware of the poor conditions and the overcrowding which characterized the institutions for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded. The Hospital Schools at Orillia and Smith Falls were chronically overcrowded even though the Smith Falls facility had only recently been opened. Both institutions were very large offering little if any developmental programming for the residents.<sup>26</sup> They had waiting lists which numbered in the thousands. In fact, it was so difficult to get anyone into the institutions for the retarded that most admissions had to be made through referrals from politicians. The administrators of the facilities were left to fight the battle of numbers.<sup>27</sup>

While parents continued to press for better institutional care during this period the literature and the briefs of the government began to voice an interest in the development of residential units which were smaller and more oriented toward research. O.A.R.C. foresaw a unit of 2-300 beds having the advantage of rapid completion "in harmony with modern trends".<sup>28</sup>

"Our main recommendation therefore, was that even though the construction must proceed on the "large" hospital schools like Cedar Springs, immediate action should also be taken to build much smaller units strategically located to encourage research and professional training. Surely a small unit can be located primarily for this purpose. We urge the Department of Health to employ a small hospitals principle in this way in order to relieve the excessive pressures while at the same time placing the whole approach to the problem on a new plane in Canada. Such a progressive step in government institutional policy would deserve the highest praise."<sup>29</sup>

### The Influence of Dr. Dymond

In 1958 Matthew Dymond replaced Dr. Phillips as Minister of Health. Dr. Dymond was a much younger man and came to the Department from the Department of Reform Institutions<sup>30</sup> with a keen interest in improving the conditions in the institutions he had inherited. This interest was partially due to the tremendous clinical strides which had been made in the Mental Health field in the late 1950s. Psychotropic drugs were seen as a whole new way of treating the mentally-ill. In addition, new forms of drugs had been developed which had virtually eliminated T.B.<sup>31</sup>

The Department of Health undertook several improvements in the first year of Dr. Dymond's tenure such as the demolition of the oldest parts of the Orillia Hospital School.

Dr. Dymond's first major move in the M.R. sector, with the solid support of the parents and institutional staff was to intervene in the construction of the Cedar Springs Hospital School to reduce the planned bed capacity from 1,800 to 1,200. Dr. Dymond saw the shift in thinking towards smaller facilities and moved to scale down the Cedar Springs development in spite of the need for growth in the number of beds.<sup>32</sup>

These moves pleased the Parents' Movement who began to feel more confident that the Health Department was interested in their cause even though they saw that the Minister focused the bulk of his attention on the facilities for the mentally ill.<sup>33</sup>

Dr. Dymond showed some interest in the research institute idea promoted strongly by the local association for the mentally retarded in London, Ontario. He decided to convert the Beck T.B. Sanitarium in Byron, Ontario on the outskirts of London into the first diagnostic and assessment centre for mentally retarded children of Canada. This facility was called the Children's Psychiatric Research Institute (C.P.R.I.) and Dr. Don Zarfes was hired as the Administrator.<sup>34</sup>

The establishment of C.P.R.I. provided an opportunity for the Minister to contribute to the resolution of several problems. He had the benefit of responding positively to the work of the influential citizens of London who had been pressing for such a facility. It was a positive indication that the government was looking at other ways of improving the system beyond increasing the number of beds. Another benefit of the establishment of this facility was the employment benefit. Because of the advances in the treatment of Tuberculosis the Beck sanitarium in Byron was no longer needed. Outright closure would result in the loss of jobs to a small community.

While these were probably enough incentives for the Minister there was a strong motivation behind this direction which made the move considerably more desirable. Professionals in the health system had been searching for ways to bring under control the blatant political interventions which were the usual mode of admission to institutions. This political style of placements severely distorted any administration attempts to create programs and contributed to the vast over-crowding. The administrators seized upon the idea of C.P.R.I. as a way to channel admissions through a professional mechanism - an assessment-oriented filter which would bring more control over admissions to the Hospital Schools especially the new Cedar Springs facility.<sup>35</sup> In fact C.P.R.I. did contribute to that direction after it was established.

Of particular interest during this period was the way in which the Minister was able to identify a single response which could deal with a number of demands. He chose the more innovative approach in establishing C.P.R.I. rather than the knee-jerk approach which simply added more beds in big facilities.

The Minister also played a key role in opening his department at several levels to the Parents' Movement. In 1961 when the parents wished to investigate the care and training of the Hospital Schools they sought support from all of the superintendents in the facilities. The Mental Health Division of the Department gave tentative approval to those who wished to submit

information to the association and many responded. The Minister encouraged this openness thereby providing more legitimacy to the parents organizations within the civil service and the institutional framework. Dr. Dymond also encouraged the M.R. institutions to support the auxiliary program run by the parents. The associations were for the first time provided with lists of home addresses of the residents of the provincial institutions so that they could contact other parents who were not part of the association to encourage them to participate in the auxiliary programs.<sup>36</sup>

In 1963 a small delegation from the O.A.R.C. met with Dr. Dymond to express concern about long range planning in the area of residential care for the retarded. Dr. Dymond, though a bit frustrated by the continual demands of the parents, established a consultancy on mental retardation by appointing Dr. Zarfas, the former Director of the Children Psychiatric Research Institute to be part of the Department's Mental Health Division. Moreover he invited the O.A.R.C. Executive Director, Mr Kirk to join with Dr. Zarfas and Dr. McNeil a Director of the Mental Division to jointly formulate new policies for the future.<sup>37</sup> This began a whole series of semi-formal interactions between Dr. Zarfas and the parents movement.<sup>38</sup>

### **Early Attempts at Interdepartmental Co-ordination**

While the liaison committee was able to work out some ways of improving specific programming - especially training for the adults in institutions<sup>39</sup> - the liaison function was probably more useful in strengthening the links between the civil service and O.A.R.C. than in any specific outcomes.

In the latter part of 1963 the Department of Health in response to the federal government's announcements of a national conference on mental retardation asked the liaison committee to prepare Ontario's position paper.<sup>40</sup>

"The Spectrum of Mental Retardation Services in Ontario" was the paper prepared by the liaison committee for the 1964 conference.<sup>41</sup>

Though the paper did not have as its prime objectives the development of recommendations to the Ontario government it did comment upon the need for increased coordination and decentralization of responsibilities for the operation for the Hospital Schools. The committee suggested the development of a standing interdepartmental committee on mental retardation which "must have wide policy making powers and involve the devolution of certain departmental authority and responsibility."<sup>42</sup> The committee further saw that residential care alone was no longer adequate to meet the needs of the mentally retarded.<sup>43</sup> "Instead it had been suggested that all programs should be strengthened to include treatment, training and education."<sup>44</sup>

After the 1964 National Conference in Ottawa, Dr. Dymond asked the committee to stay on to submit plans for the future directions of M.R. services.

Before proceeding to discuss the recommendations of the Liaison Committee, it is important to step back slightly to look at the wider context in which these discussions were proceeding. It is important to note that this committee was created and orchestrated by Dr. Zarfes in the Health Department. It had representation from Health, Public Welfare, Education and O.A.R.C. (i.e., Bill Kirk). Health, i.e., Dr. Dymond was supportive. Education, as later material will show, was also supportive. Public Welfare was not.<sup>45</sup>

The committee was given mandate and support in the Department of Health to explore matters which ranged beyond the jurisdiction of that one department.<sup>46</sup> It tapped new ideas around a number of points. In a general sense, it moved beyond the exclusive focus on institution and schools to the wide ranging support services which were required by the mentally retarded.<sup>47</sup> It noted the "traditional role of the Department of Public Welfare and voluntary agencies has been to provide for the needs of the retarded through general welfare services". It continued "it is recommended that immediate attention be given to the development of specialized programs for community residential care and sheltered employment."<sup>48</sup> This

clearly had the effect of mounting enormous pressure on Public Welfare even though the Report was sent to the Minister of Health.

The output of the liaison group was sent to Dr. Dymond in 1965 in the form of recommendations for action based on a philosophy of shared responsibility for services. The recommendations speak to the issues of how coordination should be managed, the roles of various departments, and the improvements which should be introduced in Health facilities themselves. It was agreed that the Department of Health should still carry "the major responsibility for those mentally retarded whose condition is complicated by severe physical and mental impairment."<sup>49</sup> They surfaced a theme that residential and diagnostic centres should be run by Boards, as were the public hospitals, and recommended the establishment of Mental Retardation Services Branch as a separate Branch within the Mental Health Division.

Part of the document was devoted to the recommendations for the improvement of the Hospital Schools themselves including the adoption of a "unit" system. "Each unit should have a Director appropriately trained who is responsible directly to the Superintendent for the operation of the program, as well as being responsible for the total care of patients in the residential setting."

The facilities would organize their programs around four basic units. The first was a medical nursing unit for the patients with more physically oriented needs. The pre-school or activity unit, was responsible for the care of children and geared to teaching skills of self care and socialization. An Education Unit would be responsible for schools and living programs of residents who could benefit from academically oriented setting. Finally the Adult Services unit would provide vocationally oriented training for adults.<sup>50</sup>

The report was presented to Dr. Dymond, who, after considering the recommendations presented them to his Cabinet colleagues. The Report was approved by Cabinet and printed as the policy of the government known as the "Blueprint".



The government accepted the entire direction of the reorganization of institutional services along the unit lines and the creation of a Mental Retardation Branch within the new Mental Health Division. The government also gave acceptance to the idea of increased responsibility of Public Welfare. It did not accept the suggestions that community boards be established for institutions or that a Deputy Ministers Co-ordinating Committee be set in place.<sup>52</sup> Instead it accepted the idea of a permanent departmental committee though, as time was to prove, that committee was limited without the support of senior personnel or budget. By the time the Blueprint was printed, then, it was no longer a discussion paper but a formalized expression of government policy. The interdepartmental committee was formed and the unit system implemented in the hospital schools.

#### **The Implications of the Blueprint for the Policy Making Process**

The Blueprint policy provides considerable meat for examining the evolution of policy making with respect to the mentally retarded. Among the important features were 1) the legitimization of O.A.R.C. 2) the incorporation of O.A.R.C. in policy development, 3) the broader based approach to policy making which incorporated several diverse interests and demands and 4) an example of the effect an initiative in one Department can have influencing policy for which another is responsible.

The incorporation of O.A.R.C. in the process, then, both legitimized them in the process and gave them increased influence on policy initiatives. The Minister, in opening the doors to collaboration with O.A.R.C. was expressing a change in political style. Dymond was able to tap the latent strength of the Association and make them partners in the process. This is a clear shift from his predecessors who had allowed resentment and anger to build for a decade.

In the events that led up to the development of the Blueprint the Minister was able to undertake initiatives which represented a pragmatic accommodation which combined many pressures of the time - pressures from over-crowding, from parents and staff, from communities about to lose

employment and from professionals interested in improving the system, into a successful policy package.

Dr. Dymond's moves involved more than openness. It involved considerable skill and initiative on the part of the Minister. Moreover, this accommodation may be exemplary of the shift in government policy making from a former stance of response to a single pressure to a newer style of policy making which places high value on the aggregation of a variety of pressures into a coherent policy package.

It is important to note as well that the approach taken by Dr. Dymond, though it was politically imaginative seems to have also incorporated a minimalist response given the economic times. It must be remembered that money was readily available in the early 1960s and that the mental health system was expanding dramatically. It seems somewhat incredible that the Minister was able to effect quite positive changes in the mental retardation system while at the same time scaling back a number of beds (and costs) which had already been planned in Cedar Springs.

In essence, then, while the style and skill of the politicians seems to have changed significantly in this case study, the actual output of the process continued to embody a tight rein on expenditure increases.

## **II. The Development of the Homes for Retarded Persons Act**

The Homes for Retarded Persons Act of 1966 was not the first legislation relating to community residences for the retarded. It was, however, as this material will explain, a change in scope.

As has been noted in earlier discussions the Parents' Movement was making inroads with the Departments of Health and Education in the late 1950s and early 1960s. During this time, there was a growing interest on the part of a small number of people in the Movement in the development of community residences. The Department of Health had moved some way to respond to this need through the development of smaller facilities i.e., with 2-300

residents and through the scaling down of the facility at Cedar Spring. Some influential members of the Parents' Movement, however, looked to a much smaller scale in terms of residential care.<sup>53</sup>

It is clear that senior Health and O.A.R.C. officials were developing a clearer idea of the role of the community and that facilities were beginning to be viewed as resources rather than permanent holding stations. Though the full import of future residences was not clear the early ideas about the community living direction were beginning to emerge in the early 1960s.

### **The First Community Residence**

In 1961, The Metro Toronto Association for Retarded Children held a very successful capital funding campaign which had raised over \$1 million in a telethon associated with the opening of a new television station. One of the projects included in that telethon campaign was a combined school/residence for retarded children. Both the province and the municipality of Metro Toronto had agreed to contribute to the capital fund.<sup>54</sup>

Construction began on the M.T.A.R.C. residential school in 1961.<sup>55</sup> At that time there was no provincial operating funding for community residential care for the mental retarded. The Department of Public Welfare was funding voluntary agencies providing residential programs for the aged, charitable institutions and was responsible for licensing children's boarding homes. The Department of Public Welfare, then, was identified as the department in government which gave money to voluntary sector deliverers - an undertaking which neither Health nor Education had traditionally allowed. Through 1961 and 1962 the Metro Toronto Association for Retarded Children lobbied the Health and Education Departments to extend their grants to residences for retarded children.<sup>56</sup> Feeding into the Metro initiative as well was the Toronto Social Planning Council study released in 1961 recommending among other things that all residential units for the retarded "not exceed 50 beds" and that there should be "half-way" houses for discharged patients. They further recommended provision of voluntary short term residential care for retarded children and adults should be the responsibility of the Metro Toronto

Association for Retarded Children.<sup>57</sup>

Under pressure from the Metro Association as well as the Departments of Health and Education, Cabinet decided that the Department of Public Welfare should create legislation in this area.<sup>58</sup> In December 1962, an act was brought forward but the Minister of Public Welfare in fact created a highly restrictive piece of legislation which was intended only to fund the Metro Toronto Residence.<sup>60</sup>

"The Association was gratified at the announcement in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the present session of the legislature. It is intended to bring legislation covering precisely this need. It is felt that such residences could best serve the mobile trainable retarded who for various reasons cannot remain in their home but who could continue to benefit from community training facilities if residential accommodation were available nearby."<sup>61</sup>

While supporting the government's initiative in funding community residences, O.A.R.C. was nevertheless very cautious in their approach arguing that there would nevertheless be a need for expansion for institutional beds. This caution mirrored a growing concern among parents about guardianship issues.<sup>62</sup> There was and is an overriding concern on the part of parents of retarded children about what will happen after the parents are too old to look after them. As the idea of community residential care began to emerge in the early 1960s parents began to feel the institution was being undermined. Since the institutional care was a symbol of stability and long term care and commitment for their children many parents began to look apprehensively at the whole community living direction.<sup>63</sup>

Though M.T.A.R.C. had engineered the legislation it was quite clear that the idea of proceeding into wholesale provision of residences for the mentally retarded at the community level was in no one's mind.

The metro residence - the H. R. Lawson Home was opened in 1963 with operating grants from the Department of Public Welfare.<sup>64</sup>

In contrast to the discussions between the Department of Health and O.A.R.C. in the drafting of the Blueprint policy the drafting of the Homes for Retarded Children's Act was almost purely internal. At a late date the legislation was reviewed and supported by the interdepartmental committee as well as Health and Education. O.A.R.C. was consulted at the last minute for their comments by the Deputy Minister of Public Welfare, Mr. Band. In fact, Mr. Band contacted the Executive Director of O.A.R.C. on a Friday evening informing them that he would like their comments by Monday so that the Minister could introduce the legislation in the House on the following Tuesday.<sup>65</sup>

The response of the Department of Public Welfare to the residential development in Metro Toronto provides virtually no indication that either the Department or O.A.R.C. recognized or anticipated the growing move toward community residential services.

Though the Homes for Retarded Children's Act was heavily criticized by the Opposition of the small amount of provision attached to it, the Act was passed readily in the legislature. The Act provided for \$1,500 per bed for construction of residences and 50% provincial sharing in operating costs. The legislation was intended to provide accommodation for children who could benefit from instruction in one of the schools for the trainable retarded but who for some reason could not live at home. The age limit was set at 18 the same age as public school legislation.<sup>66</sup>

The passing of the legislation did not have much immediate impact. The Department of Public Welfare dragged its feet taking a long time to prepare the regulations. O.A.R.C. was only luke-warm in its support and the high contribution rate demanded of the sponsoring agencies acted as a financial disincentive. Moreover the Act was very restrictive including the requirement that the organization providing a residence receive several approvals from Cabinet both in the development and initiation of their programs. The process of approval and eventual funding made excessive demands on the sponsoring agencies in terms of cash flow and determination to go ahead with the plans.

After the legislation was created and Lawson residence established, O.A.R.C. began to see some of the possibilities in the community residential area though they emphasized the auxiliary nature of the legislation continuing to concentrate most of their efforts in the improvement of institutional and educational programs.<sup>67</sup>

### The Push For More Community Residences

The main momentum which kept the community residential interest alive was the linkage between Gerald Anglin, the Chairman of the O.A.R.C. Institutions Committee, William Kirk, the Executive Director of O.A.R.C. and Dr. Zarfes.<sup>68</sup> Slowly plans for the development of residences began to flow into the Department of Public Welfare in the latter part of 1964 and 1965. Even this mild interest in the development of residential programs brought claims from community groups that the legislation was seriously inadequate.<sup>69</sup> The problems in the legislation were taken by O.A.R.C. to the Interdepartmental Committee and to the Department of Public Welfare.

Gradually the experience of the Lawson residence in Toronto provided a successful example of community residential care. Toward the end of 1964 the local associations who were planning residences began to pressure the administrative level of Public Welfare in which one Child Welfare Supervisor had been appointed to be responsible for the M.R. residences.<sup>70</sup> That Supervisor was also responsible for the Children's Boarding Homes Act and the Charitable Institutions Act leaving very little time for the MR residences.<sup>71</sup>

In late 1964 the federally sponsored Conference on Mental Retardation created a forum for discussion of issues and thinking about future directions. That conference saw considerable discussion of the community residence idea. The strongest proponents of these directions came from Dr. Dymond's Interdepartmental Committee members. In early 1965 following up on the national conference some senior board members at O.A.R.C. began to push with renewed vigor writing editorials in the O.A.R.C. newsletter urging the commitment to the community residential idea.<sup>72</sup> By this time the



association had hired a full time staff person assigned to stimulate residential growth.<sup>73</sup> The staff person sent out a number of information packages to locals encouraging planning. These documents dealt with many issues including grant structures, financial implications for Children's Aid Society wards, zoning and many others. The first report stressed the value of residences for children and the benefits of community living.<sup>74</sup>

O.A.R.C. concentrated the lobbying efforts around residential care through the Interdepartmental Committee which was in turn recommending action to Public Welfare and Health. The Committee suggested the improvement of capital grant to the 80% level to enable them to build residences and that operating costs be increased to 80% as well. They further recommended pilot projects in conjunction with the centennial project (1967) planned by O.A.R.C. and patterned after the funding formula used in the support for the homes for the aged.

At this point the interdepartmental committee, with support from Health put emphasis on expansion of community residential care in the Blueprint document which was approved by Cabinet and released by Dr. Dymond in early 1965.

As pressure mounted the Department of Public Welfare brought forward Bill 155, an Act to Amend the Homes for Retarded Children's Act. This legislation responded to the specific concerns about the inadequate funding base for the residences. It raised the operating subsidy from 50% to 75% and increased the capital grant from \$2,500 to \$5,000 per bed.<sup>75</sup>

The timing of this bill is interesting in that Dr. Zarfes "Blueprint" had already been made public and there was a growing momentum for community residential care. Yet Public Welfare brought forward an amendment which dealt only with financial issues. It did not include adults. It did not remove the cumbersome approval processes. The whole process seems curiously out of step with the action in O.A.R.C. and Health.



In fact, the Act was so limited in scope, and so insensitive to the groundswell of demand that Public Welfare, under a new Minister, was back in the House less than a year later with another Bill to Amend the Homes for Retarded Children's Act.<sup>76</sup> This time the funding formula was extended from 75% to 80% and the age limit was removed. Finally, the link between the residences and the schools was dropped. This new Act was entitled The Homes for Retarded Persons Act of 1966.

The saga, however, was not over. The lack of commitment to this legislation gradually became apparent as the Department once again delayed bringing forward the regulations. In fact, the delay was so long that a further amendment to the Act itself had to be created (Bill 62) in March 1968 to allow for retroactive payments.<sup>77</sup> On March 1, 1968, the regulations were finally published bringing into force the legislative Amendments of 1966.

From our review of the development of the Homes for Retarded Persons Act, one can see several apparent weaknesses in the policy making approach of the Department of Public Welfare. There was a clear lack of Ministerial leadership, highly limited consultation with those affected, a cumbersome and restrictive approach to the legislative and regulatory provisions and a lack of commitment to this whole program area.

It must be remembered, however, that Public Welfare did not have the benefit of 80 years experience with the retarded as the Ministry of Health had or ten years dealing with the Parents' Movement which both Health and Education had. There were no professionals in the Department who had any background in this field. The decision to develop community residential care was, in fact, dumped on this Department by more senior Cabinet Ministers who had apparently no qualms about the developing policy which Public Welfare had to implement.

The Homes for Retarded Persons legislation is interesting and ironic from the perspective of Ministerial leadership. With the exception of the actual presentation of the bills in the House there is no suggestion that the Ministers of Public Welfare were involved, much less leading these events. The

primary person who dealt with Health and the Interdepartmental committee was the Director of the Vocational Rehabilitation Branch - a man with limited time or interest in residential issues.<sup>78</sup> Mr. Band, the Deputy Minister was involved in the drafting of the Acts and did consult briefly with O.A.R.C.

One effect of the lack of Ministerial presence, was the passing of political cudors to Dr. Dymond while taking all the flack for the inadequate legislation and stumbling implementation.

Another important factor in the discussion of The Homes for Retarded Persons Act was the controversy and lukewarm support in the Parents' Movement. While there had been a considerable consensus of opinion around the development of the schools and institutional improvements the residential program did not enjoy a clear consensus.

Still on the subject of the Parents' Movement it is highly interesting to note that the community residential policy area is the first example of O.A.R.C. shifting to a more prescriptive role. A small group of board members and professionals moved ahead of the parents in exploring and promoting the community residence idea through the Interdepartmental Committee. It was clear that the local associations were quite reluctant at first fearing the loss of security associated with the institutional system. This promotional role of the O.A.R.C. leadership within its own ranks which will appear with increasing frequency in the later years is examined in succeeding pages.

### **III. The Retarded Children's Education Authorities**

Nineteen Sixty-five was a watershed year for the mentally retarded and their families in Ontario. On January 1 of that year the cost of operation of the parents' schools, was assumed by newly formed Retarded Children's Education Authorities. These Authorities were boards of management appointed by the Minister of Education comprised of representatives of the local associations for the mentally retarded and the local municipal councils. Funding for the operation of the school system was, commencing January 1, 1965, shared by

the province and local municipalities on 80/20 basis. The schools owned by the local associations remained in their hands and the associations continued to be responsible for capital projects.<sup>79</sup>

By the 1960s there was considerable experience in the public school system in the training of educable<sup>80</sup> retarded children. Though these programs were still discretionary, a large number of these children were attending "auxiliary" classes operated by local school boards under the authority of the School Administration Act (1948).<sup>81</sup> This Act specifically excluded the 'trainable' retarded<sup>82</sup> who, as we have seen, were incorporated into the parents' schools beginning around 1950.

During the 1950s the parents had made several approaches to the province taking a variety of strategies and positions respecting the education of both the 'educable', and the 'trainable' children.

The O.A.R.C.'s Brief to the Cabinet in 1957 sought closer connection between O.A.R.C. schools and the Inspectors in the education system. Moreover, parents requested that "the Ontario government revise and clarify the Public Schools Act, Section 5 and the Schools Administration Act, Section 5-1 so as to remove any barriers or misconceptions that might lead local municipal authorities and Boards of Education to believe that their responsibilities exclude the trainable retarded. That Brief also sought to transfer the schools to the public school boards and the establishment of joint committees to oversee the transfer."<sup>83</sup>

The approach was not too subtle. They foresaw gradual infiltration into the regular school system at several levels: an Inspectorate, the classroom and the board.

At the O.A.R.C. annual meeting in 1958 a resolution was adopted taking a slightly more conservative tack. They sought the Department of Education's agreement to allow local boards to dispense money to the associations for the operation of their schools.<sup>84</sup> It is clear from this and other documents of the time that there was some wavering on the question of continued direct

operation of the schools by the parents' organizations. A divergence of opinion was developing between public takeover which was broached in O.A.R.C. briefs and the resolutions which came forward at the annual meeting stressing funding which would leave the schools in parental hands.

The Department of Education did not like the idea of school boards purchasing services because of a long standing policy in that Department which favoured direct payment to the Board providing the service rather than allowing the boards to purchase services.<sup>85</sup>

In the background to the discussion between O.A.R.C. and the Department was considerable concern on the part of the local boards of education. Among their concerns was strong professional resistance to incorporation of the lower functioning retarded, the trainable group, in the school system. Additionally, neither the Ministry of Education nor the boards of education had a very clear idea about the size of the problem. Many feared that there were large numbers of children living with their parents in communities across Ontario who would swell demand for programs once they were started. There were also objections on economic ground since the municipalities feared that the inclusion of mentally retarded children would put severe demands on their municipal tax base which had the majority funding portion of the school system.<sup>86</sup>

By 1959, there were 1,500 children in the parent's schools and it was becoming increasingly difficult for the Department of Education to look at them as "experimental". The education officials continued however to be sensitive to the "local educators" who looked on the retarded as "a training problem which should be under another Department, i.e., Health or Public Welfare."<sup>87</sup>

In 1959 the association in their yearly Brief to the Cabinet pressed the Minister of Education, Dr. Dunlop for a mandatory provision of education in auxiliary classes and "under exceptional circumstances, the enrollment of those with IQ's up to 65" in the O.A.R.C. schools. In this way the parents sought to provide for the educable children who were still excluded from classes in many areas, either in auxiliary classes or in their own system.

Again in this document O.A.R.C. asked for the eventual integration of parent's schools into "the general public and separate school systems."<sup>88</sup>

By this time, it was possible to detect some modifications in the official view of the departmental officials for the parent operated schools. H. R. Beatty who was the senior departmental official responsible for oversight of these schools came to the belief in late 50s that:

"even though there are obstacles which stand in the way of placing the schools for the retarded under the administration of the School Boards steps should be taken at the appropriate time to strengthen the present system and to move gradually toward the time when local charity drives are unnecessary for the support of the schools with the required funding for operations of the schools coming from grants of the Government of Ontario and local taxation."<sup>89</sup>

Clearly, there is some change in attitude in the Education Department over these years and increasing common ground between the attitudes of the public sector officials and O.A.R.C. Though this statement does not necessarily imply integration it does accept the idea of public funding.

By 1960 the internal controversy among the parents over the continued operation versus divestment surfaced more obviously.<sup>90</sup> In that year as well the Minister of Education, Dr. Dunlop retired and was replaced by Hon. John Robarts.<sup>91</sup> O.A.R.C. responded to the appointment of the new Minister by preparing a new Brief which pressed for the extension of school board grants in support of their operations.<sup>92</sup>

The Deputy Minister of Education met with representatives of O.A.R.C. who asked him for improvements in the operating and capital grants and changes in the age limits for children who were subsidized in the O.A.R.C. schools.<sup>93</sup>

The Deputy met with the President of O.A.R.C. and Executive Director several times over the winter of 1961 in an attempt to find ways to improve the MR school system.<sup>94</sup> In the absence of agreement among the membership, O.A.R.C. board decided to continue to pressure for a broadening of the age and financial support framework.<sup>95</sup> At the end of this series of

meetings, Mr. Robarts announced a small increment in the operating and capital grants for the schools and appointed an additional Inspector in the Special Schools and Services Division.<sup>96</sup> O.A.R.C. saw these changes as a breakthrough in spite of the fact that no public commitments had been made concerning the future direction.<sup>97</sup>

In fact, the integration issue had been left in a sort of limbo. It is clear that though the legislation in 1961 sidestepped the question of integration, the Minister was able to make some improvements in the funding arrangements without becoming involved in the raging internal debate.

The capability to proceed with policy improvement in spite of the controversy is also a testimony to the skills of the provincial association who were able to avoid outright confrontation by agreeing to a position with which both sides of the controversy could live.

In 1962, a new factor was inserted in the education pattern which altered the balance considerably. The new factor was the new Minister, William G. Davis. Davis came to the Department with some demonstrated personal concern for the retarded.<sup>98</sup> O.A.R.C. again seized the opportunity of the appointment sending the new Minister a letter of congratulations and inviting him to have lunch with them. The Minister met with the Executive Director, the President and Chairman of the Education Committee and pledged his support to improve the situation for the retarded in some form.<sup>99</sup>

Very soon after he came into Office, Mr. Davis under questioning in the House was informing the Members that he had been in consultation with representatives of the parents' movement and had accepted the principle that retarded children's education should not be dependent upon campaigns and public charity.<sup>100</sup> The new Minister had moved very quickly to identify an issue at the heart of the parents' long struggle i.e., the right of mentally retarded children to publicly supported education.<sup>101</sup> He was able to make a political commitment to this direction while continuing as his predecessor had to avoid the issues related to who should run the schools.



### The Emergence of the 'Authorities' Plan

Davis and Beatty came up with a plan which would create Retarded Children's Education Authorities - joint municipal/parent boards to be responsible for the operation of the schools.

This plan had several strong points. It incorporated the commitment of the province to removing the parents schools from dependence on private charity. It provided a more reliable and enhanced funding base for the teachers. It offset the concerns of parents who wished to continue to operate the schools directly and it represented one step toward public operation of the schools which appealed to those who supported the integration idea. According to the Ministry of Education Officials it also had the advantage of providing more time for local school boards and local communities to accept and understand the education needs of mentally retarded children.

The idea of the Authorities was able to offset the concerns of local school boards in not giving them responsibility in operation of the schools. Moreover, Davis was able to assure the municipalities that once the Authorities were established the province would fund those programs at 80% of their cost whereas the provincial share of the public school operation was between 35 and 38%. It would have been very difficult to rationalize this richer formula for the retarded under the school board's jurisdiction.

Having identified a direction the Education Department met in "absolute" confidence with the President and Senior Officials at O.A.R.C. and gained their "whole hearted support in principle".<sup>102</sup> Thereafter the Department and the association began to work in concert at the Board level in an attempt to work out details such as how local Boards should be appointed and how the Authorities could be established.<sup>103</sup>

Having hammered out an agreement with O.A.R.C. and having dealt with the concerns of the municipalities<sup>104</sup> the department introduced Bill 151 in early 1964. In the time between the development of the Authorities idea and its actual implementation the O.A.R.C. board and senior staff had spent

considerable time discussing this idea with the locals and promoting the compromise stand.

The Authorities were established on January the 1st 1965 and immediately tended to be dominated by the local associations. Because the municipal councils were not required to appoint representatives from within their ranks they often sought the advice of the parents' organizations respecting membership. Metro Toronto was a typical example of this phenomenon. The Authority had five members. A Chairman appointed by Metro council, two other appointees from Metro and two from M.T.A.R.C. The Chairman appointed by the Metro Council was the immediate past President of M.T.A.R.C.<sup>105</sup> Thus there were three people out of the five from the Metro Toronto Association for the Mentally Retarded. At their first meeting the Authority appointed the Executive Director of the Metro Toronto Association as Executive Secretary to the Authority. They then appointed an Executive Committee for the Authority comprised of the Chairman, the Executive Secretary and the President of M.T.A.R.C. In short the Executive Committee for the Authority was comprised of the President of MTARC, the Executive Director of M.T.A.R.C. and the past President of M.T.A.R.C.<sup>106</sup>

The Authorities policy highlights a number of new developments in both the public sector and the Parents' Movement. Whereas Robarts had accepted as given the controversy in the Movement and had consequently responded with minimal change, Davis was able to go one step further negotiating support from the O.A.R.C. board for a more imaginative approach. The Minister's initiatives drew the O.A.R.C. Executive into collaboration with the government in the promotion of change which was still controversial at the local levels. As in the Homes for Retarded Persons case study, the O.A.R.C. Executive are assuming a leadership role more than a representational one.

#### IV. The Integration of the Schools

Once the Retarded Children's Education Authorities were in place there was considerable growth in the educational system and a certain

professionalization of the processes in those schools.<sup>107</sup> The major difficulty experienced by the associations was the increased demand for capital construction.<sup>108</sup>

While the Authorities were being set up and through the first year of operation most education issues were placed on the back burner by the O.A.R.C. The capital issue, however, did not subside. This matter was taken by the Executive Director to the Inter-Departmental Committee.<sup>109</sup> Without quick resolution the recommendation came forward again at the annual meeting of the Association in 1966. While there was discussion at this annual meeting O.A.R.C. delayed pressing government on these requests because of the recent gains in the education field.<sup>110</sup>

By 1967 the pressure within O.A.R.C. for integration began to surface again. The Association's President and Executive Director at the 1967 annual meeting persuaded the membership to allow them to pursue the integration issue through informal staff contacts.

An important feature in the discussions between O.A.R.C. and the government at this time was a shift in leadership in the Executive. The main link between government and the Association up until 1967 was Bill Kirk the Executive Director. After 1967 the O.A.R.C. board was somewhat concerned about this exclusively executive linkage and decided to strengthen the role of the Board itself and its subcommittees in dealing with government.<sup>111</sup> The Board members who were appointed to deal with government sought a meeting with the Minister of Education and began to press more forcefully for more financial assistance for the Authorities and the transfer of the schools to local school boards.<sup>112</sup>

During this time the Department of Education was beginning a process of examining the framework of public, high school and separate school boards which managed the local school systems. The province saw the necessity for a major reconsolidation of the thousands of local boards into larger units. This restructuring had begun at the primary level in 1964. The

reconsolidation of the secondary system was already being planned in 1967 when the issue of the MR integration came forward again.<sup>113</sup>

From the discussions with L.M. Johnson (Deputy Minister) and Officials in the Department it was clear that the question of integration of the schools was a clear possibility. The provincial Supervisor for the Authority system, Mr. Reynolds and other Senior people in the Department saw the potential for incorporating the MR system in the larger school system at the time of consolidation. Several problems had been identified. One of these was the ownership of the parents' schools. Another problem was the variety of local board arrangements which existed. There would be difficulty in fitting the Association schools into local patterns of public and separate, primary and secondary schools. Moreover, the funding formula for the Authority schools was more generous than either the public and separate systems.<sup>114</sup> They were also aware that there was considerable ambivalence in the local Associations for the Mentally Retarded at the time though the Senior Officials at O.A.M.R.<sup>115</sup> supported the move.<sup>116</sup>

The Provincial Government noting this ambivalence in the Parents' Movement reasoned that consensus could not be achieved in the short term. On the other hand, if the consensus were not worked out quickly the chances were that once the new reorganized School Boards were in place they would generate opposition to integration. The choice then, was either to include this change with the larger one thus limiting the opportunity of local educators to raise objections or to accept the fact that the Authority system would likely continue for many years. If the Department opted for the latter alternative they could look forward to either funding the MR schools at a higher rate than the public schools or to have constant pressure from the parents.

There were professional considerations as well. Although the Authorities ran smoothly they were quite conservative in their approach to the provision of facilities and programs. Many worked from a "small organization outlook".<sup>117</sup> Teachers were less qualified than those in the regular school system and had no career structure. Many of the children were quite high functioning and Mr. Reynolds and other provincial authorities saw that these

children could benefit from the more professional training available in the public school system.<sup>118</sup>

This interest in professional training for the more capable mentally retarded children was a recent development which gained some momentum after the Authorities were set up. The teaching profession, while they did not believe that "training" was their business began to see that many of these children had more potential than they had thought. To some degree, then professional interest in providing a good standard of education began to counterbalance the more traditional view that these children were not an educational matter. Resistance among teachers was lessening.<sup>119</sup>

In an atmosphere of continuing uncertainty the education department carried on quietly its planning for the transfer at the time of reorganization with the co-operation of senior O.A.M.R. representatives.<sup>120</sup>

As the local Associations began to become more aware of the pressure their provincial Association was generating toward integration they began to object to the Board. This brought a slight retrenchment in the position of the O.A.M.R. Board.<sup>121</sup> They wrote to the Minister in October 1967 noting that "the problem of how, ultimately, to meld schools for retarded children into the regular school system, and how this can best be accomplished and financed is a long term proposition."<sup>122</sup> The letter also reinforced the concerns of the locals that immediate financial problems were of more concern to the Parents' Movement than integration.<sup>123</sup>

In October 1967, the Premier, Mr. Robarts made an announcement about the reconsolidation of the County Board system noting "equal opportunity for every child".<sup>124</sup> O.A.M.R. wrote to the Minister of Education noting that this "implied" the retarded child as well. O.A.M.R. again requested at the meeting with officials "to discuss the possibilities".<sup>125</sup> Though the membership of the Association were still divided on the issue of integration, it is clear that the Board finally took position in favour of integration. In discussion with Departmental officials and the Federation of Retarded Children Authorities they began to press for a "melding of our retarded

children schools into the regular school system".<sup>126</sup> It is clear that the Minister of Education was by this time becoming impatient with the O.A.M.R. ambivalence. He met personally with Officials of O.A.M.R. outlining the planning the Education Department had undertaken and encouraging them to take the initiative to clear up the ambivalence.<sup>127</sup> The Minister was pushing the Board to pick up leadership on this issue and work on the membership. Such an initiative would either bring sufficient opposition to enable the Department to set the idea of transfer aside or enlist the Board in a campaign to convince the membership of the appropriateness of the direction in time to include it in the reorganization package.

After this meeting with Mr. Davis, O.A.M.R. began to meet with representatives of the Department to examine in more detail the types of provisions which would be included in the Bill.<sup>128</sup> There were several issues which had to be dealt with. The first was a sensitive issue of the property. It was agreed that provision would be made for the investiture of the property in the School Boards as of January 1st, 1969 and that a Committee would be set up to work out compensation due the locals for their schools. In return the O.A.M.R. Board agreed to persuade the local Associations to write off the school property since so much of the money came from government in the first place.<sup>129</sup> In most cases, this is what did happen.

Another issue discussed between the Department and O.A.M.R. was the question of separate school participation. The Separate School Boards were not part of the public school system and therefore not a part of the reorganization. Local O.A.R.C. representatives and the Department felt that the MR schools should be incorporated in the public school system rather than provided from both the public school and the separate school base. This issue however, was potentially quite dangerous since many of the parents in the Movement were Catholic. O.A.R.C. agreed to support the government's move to put the MR schools under the public school boards and also agreed to persuade the local Associations to support the move.<sup>130</sup>

By the Spring of 1968, the O.A.M.R. Board members felt they had improved support and could sell integration to the rest of the parents.<sup>131</sup> The Board



met with the Minister and officially agreed on behalf of the Association to the idea of passing the schools to the Public Boards of Education. A key adjunct to the plan was the agreement of the Department to have mandatory Advisory Committees to the local boards of education which would oversee the MR schools. These Advisory Committees would have mandatory appointees from the local Associations. This assurance made it much easier for the O.A.M.R. to sell the benefits of integration.<sup>132</sup>

After these issues had been agreed between Department officials and the O.A.M.R. Board the two combined efforts to do a thorough job of convincing the local Associations of the benefits of the move. Departmental officials and O.A.M.R. Board members met with all of the Presidents of the local Associations in May of 1968.<sup>133</sup> These meetings were bolstered by individual letters from the Minister to the Presidents of each local association.<sup>134</sup>

The transfer dominated discussion at the 1968 annual meeting.<sup>135</sup> Mr. Reynolds representing the Department of Education spoke at length and answered questions on the move.<sup>136</sup> Mr. Grigor, the incoming President spoke strongly, arguing for the acceptance of the legislation to meet the long term goals of the parents Movement.<sup>137</sup> The meeting gave an informal approval to the plan and the Department went ahead reassured.<sup>138</sup> After the meeting, the Board renewed its efforts to persuade those still opposed.<sup>139</sup>

It is clear that the negotiation and implementation of the integration policy represented a new step in governmental/O.A.M.R. relations. In this case, the public and voluntary sector actors can be seen to be collaborating extensively to create consensus. Whereas Dr. Dymond, as Minister of Health had been quite imaginative in packaging a consensus which was more or less latent, Mr. Davis and his officials went one step further by actually generating the consensus and combining their efforts with a small group of O.A.M.R. representatives to persuade the larger group.

The extent of collaboration is amplified in a letter from one of the O.A.M.R. Board members Mr. Gibard to Mr. Davis, on May 24, 1968 outlining O.A.M.R. support for the move and offering "my assistance to quell any brush fires that

may arise. If I could be informed of any problems of dissention from any of our affiliated locals, I would be pleased to move in and deal with the situation."<sup>140</sup>

The discussions leading up to the transfer were kept highly confidential until very late in the process. For example, in the March meeting of the Metro Toronto Retarded Children's Education Authority there was a "hint of new legislation affecting the authorities."<sup>141</sup> This was long after negotiations had been underway between O.A.M.R. and the Education Department and only two months before the full blown plans were presented to the annual meeting of O.A.M.R.

The Bill was introduced in the House on May 10th. By June 10th, the regulations were out. The entire process from approval at the annual meeting to third reading took little more than two months. This is especially outstanding considering the legislation and regulations relating to residential care took well over three years under the Department of Public Welfare.

Bill 120, an Act to Amend the Secondary Schools and Boards of Education Act came in effect January 1st, 1969 bringing the Authority Schools under the new County Boards of Education. The Bill incorporated the accommodations worked out between the Associations and the Department including mandatory participation by local associations.<sup>142</sup>

### Summary of Developments During the 1960s

It is clear from the material that a number of major shifts occurred, during the 1960s both in the Parents' Movement itself and in the public administration. In an environment of growth, the Parents' Movement continued to expand and use the methods of local support development it had started in earlier years. It is testimony to the increasing capability of the Movement that in 1960 it had enough influence that it could create enough pressure that the Premier would meet with the executives of O.A.R.C.

In the public sector, the 1960s witnessed a growing attention to improving financial controls and good management within the public service. During this time as well, there seems to be a shift in attitudes in the government as the old line ministers began to be replaced by such new ministers as Dr. Dymond, Mr. Davis and Mr. Robarts. These ministers were more accessible to private interest groups and recognized the benefits which could be derived from contact with such organizations.

During this time, there is a clear shift in communications activity between the public and voluntary sector. The ministers took leadership in opening the doors of the bureaucracy to the Parents' Movement. The Movement took advantage of this entering into a variety of liaison roles such as the inter-departmental committee and the institutional auxiliaries. While the non-governmental actors never participated directly in the final decisions of the government, they moved step by step toward increasing participation in those decisions. These steps began with Dr. Dymond's initiatives consulting with O.A.R.C. through its Executive Director. The Blueprint policy, was a significant step in legitimizing the role of O.A.R.C. in co-operation with senior bureaucrats. The Education case studies reflect an even closer relationship approximating the symbiotic paradigm.

It is clear that a major factor in the development of this symbiosis was the change in policy making style of the political administration. Dunlop and Phillips resisted policy change and adopted a "knee-jerk" response to the parental initiatives. These ministers displayed policy responses which were unimaginative and unsophisticated. Their style of policy development was unidimensional. The policy maker responds directly to a specific pressure when it becomes so great that he cannot resist any longer. There are clear distinctions between those involved in the creation of policy and those who are pressuring for change.

In the 1960s the methods or processes of policy development began to shift considerably. This shift can largely be attributed to the initiatives taken by the new ministers, like Dymond and Davis. They essentially shifted to collaborative style of policy development. This style recognizes and uses community power bases to the political advantage of the ministers and the government. Matthew Dymond was frustrated by the constant demands of the Parents' Movement but

unlike his predecessors he did not cut them out. He included them in a multitude of activities. He opened institutions to the voluntary assistance of the parents. He invited them to meet with his senior civil servants to discuss policy matters. Dymond moved a long way toward legitimizing the Parents' Movement as a corporate influence on the direction of services in the Province.

Another major change which Dymond exhibited was an attention to a variety of policy stimuli. He clearly moved away from response to individual pressures toward a more comprehensive approach in which a large number of demands are linked together in a single response.

It is highly important to note that this policy making style was still well within the control of the political administration i.e., the Minister and senior Civil Servants. The case studies which focused on the Health system incorporated several examples of policy changes in which the professionals including the Administrators of the institutions and senior civil servants were the engines of policy development but where the Minister was able to derive considerable political benefit and support by acknowledging the concerns of the parents and by offering them political benefits such as participation and organizational legitimacy.

Davis, of course, went much further than Dymond in terms of his collaboration and use of the potential influence of the Parents' Movement. Like Dymond, he opened up his organization to access by the O.A.R.C. executives. Like Dymond, he created individual policy initiatives which incorporated a variety of stimuli and pressures. Davis, however, was able to draw the executive into a collaborative style of policy development in which the executive were able to move out ahead of their membership and create deals with the government. The deals having been made the combined power of the O.A.R.C./O.A.M.R. board, the civil servants and the politician were used to create a consensus in the Movement.

There is a clear and dramatic shift in role of the leaders of the Parents' Movement as they became more directly involved in the political decision-making process through the Interdepartmental Committee and the negotiations with the Department of Education. The O.A.R.C. executives were drawn away from their representational role, i.e., presenting the consolidated views of their group into a

collaborative role as partners in policy development. This meant that the executive became less representative and more leadership oriented. They made accommodations and "deals" which were beyond a representational mandate. They played roles in the aggregation of interest and in the generation of support after their "deals" had been made. The price of participation was support generation.

The capability of the leadership of the Parents' Movement to participate in this symbiotic relationship was heavily dependent upon the leaders capability to tap and mobilize the support of their membership - their constituency. By the mid 1960s the strength of that constituency was solidly established. Their promotional skills were well developed and highly sophisticated. Their direct service role, i.e. the operation of the school, strengthened their promotional role by providing a focus for local support generation. Moreover, the operation of the schools necessitated strengthening and consolidation of their corporate leadership. That leadership in turn could negotiate with government not only as concerned citizens but also as service providers.

These case studies also provide a growing indication that service provision is a two edged sword. On the downside the operation of the school did, as Wolfensberger indicates, introduce an element of goal displacement. Once parents had their hands on 'their' schools they became divided on the subject of integration in the public system. The schools also served to drive a wedge between the local associations and O.A.R.C./O.A.M.R. thus contributing to the germinal controversy which will become more overt in later chapters.

Another theme which runs throughout the case studies - one which did not shift significantly during this period was the continued secondary position of the mentally retarded in the service system. These policy changes were all effected without significant increases in the resources provided for the care and supervision of mentally retarded people. Dr. Dymond could scale down one facility and use the funds to develop a much more popular model. Mr. Davis did inject more funds into the school system though 50% of those funds came from municipal and local sources as opposed to the provincial government. After integration in 1969, still more funds were channeled into the schools for the trainable retarded though these

increases were still quite marginal compared with the boom in the educational system and indeed the whole economy.

While the evidence in the Public Welfare case study is admittedly somewhat limited thus far there are a number of hints in the residential case study as to the place of this Department within the political administration. There is some evidence, for example, of a lack of ministerial leadership. Certainly, the seriousness of this factor is mitigated by the questionable position of O.A.R.C./O.A.M.R. on the residential care issue and the lack of involvement of Public Welfare in the mental retardation sector.

Perhaps more important for the present analysis is the apparently inferior position of Public Welfare relative to the Health and Education Departments.

Both of these departments seemed to be able to impose policy initiatives on Public Welfare notwithstanding the internal priorities of the latter department. This apparently inferior position of Public Welfare provides some additional evidence to the Simmons characterization of this Department as the "begrudging safety net". It is particularly interesting in light of the fact that by 1973 (next chapter) the bulk of responsibility for M.R. programs was consolidated in the successor to the Department of Public Welfare - the Ministry of Community & Social Services.



### Footnotes

1. Financial Administration Act - Revised Status of Ontario, Chapter 166, 1954.
2. Lang, Vernon, The Service State Emerges in Ontario (Ontario Economic Council, Toronto,) Jan. 1974. p.p. 20/21.
3. Lang, p. 47-49.
4. Lang, p. 21.
5. Bryden, Kenneth, How Public Medicare Came to Ontario in Government and Politics of Ontario ed. MacDonald, p. 40.
6. Lang, p. 26/27 and 34/35.
7. The Canada Assistance Plan Act of 1966 is cost sharing legislation under which the Federal government shares at the 50% level the cost of social services to "persons in need" or "likely to be in need". the plan allows the Federal government to assist the Provinces in providing welfare services and personal support services to a wide variety of disadvantaged groups who are on Provincial income maintenance programs. (See Estimates Debates - Department of Social and Family Services June 12/67 p. 4585.)
8. These costs were donated by the Foster Foundation - a charitable foundation established by Harry "Red" Foster.
9. Interview. Hunt.
10. Interview, Lobb.
11. See minutes of O.A.R.C. Board 1955-1960. (NB. O.A.R.C. Board Minutes Feb. 13/60 and O.A.R.C Annual Report 1959, p. 3).
12. Ibid.
13. Interviews. Hunt, Patricks and Clayson.
14. Minutes of O.A.R.C. Board meetings, 1958/59.
15. Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded - Twenty Five Years of Growing Together (O.A.M.R., Toronto) 1978 p. 19.
16. Ibid. p. 19-32.
17. Before this time the Association had almost always dealt with Ministers. Their yearly briefs had often gone to the Premier but they had rare access to him directly. Premier Frost granted the meeting after being approached by one of his Cabinet Ministers and several influential people in the Conservative Party hierarchy. (Interview. Dymond and correspondence from President of party, Moore, to Premier Frost.)

18. Interview. Dymond.
19. Interviews. Dymond, Kirk, Anglins. (See also Globe and Mail article Nov. 18/60).
20. Board Minutes. O.A.R.C. Feb. 16, 1960.
21. Kirk was appointed in 1958.
22. Interview. Kirk.
23. Assessments are membership fees charged by the provincial association payable on a yearly basis by the local affiliates.
24. The most successful telethon was run in 1960. The opening of a new T.V. Station in Toronto was linked with an appeal with for donations to the Metro Toronto Association for Retarded Children. Annual Report. 1960. p. 3.
25. M.T.A.R.C. Executive Committee. Feb. 28, 1962.
26. G. Anglin reports heavy criticism of the M.R. institution during this period with well known writers, e.g., Pierre Berton, and politicians visiting Orillia and criticizing the government heavily for its neglect of the institutions. (See also Globe and Mail article Feb. 9/65).
27. Interview. Dymond. (See also Globe and Mail article May 3, 1961).
28. O.A.R.C. Report of the Residential and Clinical Services Committee - minutes of O.A.R.C. Board Jan. 25/ 58 p. 1.
29. Ibid. p. 2.
30. Interview. Dymond.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Interview. Anglin. (See also Globe and Mail article Nov. 2/59).
34. Ibid. Anglin.
35. Ibid. Anglin.
36. Interviews. McNeel and Dymond. (See also Minutes of O.A.R.C. Board Meetings, 1959-60.
37. Interviews. Zarfes, Kirk, Dymond and the Anglins.
38. Interviews. Zarfes, Dymond, Kirk, Anglins.
39. Conclusions and Recommendations for the Mentally Retarded in Ontario - Report of M.R. Co-ordinating Committee to Hon. M. Dymond.

40. Interviews. Zarfes, Dymond, Amos, Kirk.
41. Ontario, "The Spectrum of Mental Retardation Service in Ontario". Dept. of Health, 1964.
42. Ibid. p.
43. Ibid. p.
44. Ibid. p.
45. See Section on Homes for Retarded Persons Act.
46. Interviews. Kirk, Zarfes, Dymond.
47. Ontario, Conclusions and Recommendations for Mental Retardation in Ontario. A Report to the Minister of Health by the Interdepartmental Committee on Mental Retardation - 1965, - p. 2.
48. Ibid. p.p. 8-10.
49. Ontario "The Spectrum of Mental Retardation Service in Ontario". Dept. of Health, 1964.
50. Conclusions and Recommendations. p.p. 16-20. (See also Globe and Mail articles - Jan 31/66 and Mar. 20/67).
51. Ibid. p.p. 15-18.
52. Interviews. Zarfes, Dymond, Kirk.
53. Community Residence - A Community Need. Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded. Oct. 1965. (See also O.A.R.C. Annual Report 61/62. and O.T.A.R.C. General Meeting Feb. 17, 1959).
54. See Chapter 2.
55. M.T.A.R.C. Annual Report 1961.
56. Interviews. Kirk, Clayson.
57. Condensation of the Report of the Committee on the Need of the Retarded - A 5 year study by the Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto. O.A.M.R. staff report, June 1961.
58. The pressure for children's residences was originally linked to schools by H.R. Beattie in the Dept. of Education. Dr. Zarfes and the Hon. William Davis, Minister of Education, opposed this idea. Zarfes viewed it as "reinventing the institution". Davis did not see the residence as within the legislative mandate of Education.
59. Ontario Debates. Dec. 13, 1962. p. 301-305.

60. Ibid. The legislation required a 50% contribution to operating costs from the sponsoring agency.
61. O.A.R.C. Brief to the Prime Minister and Cabinet Dec. 1962. (See also Globe and Mail article July 17/63).
62. O.A.R.C. Annual Report - Report of the Legislation Committee p. 3.
63. O.A.R.C. Brief to Cabinet. Dec. 12, 1962. (See also Minutes M.T.A.R.C. Annual Report, 1965).
64. M.T.A.R.C. Board Minutes. Sept. 19, 1963.
65. Interview. Kirk.
66. Ontario Legislative Debates. Dec. 3, 1962.
67. O.A.R.C. Annual Report 63 and 64.
68. Interviews. Kirk, Zarfes, Anglin.
69. Interviews. Kirk, Davenport, Magder
70. Interview. Davenport.
71. Interview. Davenport.
72. Interviews. Kirk, Anglin. (See also Speech of G.R. Anglin to Niagara Association for Retarded Children. March 31, 1962).
73. Interview. Kirk. (See Also O.A.R.C. Annual Report, 1964).
74. O.A.R.C. Report - The Role of the Community Residence, April 1965.
75. Ontario Legislative Debates, First reading. Bill 155. An Act to Review the Homes for Retarded Children's Act, 1962-63. - May 21, 1965, p. 3193.
76. Ontario Legislative Debates, First reading. Bill 168. An Act to Review the Homes for Retarded persons Act of 1962/63 and to extend its scope.
77. Ontario Legislative Debates, First reading. Bill 62. An Act to Amend the Homes for Retarded Persons Act of 1966. March 1, 1968.
78. Interviews. Amos, Kirk.
79. Bill 131 - An Act to Amend the Schools Administration Act - May 8, 1964.
80. Educable refers to mentally retarded children with mental capacity of eight years and above. In IQ terms this means 50 to 80.
81. "trainable" refers to children with IQ's under 50. This act replaced the "Auxiliary" Classes Act of 1914.

82. "trainable" refers to children with IQ's under 50.
83. O.A.R.C. Annual Report 1957/58. Report of Education Subcommittee.
84. Minutes - O.A.R.C. Annual Meeting, 1958.
85. Interviews. Clark, Reynolds.
86. Interview. Reynolds.
87. Interviews - Clarke, Delaporte.
88. O.A.R.C. Brief to the Honourable W. S. Dunlop, Minister of Education. Sept. 1959. See also O.A.R.C. 'Memo' to Cabinet Dec. 62.
89. Ibid.
90. O.A.R.C. Board minutes - 1960/61.
- 91.
92. O.A.R.C. brief to Cabinet 1960 (draft - not sent).
93. Minutes O.A.R.C. Board - Feb. 11/61.
94. Minutes O.A.R.C. Board - Feb. 11/61.
95. Ibid.
96. O.A.R.C. - Report of the Education Committee - Dec. 10, 1960.
97. Minutes of O.A.R.C Board - Feb. 11, 1961.
98. Globe and Mail article, Sept. 1, 1960.
99. Interviews, Kirk, Anglin.
100. Glove and Mail article Apr. 26/63.
101. The belief that "parents are entitled to as taxpayers to such training and education . . . . as the responsibility of the local school system", surfaced again in the O.A.R.C. Memo to Cabinet in Dec. 1962.
102. Memo from R.G. Anglin President of O.A.R.C. to H.R. Beattie Superintendent of Special Services, Dept. of Education Mar. 17/63.
103. Ibid.
104. Interview. Reynolds.
105. Interview. Clayson.
106. Interview. Clayson.

107. Interview. Reynolds.
108. O.A.R.C. Board Minutes, March 1965, see also memo from W.R. Stewart, Assistant Deputy Minister of Education to Dr. Z.S. Phimister, Deputy Minister Oct 28/66.
109. Interviews. Reynolds, Kirk, Clarke.
110. O.A.R.C. Board Minutes, Dec. 11/65 and March 25/67.
111. Interviews. Kirk, Robertson.
112. O.A.R.C. Board Minutes, Feb. 25, 1967.
113. Correspondence F. Reynolds, Superintendent of Special Education to F.S. Wilson, Director of Grants Division (Dept. of Ed.) Mar. 2/67.
114. Public and Separate Schools were funded on a sliding scale with the Province paying 40 to 80% of capital costs.
115. In 1968 O.A.R.C. changed its official name to the Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded. (O.A.M.R.).
116. Interviews. Reynolds, Clarke. (See also minutes of meeting taken by O.A.M.R. Executive Director.
117. Interviews. Reynolds, Kirk.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Letters, A. Gibbard, President of O.A.M.R. to the Honourable William Davis, Minister of Education - October 3, 1967 and Dec. 29/67.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Ontario Legislation Debates - Statement to the House by the Hon. John Robarts, Oct. 7, 1967.
125. Letter, A. Gibbard, President of O.A.M.R. to the Honourable William Davis, Minister of Education - November 29, 1967.
126. Letter, A. Gibbard, President of O.A.M.R. to Honourable William Davis, Minister of Education - November 29, 1967.
127. Letter, A. Gibbard, President of O.A.M.R. to Honourable William Davis, Minister of Education - December 29, 1967.



128. Interview. Reynolds.
129. Ibid.
130. Interview. Kirk.
131. O.A.M.R. Board Minutes May 8/68.
132. O.A.R.C. Board Minutes May 8, 1968.
133. O.A.R.C. Executive Committee Minutes - June 15/68.
134. letter from Hon. William David, Minister of Education to all Presidents of Associations for the Mentally Retarded May 4/68.
135. O.A.M.R. Minutes of Annual Meeting May 8/68 and interview Reynolds, Kirk.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Letter A. Gibbard, President O.A.R.C. to Hon. W. Davis May 24/68.
141. Minutes Metro Toronto Retarded Children's Education Authority May 27/68.
142. O.A.M.R. Board Minutes June 18/68.

## CHAPTER V

### THE FAILURE OF SUCCESS

#### Political Administration - 1969 Onward

After a major study of Provincial administration in 1969/70 the Reports of the Committee on Government Productivity (COGP)<sup>1</sup> The Ontario Provincial government underwent substantial administrative reorganization. The major changes involved the enhancement of the roles of the central financial agencies of government and the passing of more of the responsibility for policy setting and program operations to the internal systems of the operating Ministries. Management Board of Cabinet, formerly Treasury Board, was given more responsibility for assessing the efficiency of programs and organizational design within Ministries. This role was intended to assist the Ministries in developing the internal controls appropriate to their growing responsibilities.

Over the first half decade of the seventies Management Board began to place strong emphasis on the use of multi-year planning technologies and the improvement of Ministry administration.<sup>2</sup>

Another product of COGP was the Policy Development Committees of Cabinet in 1972. The "policy fields" were sub-committees of Cabinet designed to co-ordinate the policy making activities of Ministries within related program areas. The Policy Fields were headed by Provincial Secretaries, who would meet with the other Ministers in the committee weekly to review and approve policy submissions generated within the operating Ministries. Banded together in the Social Development Policy Field were the Ministries of Health, Colleges and Universities, Education, Culture and Recreation and Community and Social Services.<sup>3</sup> After 1972, all policy initiatives which would have effects broader than the programs directly within the purview of the individual Ministries had to be brought to the Policy field committees for approval.

Submissions on their way to Cabinet also had to be reviewed for financial viability by Management Board.<sup>4</sup> Management Board played a broader role in the government than the review of policy submissions.

The Management Board Secretariat also undertook studies of the administrative and financial capabilities of individual Ministries and followed their performance in order to continually improve the managerial capabilities of the operating Ministries. Over time Management Board became the centre for financial control and overall spending watchdog for all the Ministries.

Management Board and the Policy Fields developed policy submission formats which required that all policy proposals have the standard components. The components themselves demanded assessment of the need for a program, the creation of alternatives to meet that need, the selection of one alternative and the justification for the selection and finally the costing of the proposal. While the format requirement was quite strict, the capability of the central agencies to analyse the proposals was limited. In fact there was one analyst providing input to the Policy Field and Management Board for all policy proposals coming forward from both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Community and Social Services with combined budgets totalling billions of dollars. For this and other reasons, Ministry proposals which had strong Ministerial commitment were rarely stopped no matter how strong the concerns of the Management Board Secretariat.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, while the analytical functions of the Management Board Secretariat were enhanced significantly, they were still firmly under the direction of the politicians who actually comprised the Board.

As these central bodies became part of the Provincial government structure in the early 1970s there was a concurrent shift of many of the former responsibilities for routine program approvals back to the operating Ministries. COGP had recommended the decentralization of many of the housekeeping duties of the central bodies, including the Cabinet, back to the Ministers and their staffs.<sup>6</sup> The new administrative stress envisaged an enhancement of the financial controls within operating Ministries so that they could take over these day to day details.<sup>7</sup>

The new emphasis on improved administration planning and financial expertise had a ripple effect throwing many Ministries into a major reorganization of their operations. The disruptions were pervasive and brought with them considerable re-shuffling of staff and the creation of new program coordinating Branches.<sup>8</sup>

Another pervasive feature of these times was the ever tightening constraint on expenditures which were dealt successive blows by the oil price hikes beginning in 1972/73. These shocks to the Provincial economy had severe disruptive effects on provincial revenues and services. In the social welfare area the government imposed a 5.5% expenditure increased ceiling after 1974. This ceiling however did not apply to the initiation of new M.R. programs.<sup>9</sup> As a result the community services budget in the M.R. Sector grew from \$10.M in 1974 to \$110.M by 1982.

By 1972 the Federal government had taken its next controversial step in the medicare area bringing the medical doctors under the Provincial health insurance program. This program inflated the Department of Health's budget enormously.

In the Provincial institutions for the Mentally Retarded the expansion of beds which had begun in the fifties began to level off. This leveling was no doubt partially due to the newer philosophy of community services and, later, the decision to expand community based residential care.<sup>10</sup> The capacity of the facilities had grown from about 3,000 in 1965 to over 8,000 in 1975 with the major proportion of that growth in the late 1960s.<sup>11</sup>

After 1969 the integration of the retarded into the regular school system and the growth of the new educational structures, tended to render the M.R. education issues less dramatic.<sup>12</sup> The lingering policy interest for the parents has been the elimination of the provisions in the legislation which allows local Boards to exclude children they consider unable to benefit from their programs. The parents argued that admission boards should be replaced by placement boards required to find a suitable place for all children. Though this issue remains to this day there has in fact been a massive change in the provision of service by the public school system since 1969. In the major urban centres, it is now very difficult, if not impossible, to find children no matter how handicapped who are excluded from the school system.<sup>13</sup>

### The Parents' Movement Since 1969

As the successes of the sixties began to be felt by the associations in the latter part of that decade and the early seventies the issues and problems of the Movement began to change.

This change took several directions due to internal and external factors over which the Movement had varying degrees of control.

The linkages with many of the Departmental people began to atrophy in the late sixties for a variety of reasons. From the O.A.M.R. perspective the new Executive Director hired in 1967 did not pursue personal links with the same vigour as his predecessor.<sup>14</sup> Another basis for the apparent atrophy of the links may well have been the slackening of parental interest in Education and Health issues after the Integration of the schools and the improvements in the institutional system.

As the public responsibilities began to operate the schools the associations suffered a loss of momentum - especially from the group which had provided much of the original impetus - the parents of school aged children. Memberships began to level off and even dropped slightly.<sup>15</sup>

The reorganization of the Ministries of Health and Community and Social Services shifted many bureaucrats into other positions thus breaking traditional liaison channels with O.A.M.R.<sup>16</sup>

As programs were established the issues became less clear cut and more philosophical. A certain malaise set in. In this time of growing public funding revenues from private sources and the United Appeal began to drop off.<sup>17</sup> There was some parental antagonism toward the administrative aspects of the associations in the late sixties. Complaints were heard about the loss of control by the parents and loss of interest. Parents also began to resent the attacks on institutions which with their faults did symbolize long term security. The businessmen who had strong representation began to feel unwanted and began to withdraw in favour of more professional involvement. Local associations with strong service commitments began to feel O.A.M.R. was not representing their interest.<sup>18</sup>

One major influence on the M.R. system in the later period was the Normalization ideology which was introduced after about 1969. The Normalization concept argues that the creation of a 'special' service system for the retarded works to their disadvantage. Where the retarded go to special schools, special recreation programs, special residences and so forth, they become labelled and ghettoized. The Normalization principle proposes integration of the retarded into normal community living situations, in every way possible. It would hold that to create special services emphasises difference and ignores the fact that retarded people have most of the same needs, desires and requirements as everyone else in society.<sup>19</sup>

There are several implications of this type of service philosophy. One implication is related to the institutions. The separate M.R. facility is seen as atavistic and unnecessary. This perception of the institution is based on the assumption that it is abnormal for people to live in institutions. The retarded are not sick, they are developmentally handicapped.

Proceeding from this central anti-institutional theme, is the corollary that if community services were developed to support families and individuals, there would no longer be a need for institutions.

Another outgrowth of the Normalization principle, perhaps the most significant for O.A.M.R. itself, is the argument that the Parents' Movement should divest itself of direct service delivery and encourage 'more normal' community agents to provide accommodation, work and training and other programs for the retarded. While special community services are clearly seen as improvements over the institutional alternative, even the operation of services by the local associations was 'special' and therefore segregating.

As the Normalization ideas including the advocacy position, began to be promoted in Ontario by their originators, Wolf Wolfensberger and Bengt Nirje, the concepts were picked up and examined by everyone in the Parents' Movement. There was a wide division of opinion about future direction. Parents felt that the security they sought for their children was threatened and that their offspring would be vulnerable in the community.<sup>20</sup> In the institutions jobs were threatened. Staff



also had considerable reservations about the capabilities of large numbers of institutional residents to live in community settings.

In the O.A.M.R. provincial body and its affiliates opinion was sharply divided. At the local levels there was commitment to the services which the parents had started. Many felt that the Movement knew their children best and were familiar with the programs which had developed and should continue to operate the programs if more money was available. It was felt that to pass responsibility to others for the services would mean less personal and sympathetic attention, if such services were created at all.

In the 1970s Wolf Wolfensberger (then Executive Director of the National Institute on Mental Retardation) and several other proponents of the Normalization idea pressed O.A.M.R. and the locals to adopt an advocacy stance both at the local level overseeing individual cases and at the Provincial level pressuring for improvements in policy and legislation. These ideas and variations on the themes swept through O.A.M.R. and the locals and left a deepseated uncertainty about the official position the organization should take. As we shall see, this uncertainty often took the form of dramatically varying positions on major issues from one Board President to the next.

Successive O.A.M.R. Boards wrestled with an official position on the advocacy question. Several of the earlier ones in the 1970s rejected the idea in favour of a massive expansion and even 'official designation'<sup>21</sup> by the government authorising the O.A.M.R. network to be the only legitimate service provider of M.R. services. Later boards adopted the advocacy view.

In 1976 the O.A.M.R. board decided to undertake a major role study. They brought in a consulting firm and asked them to seek out the views of a wide group of the membership and to present the Board with alternative courses of action. The report found a serious "role conflict" in the association and stated bluntly that "If the O.A.M.R. federation wishes to influence the course of public policy, it must realize that their influence will be minimized as long as their hands are held out for money." The consultants report essentially echoed the Wolfensberger thesis arguing that the greatest responsibility of the Federation should be "policy

interest" and its least responsibility "direct program delivery".<sup>22</sup> While the response of the association is not univocal it is clear that the O.A.M.R. Board moved after 1977 to "represent the interest of mentally retarded people rather than the interests of their parents or the local associations".<sup>23</sup> Notwithstanding that overall direction locals continued expansion of their services. Some even openly disavowed the O.A.M.R. direction.<sup>24</sup>

## **I. The New Policy Focus - Community Living**

The Community Living policy in 1974 was considered by most to be the largest policy change to occur in the M.R. service sector in 100 years. The decision was quite simple when it was taken though the events leading up to it and proceeding from it were anything but simple.

The essence of the policy was the decision of the government to formally change the emphasis of M.R. services from an institutional base to a community base through the large scale expansion of community services.

In order to provide co-ordinated management for this process of re-orientation the whole M.R. service system including the institutions would be placed in one ministry.

The idea of uniting the various responsibility areas in the M.R. field involved a rapid development of community based resources and the phase down of the facility based system. The only program area which was not to be included in the new Community and Social Service responsibility was education which was, by this time functioning well under the local school system.

By 1974 the idea of co-ordination was well worn. There had been several attempts to bring improved coordination to this area as far back as 1959. The interdepartmental committees had had some minor coordinative effects but on the whole a lack of commitment on the part of the government had severely limited their efficacy.

Around 1970 the coordination issue began to heat up again because of a number of initiatives. The first was the Committee on Government Productivity which had placed greater stress on the requirements of policy and program coordination -albeit at the macro levels. O.A.M.R. was stimulated at that time to focus on the subject of coordination and created a brief to COGP noting the coordination difficulties experienced by the associations as services grew. They noted the difficulty caused by the departments "vertical structuring" while the needs of the retarded were "horizontally structured".

The brief went on to recommend an enhanced Interdepartmental Committee with centralized budget which would give it the control over implementation as well as policy discussion. Echoing the 1966 recommendations of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee, they proposed a Deputy Minister's Committee and a Secretariat made up of staff seconded from the various departments.

The Secretariat would have a leader at the DM level and would serve a supervisory and consultative role with the Cabinet and Management Board.

Such a system, it was argued would reduce the interdepartmental competition for funds and allow horizontal planning at the provincial level which could encourage horizontal planning at the local level.<sup>25</sup>

While this was going on there was considerable action on other fronts. After the death of two Hospital School residents in 1970 the press and the Opposition began to press strongly for a full investigation of the M.R. institutions. At this time Walter Williston, a Toronto Lawyer, was asked to chair a Royal Commission to investigate the provisions for the care and supervision of the mentally retarded. Williston's mandate was broader than the two cases directly involved and he proceeded to visit almost all of the institutions and talk to a great number of people concerned about the service system of the mentally retarded.<sup>26</sup>

While the Williston Commission was clearly the most influential of the initiatives underway during this period, there were other undertakings of

significant importance underway in the Ministry of Health. For example, Dr. Zarfes was busy making plans for the establishment of six smaller institutions of 2-300 beds each in several areas of the Province. Additionally, a well publicized task force report on services in North-eastern Ontario had recommended the establishment of a 400 bed facility in Sudbury.<sup>27</sup>

Nevertheless, when Williston's report, "Present Arrangements for the Care and Supervision of Mentally Retarded Persons in Ontario," was released, it attracted overwhelming attention.<sup>28</sup>

The objectives of Williston's report were clear. He looked to the expansion of community services for the retarded and the phase-down of the large institutions.

Williston, after stating his objectives, makes it clear that they can only be accomplished by:

- "(a) having one department of Government responsible for the overall planning, programming, financing, budgeting and coordination of the services for all handicapped persons;. . ."<sup>29</sup>

Williston argued that

"the effectiveness of government policy making and its implementation...is seriously impeded by the number of departments and branches which are independently trying to deal with one overall situation."

"No one department or service has a clearly defined comprehensive responsibility towards handicapped persons. Yet their social needs today are so complex that each part can not be satisfactorily be dealt with by separate services acting independently."<sup>30</sup>

After noting that many Branches are involved he goes on to comment "Thus, complimentary and alternative services are administered by separate departments with different policies and practices. The different departments and branches administered by different agencies are influenced by different outlooks and ideologies and thus a balanced comprehensive policy is impossible and the problems of the mentally retarded are treated in a piecemeal fashion. As the agencies increase, the number of problems resulting from functioning in an un-coordinated fashion

will multiply and become more acute. The fantastically complicated array of problems in dealing with the handicapped can only be satisfactorily resolved by unified planning and co-ordination of services."<sup>31</sup>

Williston proposed a single department for the handicapped and their families to be responsible for "planning, coordination and implementation of a complete and comprehensive province wide program for handicapped persons." Failing this he saw at least a Senior Minister responsible for coordinating all departments activities in the field.<sup>32</sup>

There was no question that the report was heavily influenced by O.A.M.R., who supported it whole heartedly. There had been constant collaboration between the senior board members of O.A.M.R. and Mr. Williston during the writing of the report. Even some of the terminology was the same as that of the O.A.M.R. documents. Williston had diagnosed the problems and had put forward the solutions O.A.M.R. had wanted.<sup>33</sup>

The Williston report is highly important in that it highlighted and reinforced the link between the idea of a single organizational responsibility with the community living concept thus moving beyond the focus on coordination of activities to organizational arrangements. This document put the community living attitudinal shift together with organizational changes and made these seem like a single issue.

In addition to the coordination advantages of the shift, Williston had drawn attention to the possibility that if services for the retarded were moved from the Health model to the social services jurisdiction it might be possible to obtain Canada Assistance Plan funding as had already happened in Saskatchewan and Quebec. To this point all programs for the retarded were operated in Ontario without any Federal sharing.<sup>34</sup>

After the release of the Williston document O.A.M.R. immediately gave it full support.<sup>35</sup> O.A.M.R. agreed with the Williston view that the institutions should be phased down and that O.A.M.R. should play the major role in service delivery.<sup>36</sup> The Provincial organization saw itself expanding and defining regional boundaries on the same basis as the Provincial regions.

Moreover, "in view of the recommendation of the Williston report and the current general recognition that the large institutions, removed from the general population, are bad for the retarded, the local associations for the retarded have a large responsibility to provide community based services. If they are to meet this responsibility, costs must be met by the government."<sup>37</sup> This meant 100% of the costs.<sup>38</sup>

The Provincial government was surprised by both the speed with which Williston did his work and the scope of the recommendations. Senior officials and Ministers saw the influence of O.A.M.R. in the document and were apprehensive about its pervasive commitment to the O.A.M.R. point of view.<sup>39</sup>

The Provincial government was also skeptical of the capability of the associations to pick up a large part of the service system. This skepticism had practical, programmatic and philosophical grounds. While O.A.M.R. was seeking bail-outs for their severe financial difficulties on the one hand, they looked to vast expansion on the other. The local affiliates were in similar financial jeopardy. Many locals were heavily in debt and the services suffered through inadequate capitalization.<sup>40</sup>

Provincial program supervisors were encountering continual difficulties in assisting the local associations in establishing their programs through this period partly because the people who were planning the programs were volunteers who usually had little programmatic skill, partly because the groups often failed to meet the financial viability requirements set by the Province and partly because of the rigid approval procedures.<sup>41</sup>

A surprised government faced with the doubts about the skills of the local associations, their widespread financial problems, the internal controversy which was becoming more apparent about the Normalization principle and an upcoming election, balked at the idea of establishing new patterns of service. Additionally, the phase down of facilities seemed to run counter to Health's initiatives to create 6 smaller institutions. It is not surprising then that Mr. Welch the newly appointed Provincial Secretary for Social Development



wrote to Angus Robertson, the President of O.A.M.R., on June 27/72 noting the need to "go carefully and deliberately in developing new patterns of operation."<sup>42</sup>

Shortly thereafter, the Provincial Secretariat for Social Development set up a follow up committee to examine the Williston Report and to develop a recommended provincial response to the direction set out by Williston. This group under the direction of Mr. Jackman, Mr. Welch's senior policy advisor reported directly to the Provincial Secretary.<sup>43</sup> Dr. Zarfes was the representative of the Ministry of Health.<sup>44</sup>

While the Jackman group was working on its recommendations several government Ministers including Lawrence<sup>45</sup> and Welch indicated a general support for the community living directions but they did not provide details about the patterns of those new services or their administration.<sup>46</sup> They did, however, feel that the creation of a new Ministry was not a good idea and indicated that to O.A.M.R. in the latter part of 1972.<sup>47</sup> It is hard to know why the Cabinet did not like this idea. It may have been due to the reorganization process that had just set several new Ministries and Secretariates in place. Simmons speculates that the government did not wish to have a clearly identified point of access which could be lobbied directly by community groups seeking service.<sup>48</sup> They may have seen this as a precedent which would be used by other special interests to split off clear targets for lobbying. The only real argument put forward by the Province was the anti-ghetto argument which suggested a separate Ministry would segregate the handicapped.<sup>49</sup>

O.A.M.R. presented a brief to the Jackman committee in November 1972 arguing that Mental Retardation was not primarily a Health problem and that community services must be strengthened.<sup>50</sup>

On the subject of Coordination, the brief continued to promote the idea of "an Inter-Ministerial Committee on Mental Retardation" at the Deputy Ministerial level. "We further believe that the coordinator of this committee should be under the Secretary for Social Development and a permanent part of the Secretariat."<sup>51</sup>

This O.A.M.R. document entitled "We Believe" went on to press for vastly expanded growth of O.A.M.R. at all levels and the acceptance by the Province of the unilateral legitimacy of the O.A.M.R. locals as the deliverers of services.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, the idea of deinstitutionalization was now modified to the creation of "small, regional centres, planned and administered by regional board in close association with the Regional Councils on M.R. and other interested citizens."<sup>53</sup> "These expenditures (programs) should remain the responsibility for the Provincial government."<sup>54</sup>

The Welch report was released in March 1973 accepting the principle of increased community living opportunities for the retarded and presenting its ideas in terms of alternatives for government direction. One of those alternatives was the shift of the responsibility for the operation of the provincial M.R. facilities from Health to Community and Social Services (formerly the Department of Public Welfare). The report envisaged several benefits of such a shift. One benefit was the possibility of cost sharing from the Federal government for the M.R. programs. This could, if successfully negotiated, bring an estimated \$35 million dollars to the Provincial Consolidated Revenue Fund each year.<sup>55</sup> The dramatically increased Federal dollars were becoming increasingly appealing as the first waves of the oil embargo were devastating Provincial coffers and given the cash requirements for the expansion of M.R. community services.

After the release of the Welch report O.A.M.R. supported the idea that programs for the retarded might be placed under a single responsibility centre in the Ministry of Community and Social Services. Moreover, there were several in the Health Ministry itself including Dr. Zarfes who supported the idea and began to press for the Transfer.<sup>56</sup> Zarfes felt that the initiatives toward more community programming approach had reached their limit in the medical system and that a shift would be the only way to promote a smaller facility system. He pressed for that direction in the Health Ministry and through his contacts in the Social Development Secretariat.<sup>57</sup>

Both the Health Department and the C.S.S. Ministry were fearful of the suggested direction however, apprehensive about the administrative implications of such a massive shift.<sup>58</sup>

One concern of Community and Social Services was the size of the directly operated institutional system. M.C.S.S. at that time had only 1800 employees. The M.R. component of Health had approximately 8000 staff. Health was concerned about the reaction of the facilities themselves to the transfer. There was clear indication that many of the facilities were very apprehensive about the possible move. Several studies were undertaken by the Departments and the Provincial Secretary respecting the feasibility of the plan. The two bureaucracies entered into protracted discussions focussed on administration staffing and budgets, etc.<sup>59</sup> They also began negotiations around Canada Assistance Plan (C.A.P.) sharing potential.<sup>60</sup>

The idea of Federal sharing under C.A.P. although it was a popular suggestion in O.A.M.R. circles did have a large hitch. In order to qualify under the C.A.P. regulations the recipients of the services had to be needs tested. This meant that in order for Ontario to obtain sharing from the Federal government all adults receiving service would have to be needs tested and the parents of children. The latter prospect was highly objectionable to the parents who felt that needs testing implied welfare.<sup>61</sup>

After initial consultation with the Federal government, Ontario learned that the possibility of sharing was indeed a viable one but the needs testing provision would be required. While the residents of the Provincial facilities were eligible on their own as disabled adults, children were a different matter. O.A.M.R. objected strongly to needs testing and met several times throughout 1973 with officials in Community and Social Services to attempt to persuade the Province to argue for an exemption of the retarded.<sup>62</sup> This was tried but doomed to failure from the beginning.

As the discussions continued, the Provincial Secretary, under pressure from O.A.M.R., and with growing acquiescence in the Ministry of Health, took the initiative at the Ministerial level to resolve the question of transfer.<sup>63</sup> At a

meeting of the Multi-Year planning process in 1973 Mr. Welch approached both the Minister of Community and Social Services Mr. Brunelle, and the Minister of Health, Dr. Potter and asked them if it was acceptable to them to go ahead with the transfer. The decision was made to effect the change.<sup>64</sup>

Many in both Ministries were stunned by the decision which pre-empted discussions at the bureaucratic level. Nevertheless, Mr. Welch sought and achieved Cabinet approval to transfer the responsibility for the operation of the institutional system for the care of the Mentally Retarded to the Ministry of Community and Social Services effective April 1, 1974.<sup>65</sup>

While there was no guarantee of federal sharing under C.A.P. there was strong optimism based on the experiences of other Provinces and Federal/Provincial discussions in Ontario that the Federal government would agree to the shareability.<sup>66</sup>

Once the Ministers had made the decision to proceed with the transfer the civil servants were quickly called upon to create the mechanisms to effect the changes required. In fact, a whole new division was established in Community and Social Services to assume responsibility for the integrated service system.<sup>67</sup>

O.A.M.R. applauded the decision to transfer the Facilities though the needs testing and programmatic implications were still in limbo. By Spring of 74 the negotiations were well along with the cost sharing for the adults programs virtually assured.<sup>68</sup> The Province was pressing for the exclusion of the children's programs from the needs testing provision.

While the negotiations were proceeding over the C.A.P. issues O.A.M.R. continued to resist on the needs testing requirement in meetings with the Minister and senior staff in Community and Social Services. The Minister of Community & Social Services and Senior Staff pressed for the Board to agree to needs testing and to actively promote that direction with the membership. At this point the Board recognizing the major financial gains to the Province agreed to the needs testing provision on the condition that the revenues

generated from the Federal government would be earmarked to expand M.R. community services. They felt, however, that this move would have to be ratified by the Membership at the annual meeting in May.<sup>69</sup> The membership was still sharply divided.

By this time it is clear that O.A.M.R. was trying to balance the interests of these constituencies - the parents who were concerned about the effects of community living on the children and the apparent threats to the long term care provided by the institutions, the locals who ran services and were pressing for better funding and expansion and O.A.M.R. itself which was wavering between the service expansion direction and the advocacy position. The needs testing question could potentially alienate the parents who were the grass-root support for the Movement. On the other hand the potential for massive infusion of money would please the locals.

At this point the developments took a turn which was unexpected by most. That turn involved William Davis, the Premier. Mr. Davis accepted an invitation to speak at the annual meeting of O.A.M.R. At that event Mr. Davis added considerable momentum to the needs testing issue proffering his personal guarantee

"I can tell you and let me make this perfectly clear, that whatever funds flow through the agreement with Ottawa to the Province of Ontario, will, without question, be allocated in total to programs related to the mentally retarded."<sup>70</sup>

This statement reverberated throughout Ontario as the "Peterborough commitment". The statement was quite astonishing from a number of perspectives. It was an initiative undertaken with very little consultation within the government and without any advance notice to the Minister of Community and Social Services. The civil servants in the M.R. area had advised the Premier to make only general remarks at the conference. The comment at the conference surprised many at Management Board not only because it was a new direction in the apparent earmarking of revenues but also because the lack of advance warning. There was, in fact, no precedent for the ear-marking of funds coming into the Consolidated Revenue Fund for specific expenditures.<sup>72</sup>

Clearly, the initiative was designed to overbalance the parental hesitation and to promote acceptance of the measure. Moreover, the act bespoke the strong government interest in securing the additional funding. The ploy worked and the association agreed to the needs testing.<sup>73</sup>

By mid 1974 the Consolidated Revenue Fund was beginning to receive reimbursement from the Federal government, the Transfer of the Facilities has been effected and plans were underway for the development of the community services.

In summary, by 1970, O.A.M.R. and its affiliates had developed considerable success in the creation and operation of community services for the mentally retarded as well as their promotional successes. They were now viewing their role increasingly as a "cradle to grave" responsibility.<sup>74</sup> Williston provided a convenient and willing vehicle to promote the O.A.M.R. position. O.A.M.R. sold Williston on their ideas and he incorporated most of them in his report.

The initial government question included in the Williston mandate was the question of public (meaning society's) and the government's responsibility for the retarded in the non-institutional setting. O.A.M.R., through Williston, promoted their aims of the shift to the community services model. The very serious questions, however, about who would deliver community services was the subject of growing controversy. Recognizing the appeal of the Williston concepts the Province was receptive to the ideas - especially the cost-sharing idea.

The O.A.M.R. executive, then, began to invest rhetoric and philosophical commitment in the Williston proposals. This was done, however, without consensus either about the future role of the associations or the future of the institutional care. Moreover, expansion was contingent upon cost-sharing and therefore needs-testing.

The Welch document then, attempted to promote a consensus within the arena which was highly emotion charged and full of heightened expectations. To do this Welch took a very tentative approach - outlining administrative



alternatives while staying away from specific program commitments. Welch used less strident language than Williston -especially with regard to the institutions. He spoke of deemphasis of institutions and the creation of alternatives.

While it is certainly believable that Mr. Welch supported the idea of community living the philosophical discussion about medical model versus community living model of services was surely only one motivation for the Minister. As had been noted, 1972/73 was a time of severe economic shock throughout the western world. There was a massive demand for money in Provincial treasury. The attraction of Federal cost-sharing dollars to underwrite service expansion was overpowering. In fact, Ontario stood to gain an estimated \$35 million per year from the Federal government cost-sharing through the transfer of the programs to the social services domain. It was obvious that at least in the short run it would not be possible to channel all of this money into the M.R. system. Therefore, Ontario's general revenues stood to gain from the transfer as well.

The intervention of the Premier, Mr. Davis at the annual meeting of the Ontario Association lends considerable weight to the cost-sharing motive. The Premier used his considerable influence with the Parents' Movement in committing dollars to the development of community services. The Premier's Peterborough commitment was an act very similar to his dealings with the Executives of O.A.R.C. in the 1960s. The Executive was persuaded first then the combined influence of organizational leaders and the politicians was used to persuade the membership.

## **II. Community Residential Care**

If mentally retarded people are to stay in community settings they have two essential requirements - a place to live and a day program which is usually some form of vocational training. One of the case studies in Chapter four examined in some detail the events of the 1960s which surrounded the early residential legislation. This case example looks at the later developments in community residential care, i.e., during the 1970s and into the 1980s.

By 1970, there were 12 residences in the Province providing care to 250 retarded persons. These programs were mostly operated by local A.M.R.s and supervised by the Children's and Youth Institutions Branch of the Ministry of Community & Social Services.<sup>75</sup> That Branch continued to have oversight responsibility for six other residential care acts designed to meet the needs of other types of clients.<sup>76</sup> This Home for Retarded Persons Act was not cost shared by the Federal government under the Canada Assistance Plan and thus there were no federal recoveries involved.<sup>77</sup>

Under the existing regulations in 1970 capital costs for new construction of residences for the retarded were supported to the level of \$5,000 per bed while the level of support for renovation of existing facilities was \$1,200 per bed. The regulations still called for approval by the Cabinet of each Corporation which planned to build facilities, then approval of the plans, then three approvals and interim payments during the actual construction.<sup>67</sup> This elaborate process necessitated an extensive outlay of money by the local associations before any recoveries were made from the Provincial Treasury. This was very difficult for even the largest of the local associations. On top of the elaborate approval process there was restricted funding available and the Branch was in the habit of informing prospective residential care providers that they would likely be required to wait three years before receiving the capital and operating grants. By 1971 the capital grants themselves were substantially inadequate. Due to inflation, the actual cost of construction was running to about 7,500 dollars per bed.<sup>79</sup>

In the area of operating costs the picture was much the same. The Province subsidized the daily costs of care to a maximum of 80%. In the case of adults the remaining 20% of the cost was covered by the Provincial pension paid to all retarded adults living in the community. In the case of children there less incentive to community living since children had no pension and the 20% share of the cost had to come from parents. This, in fact, ruled out the placement of children in the community unless the family had a substantial income.

In the early 1970s O.A.M.R. became increasingly concerned over the restrictive effects of such regulations. The Association sought an increase of the capital grant from the existing flat rate to 80% of the actual construction or renovation costs.<sup>80</sup> There was no action by the Ministry and the issue continued to fester. Again in early 1973 O.A.M.R. began to push following up of the Williston and Welch documents seeking either the improvements noted in the 71 brief or 100% funding of capital costs.<sup>81</sup> In that later brief the Movement also pressed for more regulation flexibility which would provide for residential care supported by the Province in a less restrictive form for those requiring less programming than the community residences were required to provide. This brief foresaw a more open ended system of residences in which those who were more independent could be accommodated in less structured, more homelike settings.<sup>82</sup>

This brief, which was sent to the Minister, Mr. Brunelle, on April 17, 1973 marked the beginning of the new round of pressure from the O.A.M.R. for major alterations to the Homes for Retarded Persons Act. The Ministry, responding to the external pressure and the governmental policy decision to promote community living began to consider the form of the new directions. In doing so it established an O.A.M.R./Ministry Liaison committee to act as a clearing house for common issues and concerns. Through this group O.A.M.R. pressed strongly for debt-retirement (mortgage based) capitalization claiming that charitable organizations could now borrow the money to start residences at highly favourable rates from Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation.<sup>83</sup> Debt retirement would allow a sponsoring agency to include mortgage payments as part of the approved operating costs of a residence. The Province looked askance on debt-retirement since this form of capitalization seemed to make long term commitments which were not clearly understood and since some professional staff began to see the benefits of rental as opposed to purchase of group home accommodation.<sup>84</sup>

In the summer, however, the Ministry did introduce a bill designed to give the Ministry more flexibility in creating regulations respecting community residences. This legislation removed the necessity for Cabinet approvals of corporations and operating costs, devolving these approvals to the Ministerial

level. It also provided for the establishment of subsidy levels through regulation. The Bill received third reading on June 20, 1973.<sup>85</sup> O.A.M.R. was invited to participate in the drafting of the regulations and remained strongly committed to debt-retirement. The Minister, Mr. Brunelle, agreed at these meetings to include this item in the draft regulations. He proceeded, then, to the Social Development Policy Committee of Cabinet which approved the direction. Management Board, however, was concerned about the implications of the debt-retirement provision because of the unclear long term implications. The opposition of Management Board persuaded the Ministry to set it aside. The Ministry then began to consider alternatives to the debt-retirement item and looked at several funding improvements including rental and renovation provisions.

It was decided to increase the capital grants to 80% of the actual cost to a maximum of \$15,000 per bed. The proposal was approved by the Cabinet committees and announced by the Minister in the House on Dec. 19, 1974.<sup>86</sup> He noted at that time that the Ministry was injecting 1.1 million dollars extra into the yearly budget under the Homes for Retarded Persons Act to accommodate increased demand.<sup>87</sup>

O.A.M.R. expressed strong disappointment with the regulations when they saw that the debt-retirement provision was excluded. They felt they had a clear commitment from the Minister and that he had reneged.

There were, however, some parts of the new regulations which were quite acceptable and which were suggested by O.A.M.R. The regulations now permitted the establishment of 'auxiliary residences' which would be rented satellite operations of existing community residences. The "auxiliary residences" would be cheaper to run since they would require less specialized and intensive programming.<sup>88</sup> The auxiliaries were exempt from some of the more stringent regulations covering the larger group homes.

While the amendments to the Homes for Retarded Persons Act proved to be very promotional in the development of community residential care over the

next few years, the dealings with the ministry left the parents and the government with unnecessary distrust and bad feelings.

This lack of trust between the Parents' Movement and the Ministry was not entirely due to residential care policy alone. In fact the Ministry was slow in the development of a range of initiatives in 1974-75. Once all of the high profile commitments had been made by the Premier and Mr. Welch, in 1973-74 the Parents' Movement expected quick responses to demand for community service growth and a fast transfer of money. The Ministry, however, took almost a year to prepare their community service package, to negotiate them with Management Board and to begin to flow the money to community services. In fact, the Ministry was so slow that by the time the package of service was in place the Movement had developed considerable mistrust feeling that the Premier and others were reneging on their commitment.<sup>89</sup>

In May of 1975 the Minister and Senior Officials of the Ministry finally announced their new funding packages at the annual meeting of the Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded in London, Ontario.<sup>90</sup> By this time the distrust was so ingrained that the membership of the association simply didn't believe the money was there. It took well over a year for cash flow to service developments to be brought to a normal footing.<sup>91</sup>

It is interesting to consider for a moment the relationship between M.C.S.S. and Parents' Movement as this relatively new linkage was being forged. Over the years, pressure was being generated for an expansion of community residential living and momentum was generated for a significant reorientation of the M.R. services. The leadership in the community living policy came not from the Minister directly responsible for residential programs but from the Provincial Secretary, Mr. Welch. In the later years, the Ministry of Community and Social Services inherited a process which had gained enormous political momentum and visibility. By 1974, new funds were made available. A new era was beginning. New ground was being broken. A liaison committee had been established to consider common issues. Yet something seems to have gone astray. Though some issues were resolved the momentum of the period seems to have soured.

There is a significant irony about these events. While slow to act, the Ministry of Community and Social Services did make significant improvements in their legislative and funding bases of community residential care in 1973. These changes were arguably as progressive as any of the earlier policy changes introduced by Health or Education yet resistance, delay and lack of ministerial leadership seemed to militate against support and political acceptance. Community and Social Services seems to have introduced some quite progressive changes while alienating those who should have been their strongest supporters. The causes of this problem seem to some degree related to political finesse and co-operation than to policy substance. It may well be that O.A.M.R. had very high expectations of quick results given their earlier successes with Dymond and Davis and given the considerable momentum of the time. The faltering progress with M.C.S.S. would seem to have been at least part of the problem.

The debt-retirement issue is illustrative of this problem in co-operation. The issue around debt-retirement seems to have done a lot to sour the relationship between the Ministry and the Association. Debt-retirement on balance would not seem to be a very large issue. One might expect an astute Minister could either have sold the idea in government or negotiated O.A.M.R. out of this demand. There were in fact precedents in other legislation of the Ministry which allowed debt-retirement. On the other hand, the significant improvement of the legislation and funding should have provided enough political leverage for the Minister to persuade O.A.M.R. to set aside this demand. Neither of these things happened.

Davis, Dymond and Welch found ways of collaborating with the O.A.R.C. executive to promote consensus and to sell it. Community and Social Services, however, seems to have had a clearly different relationship with the Movement - one characterized by growing distrust, suspicion, and uncertainty. In spite of considerable momentum and commitment to growth the Ministers of M.C.S.S. seem to have failed to cash in on the political benefits of the times. Davis, Welch and Dymond were celebrated as "friends of the Movement". No Minister in M.C.S.S. received such acclaim.



It would be inappropriate to attribute all of the problems of this era on the doorstep to the Ministry, however. It must be remembered that the Parents' Movement was deeply divided during this period. The constituency support which is required for participation in the collaborative process was simply not there. The O.A.M.R. board could not make accommodations because they did not know with any certainty what their position should be. O.A.M.R. ambivalence unquestionably undermined the intersector negotiations.

The dimensions of this growing intersector cleavage will be probed in more detail shortly.

### III. Resource Centres

No single issue in the past thirty years in Ontario in the M.R. field has caused such acute controversy as the Resource Centres issue. In order to understand the events in this confrontation one must look to the climate of the early seventies which has been described earlier, - the anti- institutional feeling, the increasing rhetorical and financial impetus behind the community living direction and the growing frustration in O.A.M.R. with the apparent slowness in the shift from the institutionally based services to the community based approach.

It will be recalled that as O.A.M.R. became increasingly embroiled in internal disputes the Province began to have serious doubts about the willingness and the capability of the local A.M.R.s to develop services at the community level and to deliver them. This doubt was highlighted in 74/75 when it seemed clearer that the Provincial association was planning to opt for the advocacy role.<sup>92</sup> During this period the Ministry began to look more earnestly for other service deliverers. Unless such were found there was a good chance that the money allocated for community services would remain unspent over the next few years.<sup>93</sup>

One of the options put forward in this context was the possibility of expanding some institutionally based services into the wider community system.

In fact this coming forth of the Facility system must be seen in broader terms lest the impression be left of a gratuitous volunteering of expertise. During this era the programs in the Facilities had been much maligned by those favouring community living. The Facilities were threatened by the escalating commitments to community living. Beyond the ideological level there was no reason to believe that these institutions could or would terminate their services and close their doors in the short term. Community based alternatives were in their infancy. Facilities were large employers with powerful union representation. They provided accommodation for eight thousand residents. They were a major part of the Ministry budget and they incorporated the major proportion of expertise in the care of the mentally retarded.

The reform element in the Facilities themselves and the promotional skills of Dr. Zarfes combined to push toward a continued role for the facilities in the new service system.

Given the shortfall of the community service system and the interest on the part of many including Zarfes in the continued growth of small centre oriented programs, the M.R. Management Committee in M.C.S.S. in conjunction with the Facility Administrators developed the idea of the "Resource Centre".<sup>94</sup> The essential idea of the centres was a community service agency acting as a fixed point of referral, assessment and individual program planning.<sup>95</sup> The centres might also include Case Management units which would undertake the planning of programs for individuals referred and who would follow the program through by contracting with local service deliverers for the care required. Each Resource Centre would have a community Board composed of appointees from the local Working Groups<sup>96</sup> and the Ministry. While the Resource Centres concept was not well developed it did have the essential element of outreach from the institutions to provide community services.

The senior Ministry personnel in the M.R. area promoted this concept in the latter part of 1975 stressing that this idea could enable the Ministry to expand local service options thereby relieving the pressure on the Facilities

and community groups.<sup>97</sup> The resource centre concept seemed to provide a way of assuring facility based staff of a continuing role in the service system while contributing to the expansion of local services.

O.A.M.R. and many of the staff on the community services side in the Ministry opposed such an initiative.<sup>98</sup> There were several criticisms put forward. O.A.M.R. believed the Resource Centres were essentially an extension of the Facility system and the institutional model. The Resource Centres were to have residential components which were seen as mini-institutions. The diagnosis and assessment capabilities and the Individual Program Plans were seen as a method of implementing the hospital model in the community by having a group of Case Managers who would plan the services for the retarded person and then contract the work out to other community agencies. It was also argued that this direction was highly labelling for the retarded person and thereby ran counter to the stated policy of the Ministry to move toward de-institutionalization and normalization.<sup>99</sup>

Ministry apologists argued that the program was not seen in rigid terms but rather as a set of principles. The concept should be seen as "a means of providing certain specialized services to a geographical area which would not otherwise be available in individual communities."<sup>100</sup> The senior Ministry staff saw no necessary variance between the plan for Resource Centres and the community living concept and assured O.A.M.R. repeatedly of the continued Ministry commitment to participation in the local planning process.<sup>101</sup>

In November 1975 the Ministry proposed an experimental implementation of the Resource Centres program in Kingston, Ontario. The Kingston plan was to involve the devolution of L.S. Penrose Centre, a Provincially operated institution, to the Board of the Ongwanada chronic care hospital and the combining of these operations as a Resource Centre in Kingston.<sup>102</sup> Opponents of the plan were especially critical of the project because they thought it completely inappropriate to have a single board overseeing a chronic hospital serving the frail elderly and a mental retardation service.

Senior Ministry officials met twice with O.A.M.R. to provide assurances that this move was consistent with the Ministry commitment to develop community services and to support the Working Groups. O.A.M.R. remained unconvinced. The plan was implemented with the strong backing of the Facility based managers in Kingston who moved it ahead in spite of strong dissent and opposition by the local A.M.R. and local Ministry staff.<sup>103</sup>

Just as this experiment began a major political storm began to develop in the Ministry of Health. In a period of growing constraint the Minister of Health moved to close down some of the smaller Psychiatric Hospitals.<sup>104</sup> These closures were to be implemented with negligible provision for alternative community services. The reaction in those communities and in the Legislature was more than the government expected. The strongest Opposition critic in the legislature, a man with considerable political expertise, a background in the Mental Health delivery system, and the Leader of the party which held the balance of power in the Minority legislature, took up the case of the psychiatric facilities.

The government was rocked by Mr. Lewis' stinging criticisms of the insensitivity and ham-handedness in dealing with hospital closings.<sup>105</sup> The attack was so strong that the Cabinet thought the minority government might fall on the issue.<sup>106</sup> A compromise was called for. The government sought a way to save face by guaranteeing the continued operation of the local facilities but not as psychiatric hospitals. The Cabinet looked to James Taylor, the Minister of Community and Social Services to absorb the mental health facilities and to work out transfer with Health under the oversight of the Management Board Chairman. Taylor, fought the initiative vigorously but was in the end forced by Cabinet to cooperate.<sup>107</sup>

The Resource Centres idea was seized upon as a solution since the Minister had no other potential use for residential institutions. The establishment of Resource Centres would enable the hospitals to remain in operation and the employees to be involved in activities considered related to their previous activities.

On December 29, 1975 the Ministry of Community and Social Services moved to create two 'Resource Centres' in Timmins and Goderich, Ontario.<sup>108</sup> There was a considerable difference of opinion about the immediate circumstances which surrounded the negotiations with the local Working Groups though the Minister himself met with each of them in advance of the announcement. In Timmins, the Minister had visited the Working Group in November '75 suggesting that the North-Eastern Regional Mental Health Centre in that community be converted to use as a M.R. resource centre.<sup>109</sup> In Goderich, the Minister suggested to the Working Group that the Goderich Psychiatric hospital be used as such a service.<sup>110</sup> Both groups agreed to look at the ideas which were presented by the Minister. Both were asked for their decisions on short notice. While the Timmins group agreed to work with the Ministry in the planning of the Resource Centre, the Goderich group rejected the idea "emphatically".<sup>111</sup> The Minister then announced that the Goderich facility would be used as a "Schedule I" facility, i.e., not as a board operated facility but as a facility run directly by the Ministry.<sup>112</sup>

Though the O.A.M.R. executive were fully informed by Taylor and other senior staff about the circumstances under which the government had made its decision,<sup>113</sup> O.A.M.R. came out in strong opposition to the government's action and pressed the MPPs and Ministers hard for a reversal of the government decision. The President, Mr. Kurisko went so far as to describe the civil servants as "inept" and to publicly threaten some leading Conservative Ministers with defeat at the next election.<sup>114</sup>

O.A.M.R. saw the developments as "smaller institutions".<sup>115</sup> Mr. Kurisko stated

"the Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded will use every means at its disposal to make its opposition to Ontario government action in Goderich, Timmins and Burwash,<sup>116</sup> situations known and felt, but were anxious to re-open lines of communication with government if we can be assured that it will involve a two-way dialogue."<sup>117</sup>

It is important to note, here, the unprecedented attack which the O.A.M.R. Board was making on the government. It would have been one thing to publicly disagree with the government policy. It is considerably stronger to

attack Ministers and to threaten to work to defeat them in subsequent elections. This move is a complete break with O.A.M.R.'s non-partisan stance. There is some evidence to suggest that one Vice-President, Dr. Christie of the Association, had personal political ambitions which may have had some impact at this juncture.<sup>118</sup> He was entertaining thoughts of running for the Provincial Liberal Party. Dr. Christie went so far as to suggest to Ministry staff that he would likely be the next Minister of Community and Social Services.<sup>119</sup> While it is virtually impossible to document personal motivations, it is difficult to believe that personal ambitions were not a factor in O.A.M.R.'s unprecedented confrontational approach during this time.

O.A.M.R. set out to mobilize the membership in a concerted action to oppose this type of development and in so doing, initiated a strategy of confrontations which was unheard-of to this point in O.A.M.R. history. O.A.M.R. received considerable but not unanimous support for their stand. There continued to be many in the Movement who stood to benefit from the development of smaller facilities which meant that their children could live better lives under close supervision but not at home.<sup>120</sup> The Resource Centre concept then had some appeal in several areas especially in the North where the resources were few.

The controversy raged as the Resource Centre at Timmins was announced in February and the Ministry created a Schedule I facility at Goderich in the face of opposition from the local Working Group.

The Ministry continued to insist that there was no deviation from the original plans either to deinstitutionalize or to support local planning. The Ministry was forced to defend itself again and again and to reiterate its stand respecting the use of the facilities as resource centres.<sup>121</sup>

The controversy continued to boil for several months coming to a head at the O.A.M.R. annual meeting in April '76 at which the Minister of Community and Social Services, Mr. Taylor, had agreed to be the guest speaker. At that time the outgoing President of the association and several prominent



members of the Board proceeded to publicly vilify the Minister and accuse his staff of incompetence and deceit. This action was highly publicized and the remnants of the ties with the government were completely destroyed.<sup>122</sup>

After the April meeting the controversy respecting the Resource Centres gradually petered out and the day to day business of service expansion among the local associations began to take precedence over higher profile policy issues. The Association leadership and Ministry officials began to change in 1977/78 and the impact of the rupture diminished somewhat.

It is clear that after the transfer took place many senior Ministry officials felt that the political direction of rapid expansion of community services and the deemphasis of the institutions was running into major problems. The largest of these problems was the poor administrative structures and inexperience of most of the local associations for the mentally retarded. The associations were expected to be the backbone of the expansion of community services yet they had very few of the skills required to develop those services. At the same time there was an ideological polarization between "community" services and "institutional" services. O.A.M.R. furthered this polarization undermining its support both from government and its own membership.

Senior officials in the Ministry of Community and Social Services began to realize very quickly after the transfer that there was a major vacuum in direction for the facilities and potential for their reorientation toward a community services base. This was very appealing at a time when the delivery capabilities of the parent associations seemed to be faltering and it looked like much of the money allocated to community services would go unspent.<sup>123</sup>

The promotion, however, of Resources Centres was unfortunate and ill-timed. It was inept because there was inadequate groundwork laid with the Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded. Moreover, the promotion of an institutional form of care was clearly distant from any possibility of consensus in the Parents' Movement. The anti-institutional wing of the

Movement were at their strongest completely submerging the wishes of the pro-institutional parents.

The Ongwanada development, in Kingston served to polarize the Resource Centres issue. Ministry moves were seen to be ham-handed decision-making with very little support.

The decision of the government to transfer two psychiatric facilities from the Ministry of Health to be operated as mental retardation facilities was nothing short of disastrous. It could not have happened at a worse time in that the relationship between O.A.M.R. and the Ministry was at its lowest ebb. It was an example of political necessity which could not be justified or rationalized within the community living policy direction.

### Epilogue

Since the Ministry of Community and Social Services assumed responsibility for the service system for the mentally retarded, there has been a large scale expansion of community based programs serving the mentally retarded, children and adults. The group home system has grown from 700 in 1974 to over 3,000 in 1982. The sheltered workshop/employment training system expanded from 3,500 places in 1974 to slightly over 10,000 places in 1982. In addition, a wide range of new programs have set in place including a variety of family support programs. The overall community services budget for the mentally retarded has expanded from \$10,000,000 in 1974 to \$150,000,000 in 1982/83.

In the institutional system there have been continuing efforts to scale down the largest facilities. M.C.S.S. inherited 8,002 beds in the institutional system from the Ministry of Health. By 1982 the number of beds in the facilities stood at 6,500. In all, over 4,000 residents of facilities were discharged to community settings. During that time though, large numbers of admissions, especially in the early years, limited the Ministry's capacity to close beds. Most of the closures were in the largest institutions including the Orillia facility which was reduced from 1,500 to 960 by 1982.

The relationship between the Ministry and Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded developed into a 'quasi cold war' after 1976. The Association maintained its ideological position after that time claiming that it was in the business of "protecting the interests of the mentally retarded" as opposed to their parents and local associations. The Ministry did consult with the Association on several programs which were initiated in the past 7 years. But this consultation has largely been confined to middle level civil servants with little substantive discussion and no negotiation with Cabinet Ministers.

In 1982, the Ministry created a highly controversial 5 year plan for services for the mentally retarded which involved the closing of 6 of the 27 institutions. This plan was developed without any consultation with the Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded and was leaked to the press only days before it was to be publicly announced. This 5 year plan reflected a new era of constraint in which the expansion of community services was directly dependent upon the reallocation of funds from the facilities being closed.

The Ontario Association for the Mentally Retarded has been highly critical of this plan as have many parents and the union representing the employees in the institutions. Notwithstanding the controversies the Ministry has implemented its 5 year plan and has completed a closure of four of the 6 institutions.

Most of the major personalities who were directly connected with the mental retardation movement and the Provincial administration in the last 30 years have now moved on to other responsibilities. William Davis continues his 13 years tenure as Premier of the Province at the head of a party which seems as firmly in power today as at any time during its 41 years history.

Robert Welch has continued as a senior Minister in the Davis government and Deputy Premier.

Dr. Dymond left politics in 1971 to return to private practice and has since retired.

Dr. Zarfes, after a brief tenure in 1974 as senior advisor on mental retardation to the Minister moved to joint responsibility as senior psychiatrist at the Children's

Psychiatric Research Institute and Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Western Ontario.

Since 1976 all of the senior officials in the mental retardation area in the Ministry of Community and Social Services have moved to other positions in the Government and in private sector. After the major breakdown in relationships between the Ministry and O.A.M.R. in 1976 the Developmental Services Division in the Ministry was gradually disbanded and subsumed within a variety of other operational entities within the Ministry.

Since 1976 another major force has asserted itself as a Mental Retardation interest group. That group calls itself the Advocacy Resource Center of the Handicapped, A.R.C.H. A.R.C.H. is a legal clinic which promotes the integration of handicapped people through the courts. The enshrinement of a Charter of Rights in the new Canadian Constitution provides increasing scope for the definition of legal rights through litigation. A.R.C.H. has emerged and in some ways challenged O.A.M.R. as a spokesman for mentally retarded people.

#### Summary of Developments During the 1970s

During the 1970s the policy respecting the care and supervision of mentally retarded people in Ontario changed dramatically once again. The growth and influence of the Parents' Movement in the 1960s deteriorated in later years in a malaise of dispute and acrimony. Questions of advocacy versus service delivery generated pervasive arguments in the provincial association accentuating the internal cleavage which had only begun to surface in the late 1960s.

In the mental retardation sector, the main change in policy was a shifting to the community living model with its concomitant shift of responsibility for administration and policy development to a single Ministry. This in some measure reflected an interest at the senior provincial levels for reorganization and administrative rationalization. It also reflected a growing concern about Ontario's fiscal position allowing the Province to capture a veritable gold mine of federal cost sharing dollars.

While community service development and expansion did take place in the 1970s, the assumption of responsibility for the M.R. system by the Ministry of Community and Social Services was certainly a mixed blessing. The administration of the Ministry stumbled very badly and made many mistakes. Notably absent during that transition was the skilled ministerial leadership, which had been noted in the Departments of Health and Education. The Ministers of Community and Social Services were never in the forefront of discussions with the private sector agencies and the Movement itself. Civil servants worked with O.A.M.R. in the absence of strong leadership. The tenor of the O.A.M.R./M.C.S.S. relationship was becoming antagonistic even before the "Resource Centres" controversy.

In considering the events of the 1970s, there seems to be an overriding enigma which begs analysis. How is it that the relationship between the Provincial government and O.A.M.R. deteriorated so dramatically at the very time when the government adopted, promoted and enriched the community living concept? This major reorientation of policy was undoubtedly the most important shift in the mental retardation sector in 100 years.

There are several obvious contributing factors such as the increasing ideological rigidity in O.A.M.R., the increasing internal debate in the Parents' Movement, the slowness and ineptitude of the Ministers of Community and Social Services and the specific points of contention such as needs-testing and the imposition of the Resource Centres. While it is tempting to accept these factors as sufficient explanation for the disruption of relations at a time of considerable success one cannot escape the nagging suspicion that there is some need to separate the symptoms from the causes.

Stepping back for a moment from the immediate events in the 1970s it is possible to identify patterns of interaction between the government and the Parents' Movement which may facilitate our understanding of what actually happened in more recent years. By the 1970s the Parents' Movement had been working for 20 years to decrease the burden of care on parents and to get public help for their handicapped children.

By 1970, then, the Parents' Movement was at its pinnacle of influence in the policy making process based on the classical accommodative/symbiotic model of policy development. There is no question that a rift was beginning to appear between the leadership, i.e. the O.A.M.R. board and the membership - the parents and the locals. But this rift was not significant enough to cause the disintegration of the Movement.

The public sector for its part was able to improve institutional and educational services and to begin funding a wider range of services offered by the parents' organizations.

Nineteen-seventy seems to be a watershed year in which the momentum shifted. Clearly, the promotion of Wolfensberger's ideological views was one factor in this change in the tide. The normalization philosophy was one part of this ideology which caused some parents considerable difficulty. It undermined their symbol of security -the institution. It must be remembered that the parents had recently won significant changes in the institutions. After the 'Blueprint' programming was improved and some smaller, less remote facilities were set up. The Parents' Movement sought better institutions - not their demise.

The expansion of community services would have been universally supported had it not had an anti-institutional overtone. The broad based support for the community service system would, on the face of it, appear to have provided such a strong base of common interest that both O.A.M.R. and the Province would have been able to overcome any technical or philosophical problems.

Unfortunately, the leadership went too far in their promotion of community services. They not only convinced Williston of the benefits of community living they also persuaded him that institutions were bad. In this, the executive launched out on their own. In so doing they began to seriously alienate a significant portion of their power base. Through 1973, however, they at least held on to the support of local affiliates through their pursuit of exclusive service mandate. Since the parents were part of the local associations the continued pursuit of the service mandate could at least offset their worries about the future of the institution. If worst came to worst and the institution reduced drastically the parents would at least have control of community services.



The advocacy position presented much bigger problems for the parents. Its proponents were suggesting that the parents get out of service at the very time when they were on the verge of an unprecedented infusion of public funding. It is not surprising, then, that this idea caused considerable division.

The adoption of the advocacy stance had the effect of divorcing O.A.M.R. from its power base - its constituents. At a time when the locals were pressing for ever-increasing ownership of services, O.A.M.R. took the view that the locals should be getting out of service delivery to become the watch-dogs in the system.

What we have emerging here is in fact the emergence of three separate lobby forces - the parents, the local associations and O.A.M.R. O.A.M.R. at first attempted to continue its role as the Federation of parents and locals but eventually accepted a distinct advocacy role which did not pretend to be responsible to either the locals or parents.

The advocacy role, thus, isolated O.A.M.R. from its original constituency. It could not mobilize the Parents' Movement to divest services. It, in fact, became a separate lobby group on its own. As the literature would predict O.A.M.R. then lost some of the currency required to participate in the policy-making process. It could not aggregate either interest or support for its central advocacy tenet so why would it be expected that O.A.M.R. could generate the support required in the policy-making sphere.

Feeling the vulnerability related to the loss of their power base the O.A.M.R. leadership became increasingly rigid and militant. This is reflected in their fixation on debt-retirement as a form of capitalization for the residences and their disgruntlement with the administration in the Ministry of Community and Social Services. By the time the Resource Centres policy was put forward, they had no room to negotiate.

In the Resource Centers controversy O.A.M.R. fell back on an ideological position when they were fully aware of the highly vulnerable position of the Ministry and the government. They had built their earlier successes on accommodation, collaboration, and compromise. When faced with their biggest challenge, their

ideological blinkers prevented them from seeing the enormous opportunity they had to wring further commitments and support from the Province. One wonders what concessions could have been negotiated from a government that felt its back was against the wall. One can easily see the government agreeing to all of their major service demands, debt-retirement, elimination of the admissions board to the schools, 100% funding for children's residences and a host of other provisions. Instead, they chose to publicly attack and threaten.

In the 1970s and 1980s several of the features of the newer approaches to policy development which originated in the 1960s appear to have held up. The incorporation of many diverse pressures into a single initiative, can be seen again and again in the case studies in this chapter. The "New Policy Focus" for example responded to multiple pressures - pressure for community services, pressure for increased provincial revenues, and the political need to respond to a high profile Royal Commission Report. There is every indication as well in these case studies that the politicians wished to continue their accommodative/symbiotic style of policy development.

Mr. Welch worked with O.A.M.R. in the elaboration of the community living policy. The Minister of Community and Social Services negotiated with O.A.M.R., albeit ineptly, around debt retirement and the Resource Centres. The Province invested considerable rhetoric and resources in the expansion community services. In short it would appear that the political administration was fulfilling its implied obligations within the accommodative/symbiotic process.

In summary, there seems to be little evidence of any significant shift in the policy making style of the province in the 1970s. There is considerable evidence, however, that O.A.M.R. opted out of that process when it undermined its own constituency support and, more importantly, when it challenged the basic rules of the game. The anatomy of this opting out process is presented in the next chapter.

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19. Interview - Nirje.
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121. Hansard - 3rd Session of 30th Parliament of Ontario - p. 442. March 16, 1976. See also Star article 5/1976.
122. Globe and Mail article January 27, 1976 and April 23, 1976.
123. In fact, analysis of M.C.S.S. budgets indicate an underexpenditure in the M.R. sector in fiscal years 1974/75 and 1975/76.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to draw together the major influences on the direction of policy in the Province of Ontario and look at the advocacy position within that perspective. Before proceeding to the conclusions and implications which might be drawn from this analysis, it is useful to recap some of the major features of political culture and policy development which have emerged in this study.

#### Political Culture

In reviewing the literature and the case studies there seems to emerge a fairly clear picture of the political culture which underpins social policy in Ontario. The values, attitudes and traditions of the society bias social policy in four main directions. These include:

- o concern that public assistance and benefits go to those who are truly deserving,
- o minimal provision - "enough to keep them from being in want",
- o the investment of resources in the promotion of independence and personal responsibility, "the curables", and
- o the private delivery of social services.

Beyond these value oriented characteristics there are some structural/organizational features of political culture which also have a normative influence. These include:

- o a strong public sector predisposition to tight fiscal control, and

- o constitutional relationship between the Federal government and the Province which enables the Government of Canada to use its superior economic powers to influence social policy.

In reflecting about the propensity toward tight fiscal control one can see how this feature can combine with others, discussed earlier, to the detriment of the social welfare system. If you have a jurisdiction which is strongly influenced by tight fiscal control, including issues like efficiency and effectiveness, as well as value orientations like the deserving poor and minimal support, one can see a kind of cumulative disadvantage for the whole social welfare sector. Even where there may be a certain benevolent concern for truly deserving people, that concern will be so submerged in the control ethos that it will be very difficult to extract resources for any social welfare cause, no matter how deserving.

In this study we have seen numerous examples of the struggle to extract resources for services for the mentally retarded. In fact, fiscal control has been so predominant that resources provided by the Province have been virtually always gained through reallocation or increased cost sharing with the Federal Government.

The relationship between the Provinces and the Government of Canada, as we have seen, is primarily a financial one in the social policy sphere. While the Federal authorities have acted in other ways to promote certain directions such as the 1964 Conference on Mental Retardation and the funding of the Toronto parents' school as a pilot project, they actually have highly limited control over policy direction. Even their attempts to influence Provincial policy through cost-sharing are a mixed blessing since Ontario tends to treat cost-sharing as a goal of policy-making often rivalling the program objective.

### **Political Culture - Perception Not Objective**

It would be neglectful not to point out that political culture is not a concrete concept, but rather one which is influenced by public perceptions. The 'deserving poor', for example, are not deserving by any objective standard. They must be established as deserving in the public mind. The Parents' Movement, clearly, recognized this dynamic in their earlier stages of development at least.

### The Parents' Movement and their Political Culture

Analysis of the Parents' Movement would suggest a high degree of complementarity between the Parents' Movement and their political cultural milieu in the years before 1970 and a rapid deterioration thereafter.

As the Eugenics movement began to die out, fears softened. At that point - circa 1950 - the coming together of the Parents' Movement introduced a whole new dimension to the mental retardation sector which brought it dramatically in line with Ontario's political culture.

The deserving poor theme, or the poor unfortunates, resurfaced again and again in these studies. The emergence of the Parents' Movement in the 1950s served to bring public attention to the needs of the mentally retarded. This group were seen to be deserving in the sense that they were not complicitous in their own misfortune. They were people who were afflicted by handicaps which they could not do anything about. In the words of Dr. Dymond, "You can't put a brain where there is none."

By focusing on the theme of education the Parents' Movement also associated their children with the societal bias toward investing in those that have potential for independence and personal responsibility - the "curables". During the 1920s and 1930s the directors of institutions, in their efforts to make those institutions self-sufficient, had identified potential for the mentally retarded, but that potential was still largely confined to an institutional colony base.

The advent of the Parents' Movement had both concrete and symbolic effects on this dimension of public attitudes. The concrete effects were the establishment of the schools and the demonstration of potential for training mentally retarded people. Education and training symbolized hope for independence and individual responsibility.

Perhaps more importantly, however, the parents shifted the public perception of the mentally retarded from individuals to families. Even if society did not truly expect the mentally retarded person to become independent and responsible, they could see that the Parents' Movement was a group that assumed responsibility for

themselves and their children. These people were taking the initiative, were establishing their schools, were seeking the same support from society that other families had, i.e. education.

Moreover, in the earlier years the support they were seeking was minimal. At that time they were not asking for community residences or community support services or the host of other demands which they presented in the 1970s. In the beginning, then, they aligned themselves very closely with the minimal support bias.

The parents also identified themselves very closely with the political cultural theme of the private delivery of social services. Before the Parents' Movement came together there was no vehicle for the provision of services to the mentally retarded outside the publicly operated institutions. The Movement, however, created a corporate base which provided a vehicle for the delivery of services.

The early experience of the Parents' Movement, then, blended to a considerable degree with all of the prevailing societal attitudes, values and traditions.

### **The Divergence for Mainstream Political Culture**

Over time, however, a number of factors shifted the Movement away from the mainstream of Ontario's political culture. In an ironic sense, their very successes contributed to that disintegration. After they had demonstrated early successes in their schools, they began to see other needs and to broaden their demands. Children who had been in the schools were now graduating and required services as adults. Improvements in programming in the institutions meant that some of the residents of those institutions were seen as candidates for community living. The more demands they presented the more they were asking for increased public resources and therefore moving away from the minimal support bias in the political culture. They began to seek public funding for community residences, public takeover of the school system, vocational rehabilitation programs, and other publicly funded supports. This is a shift away not only from minimal provision but also from the support for the deserving poor concept. It is one thing to seek help to relieve a family of the day-to-day burden of caring for handicapped family



members through the provision of a day program. It is quite another to demand full-time, publicly-funded support services and housing.

While the expansion of demands was stretching the capability of the Movement to align itself with mainstream political culture, they were able through the 1960s to maintain an uneasy relationship with that society because they were still essentially a self-help group which was creating its own services and promoting independence for families and children.

In the 1970s, however, the Parents' Movement, or more properly the federated corporation, O.A.M.R., began to adopt positions which divorced the Movement entirely from mainstream political culture. It will be recalled that O.A.M.R. assumed three strong ideological positions all proceeding from the Normalization hypothesis. These were:

- o the anti-institutional position,
- o the community service position, and
- o the advocacy position

The anti-institutional position may have had some negative effects but it did not directly challenge mainstream political culture.

The community service position suggests a certain escalation of demand which would imply more than minimal support. It would, therefore, represent a more significant divergence. These two positions, however, would be capable of rationalization because they would not, in themselves, represent a complete break from political culture. Moreover, they occurred, as Simmons has noted, in a time of growing public disillusionment with medical/psychiatric models of service.

Once these two position were linked with the advocacy position, however, the three combined to directly attack all of the main tenets of Ontario's mainstream political culture.

The advocacy stance of O.A.M.R. did not cast the mentally retarded as the deserving poor, but rather as a people who had a right to the same benefits, privileges and participation as everyone else. It was not seeking minimal support but full public support. It was not based on the private delivery of public services but on the right of all mentally retarded people to use the full range of generic services. Finally, it was not focused on the independence and personal responsibility theme. It was, rather, focused on the right of every individual, no matter how handicapped, to participate to the fullest of their capabilities. This implied an expenditure of considerably more resources on those who had no possibility of independence.

While one might see the gradual separation of the Parents' Movement from mainstream political culture, this separation, in and of itself, does not represent a full explanation of their ascendancy and decline in terms of their participation in the policy development process. In order to complete this picture, it will be necessary to link these phenomena with the actual relationship between the Parents' Movement and the political administration.

### **Shifting Models of Policy Development**

While the main features of political culture do not seem to have shifted much over time the policy development style of the political administration certainly did. As noted earlier that style moved from what was termed the 'siege warfare' style to a collaborative policy development model.

The 'siege warfare' policy model set government up as the target of lobbies. Successful policy grew out of massive pressure for change which broke down the resistance of the provincial coffers and captured the policy prize. In this policy style the initiative responded almost exclusively to single pressures for specific changes.

In this policy style the Ministers set themselves up as gatekeepers to the Treasury in the sense that they would judge the worthiness of the applicants for public funds. This policy development style isolated the provincial government from the interest groups rather than incorporating them in the policy process.

The new wave of politicians in the 1960s, notably Davis, Dymond and Welch, brought in a more sophisticated approach to policy making. Their approach differed from the earlier model in that it responded to a variety of demands in single policy initiatives, and incorporated the interest groups in the development of policy to a much larger extent.

The earlier politicians seemed to associate their political role with judgement as opposed to leadership. The new Ministers, however, assumed a much more facilitative stance. They were more the brokers among interests than the final recourse.

There is no question that the politicians continued to be the gatekeepers to public resources. However, the later Ministers managed to deemphasize the judgement role in favour of a facilitating one, thus partially deflecting their role as targets of lobbying in favour of a more neutral broker among interests.

When one refers back to the main findings in the literature respecting pressure group politics one can see quite clearly the emergence of the accommodative/symbiotic policy making model in Ontario in the 1960s. O.A.R.C./O.A.M.R. were intimately involved in the 'Blueprint' policy, the establishment of the Retarded Children's Education Authorities and the schools Integration initiative. The use of non-confrontational approaches, the 'symbiotic' relationship between leaders of the Movement and public administrators, and 'selling' of accommodations to the membership are all clearly identifiable elements of the O.A.M.R./Provincial relationship prior to 1970.

It will be recalled that the literature highlights three motivational bases for the symbiotic relationship;

- o common interest,
- o mutual benefit, and
- o reinforcement of shared attitudes and values

During the 1950s and 1960s the common interest of the Parents' Movement and the political administrators was focused on service improvements - principally the

schools and the institutions. The parents were seeking "a little aid and encouragement to shoulder their heavy burden". The public administration wanted to relieve the parents of the need for charity drives. Parents and bureaucrats came together around services.

As the symbiotic relationship evolved services also became a vehicle through which the government could provide one of the benefits O.A.M.R. required to continue to participate in the policy process. In addition to other benefits such as legitimization and access, the political administration also supplied the financial resources which allowed the schools - the services - to expand. In turn the Movement supported the government, aggregated demand, and disciplined its membership.

The operation of services also contributed to the shared values criterion for participation in symbiotic process. Services helped link the parents closely with the self-help, private delivery and independence themes of political culture.

The adoption of the advocacy position, by attacking the service delivery function, struck at one of the main supports of the symbiotic process. It threatened a common interest of the process as well as the major vehicle through which government could convey benefits on the Movement. More importantly, the advocacy position, by rejecting the main feature of Ontario political culture undermined the shared value base which is intrinsic to the symbiotic style of policy development.

What becomes clear, here, is the critical nature of the relationship between the interest group and its political/cultural surroundings. The policy-making process, because it is culturally normative, will allow interest groups who are aligned with mainstream political culture to participate in the formulation of policy. It will exclude those groups who challenge that culture.

On balance, then, the advocacy position represented a direct challenge to the symbiotic policy-making style by undermining the common interests of the actors and the medium of mutual benefit and the shared value base which underlies the symbiotic process.

As we survey the results of this study it is obvious that Wolfensberger's analysis of the limitations of service delivery has been to some degree upheld. In the case studies we find evidence that the direct delivery of services by the parent organizations did lead to goal displacement, the creation of segregated services and co-optation by the public administration. Wolfensberger's criticism, then, is well founded.

Yet, when we examine the Parents' Movement in the context of Ontario's political culture and policy making process we can appreciate some of the benefits of the service base of the Parents' Movement.

On reviewing the evidence, one might cautiously conclude that if purity of goals were the main concern of the interest group the advocacy position would be undoubtedly preferable. If, however, the group's prime concern was influence on policy direction the advocacy position would be highly dysfunctional.

### **Implications for Social Policy in Ontario**

The symbiotic model of policy development presents a very tall order to any interest group. They must be aligned with the political culture, they must be able to generate some political capital, they must have leaders who are skillful in using that political capital to eke out accommodations with the political administration, and they must accept that the benefits they derive from these tradeoffs will always be considerably less than their ambitions.

Those who cannot accept these rules of the game will not be able to participate directly in the development of social policy. Failing this, they will be dependent upon the goodwill and benevolence of the politicians and their political culture. As we have seen, the orientation of the political culture toward minimal provision and the political manifestation of that, i.e., strong fiscal control, will mean that those who cannot participate in the policy development process will receive very little in terms of government resources.

It is not surprising, then, that though Ontario is the most affluent of the Canadian provinces, it has very low income maintenance rates. Ontario has been criticized

in recent reports for income maintenance rates which are the second-lowest of all the provinces in Canada. Social assistance recipients are dramatically at odds with the prevailing political culture, and do not have the political capital to offer in order to gain access to the policy making process.

On the other hand, there are groups of people who can be identified with considerable latent potential and who could, if organized, gain access that they do not now have. The physically disabled community in the Province has been splintered into a large number of subgroups, with narrow interest focused on their own disability types. For example, those with spinal cord injuries, cerebral palsy, hearing impairments, cystic fibrosis, blindness, and so forth, have all established their own organizations. If these organizations were to band together in some form of umbrella group they would have considerable potential to enhance their collective political position.

Similarly, the aged represent a constituency which possesses considerable latent political capital which has not been effectively channelled to access the policy making process.

Because the potential influence of the physically disabled and the aged has not been effectively channelled, these two groups are still well behind the mentally retarded in terms of community services. The preponderance of service for both these groups is still incorporated in an institutional model of service, such as Homes for the Aged, Nursing Homes and Chronic Hospitals. The Parents' Movement for the mentally retarded, on the other hand, has succeeded in moving a considerable distance in shifting the service model from the institutional base to a community services base.

Another group that are severely disadvantaged by this policy making style are the psychiatric patients who have very little political capital and who therefore have been relegated to psychiatric hospitals with very little in the way of community services.



### The Eschewance of Rights

Another feature of the Ontario policy making model which is of particular interest is the virtual total absence of an orientation toward rights. The political culture in Ontario and the political style of the administration seem antithetical to a rights orientation. The Parents' Movement was successful when it sought assistance through political action. It was relegated to a bystander role when it assumed a rights orientation based on an ideological position. This eschewance of a rights orientation favours those who can marshal and channel political capital and makes it all the more difficult for those who cannot generate such support. One can see this resistance to extension of rights in many Ontario political positions. For example, the Province has been under pressure for many years to offer francophone citizens their right to services in French. The Province has consistently resisted the extension of such rights, but has at the same time implemented wide ranging program changes which provided more services in the French language.

This apparent resistance to the extension of rights is particularly interesting in the light of the enshrinement of the Charter of Rights in the new Canadian Constitution. In the future, one can see a pervasive change coming in this Province as certain prerogatives are taken from politicians and defined by the courts. This change would on the surface at least run counter to the values and attitudes of not only the politicians but all those who participate in the policy making process.

The Charter may undermine the symbiotic style of policy development and to give the advocacy oriented interest groups more leverage. They will be able to circumvent the political policy making process in favour of putting their case before the courts. Given the level of entrenchment of the political administration in the Province, however, it is unlikely that this shift to a rights orientation will come quickly. It is also possible that the human rights issues will become another set of variables in the policy process rather than an alternative to that process. The possibility of recourse to "reasonableness" in the Constitution may become the relief valve which maintains the integrity of the policy process.

### The Last Word

It is very tempting to comment on the apparent motivation and morality of this type of political system. The Provincial Government in Ontario is often criticized for its apparent lack of commitment to social policy. That criticism is largely based in the social welfare sector, which sees the successive administrations in the Province more devoted to continued rule than to any specific program or ideology. The evidence in this study would strongly support the position that the government and society of Ontario have no particular goals or missions with respect to people who suffer physical, mental or economic disadvantage.

There is undoubtedly another side to this argument which sees the Provincial Government as an effective broker among interest in society. The longevity of the Progressive Conservative Party in the Province would strongly suggest that the people in this jurisdiction support the 'broker' stance. By implication this means that there is a broad resistance in Ontario society to government action which 'leads'. Clearly this means that the people of Ontario do not want a government that is perceived as telling the populace how to live or how to behave beyond the minimum which is absolutely necessary to eliminate the worst abuses.

Perhaps this pervasive orientation is best captured in the British North America Act, which served as the Canadian Constitution through 116 years. Whereas the American Constitution underlined individual rights in terms of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, the Canadian documents highlight the expectations of Canadian society in terms of "peace, order and good government".

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